

**JPRS 70026**

**3 December 1990**

# **West Europe Report**

**No. 1003**



**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**

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3 December 1980

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No. 1663

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## ARMAMENT ADVISER GIVES OPINION ON ARMS COOPERATION

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 80 pp 25-41

[Article by Marc Cauchie: "International Cooperation in the Field of Armaments"]

[Text] The problems created by the armament industries are now very sensitive, as a number of recent events have indicated and in particular the meeting held in Brussels from 15 to 17 October 1979 by the WEU [Western European Union] Assembly.

The Armament Engineer General Cauchie, who is the armament adviser of the French delegation to the North Atlantic Council and France's regular delegate to the WEU's Standing Armament Committee made a very remarkable speech at this meeting on "the prospective status of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the European system." He expressed his opinion here in this difficult field.

We find such terms as standing armament committee, tripartism, quadripartism, Independent European Program Group, CDNA [National Conference of Armament Directors], Eurogroup, etc.

An avalanche of titles which has overwhelmed the reader for 25 years, when the more and more generalized use of abbreviations such as PINABEL [expansion unknown] or TAD [Transatlantic Dialogue] do not add to the confusion. This multiplicity of organizations has a dual significance: international cooperation in armaments which all these organizations are attempting to promote is extremely important and faces many problems.

Consequently, we are going to try to rediscover it together in the following pages, according to many authors more qualified than myself.

The field of armaments remained national for a long time in most of the industrially developed countries. In other countries, the only foreign contributions were purchases. These purchases abroad have increased considerably since the Second World War II, in part with the Third World becoming independent and the need of these new countries to provide for their security.



Besides this, there developed in the last 20 years a new form called "international cooperation in the field of armaments," which involves the participation of two or more countries in the joint implementation of a common armament program, meeting a mutual military need with the pooling of funds and industrial and technological facilities.

## 1. Background

### Motivations

Instituted sometimes because of foresight and a decisive political aim as by Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle, in the case of Franco-German cooperation, economic-budgetary research also led countries to cooperate: the initial period of armaments which were relatively simple, not very diversified and only became obsolete very slowly, is over. Technological progress, which has been revolutionizing the world the last 30 years, demands especially diversification and constant modernization of weapons and armament systems. Formerly, weapons such as the famous 75 cannon were simple, produced in large numbers and useful for half a century. Now weapons have become very sophisticated; their development, which is more and more expensive in absolute value, also represents an increasing percentage of the cost of production, all the more so since high prices and rapid obsolescence require limitation to small series production. In addition, rates of replacement are such that a new weapon is hardly introduced before it is necessary to study it or its successors. This leads to armament programs with multiplicity, complexity and increasing costs and development expenses, added to the total of weapons necessary, become progressively prohibitive in almost all countries and the United States itself will no longer be spared.

### Accomplishments

France has carried out bilateral international armament programs:

With the German Federal Republic, Transall transport plane, Roland ground-air system, Milan and Hot antitank missiles, Ratac fire control radar, Alphajet planes;

With the United Kingdom, Martel air-ground missile, Jaguar training and tactical support plane, Puma SA.330, Gazelle SA.341 and Lynx WG.13 helicopters, coproduction of the Execet MM.38.

With Belgium, RITA [Integrated Front Transmission System] and production of the Mirage 5

Likewise France is cooperating multilaterally in:

The NADGE air alert and defense system with all the Atlantic Alliance;

The Breguet Atlantic sea patrol plane with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Italy;

The Paris sonar with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands;

The VCL [Combat and Communications Vehicle] with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: cooperation ordered after development;

A mine sweeper with Belgium and the Netherlands.

There is finally the example of what is now called "dual production," that is without participation in development: the ground-air Hawk missile, European production under American license, with the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium; then in 1974, the improved Hawk with only partial production in Europe, with the same countries, with the addition of Denmark and Greece.

Of course, cooperation is not France's privilege; we mention among the projects in which France has not participated:

In cooperation since development: the MRCA combat plane (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom); the 155 howitzer, FH.70 tractor unit, and 155 SP.70 self propelled unit (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom);

In cooperation "dual production" by a European production consortium, under American license: the P.104 plane (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands); the air-air Sidewinder missile (majority of NATO countries); the Bullpup missile (part of the NATO countries)

### Summary

Cooperation in the field of weapons appears very selective from a geographic standpoint: it was created and developed around western countries, which customarily produced weapons and had for that reason a comparatively advanced technology, mainly: France, Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, despite an excellent industrial base, are handicapped in cooperating because of their traditions of neutrality.

Despite numerous exchanges of information, which, moreover, are very productive, cooperation with the United States in the complete and "equal" sense of the word, has not made itself felt, because of its too disproportionate size compared with each one of the European countries taken individually and also because of obvious and understandable American unwillingness to depend on geographically remote countries for its security. The various attempts at cooperation

between the United States and a European country have always been offset by failures: two successive projects for the German-American tank, the Mallard project with the United Kingdom, the "transatlantic" case of the Roland, will only be, assuming the best, acquiring a license and that of the Harrier, exceptionally, an American purchase of 100 planes.

The summary of this first generation of cooperation can be outlined in several aspects.

Operationally, the general recourse to a compromise of various operational needs leads to the sacrifice of the optimum achievement of each national need, when it does not lead, by superimposition of all specifications, to a monster whose price causes the abandonment of the project, as in the case of the Franco-German-Italian VCL. On the other hand, cooperation has the very great advantage of interchangeability (through standardization).

Economically, for development, the increase of expenses due to complexities, delays and duplications, is compensated for by sharing costs. One can thus anticipate, in bilateral cooperation, a moderate profit, which, far from being insignificant, is not, however, in itself a determining factor. On the production level, the gain as a result of series production is still less substantial, also taking into account duplications allowed. Finally for the whole, the often obvious differences in schedules can make joint financing difficult.

Cost planning and employment of labor: cooperation has an overall zero effect in this field, since for a dual bilateral production, each country produces 50 percent. This result becomes unfavorable when the cooperating country has a domestic policy discouraging exports. Half of the exports made by France under its political responsibility alone return, nevertheless, to the industry of each non-exporting cooperating country, while this cooperating industry would not have exported domestic production. This eventuality would become catastrophic and hence inadmissible, if the cooperating country succeeded in opposing exports.

Technological budgetary capacities: Europe as a whole has the necessary technological bases. Their development and especially their competitive maintenance depend solely on the budgets which Europe can devote to them. For the individual armament development budgets of the European countries vary roughly between a thousandth and a quarter of the corresponding U.S. budget and the sum of all the European development budgets is about 60 percent of the same American budget. In fact, the United States has sizeable and mutually related development budgets of powerful competitive industries; this allows it a policy of industrial competition on the development level, hence an increase of corresponding expenditures. In addition, their



"world involvement" forces them to design a more extensive range of armaments than those necessary for Europe, as well as systems more resistant to extreme climatic conditions (see the additional Roland tests in Alaska). The total of these expenditure factors, obviously impossible to calculate, thus leads to considering the total figures of the United States development budget as clearly higher than that necessary for Europe to cover the development of its defense. If, taken individually, each European country can only partially cover, at best, defense development funds and only for the richest among them, on the other hand, through intensive cooperation and eliminating duplications (as provided for in the GIEP /Independent European Program Group/ Charter), Europe would have the financial means to cover technologically the range of its defense development needs. There is where the major interest of European cooperation in armaments rests.

The results of European cooperation, which were not too obvious at the beginning are a guarantee for us that Europe, if it makes a political choice, can successfully continue in this direction and assure the means for its security.

## II French Position

As we have seen, France has played a significant role in European cooperation. Consequently it will have an influence on the development of this cooperation. Also before coming to the latter, it seemed indispensable to me to analyze the French position, all the more so since this analysis, in practice, should not be separated from that of its main partners.

France bases its policy on freedom and national sovereignty which imply that each country freely makes its choices and decisions, which automatically involves, as long as there will be danger on the international level, the principle of independent national defense (this idea of sovereignty is not at all synonymous with isolationism). National defense now includes all aspects of a country's life and extends far beyond the jurisdiction of the ministry of defense. But the latter plays a vital role in it, since it sees to it that the chief of state, the commander in chief, has in his hands the independent instrument necessary for the policy of freedom and independence which the French have chosen democratically. Consequently the minister of defense must be careful to protect the independence of this medium, that is his armament. To assure the effectiveness of its defense, France follows a policy of actual costs in its equipment budget. Despite this important effort authorized, the inordinate and uncontrollable increase of unit costs due to increasing sophistication, offers no hope of a considerable increase of series or rapid replacements.

The survival of technologies and industrial facilities necessary for the instrument to preserve an independent base requires both sharing



the costs of development (for technology) and increasing series (for industrial facilities). The two means are respectively cooperation and exports, the latter, of course, respecting the United Nations Charter and the right of peoples to purchase weapons to defend themselves, but also disarmament efforts, in particular, the initiatives of the president of the republic. Consequently cooperation and exports appear not as opposed to each other, but complementing each other and both are also indispensable to our security weapon. That is why France maintains a balance between them. Of course, the standards of application for cooperation and exports must see to it that the latter do not threaten precisely the independence which is the main reason for their existence. However, it should be pointed out that cooperation and exports can be justified for many other reasons besides sharing development costs and increasing series production.

### III European Cooperation

#### European Capacities

Like France, the European countries are devoted to their freedom and consequently to their independence. In the field of armaments we have seen at the conclusion of paragraph I that only European cooperation can provide and maintain for Europe the financing for the technological capacities to cover most of its needs and survive in all the indispensable strongholds. The only alternative to this European cooperation is purchase from the United States, each European country keeping national strongholds, according to its means, moreover, possibly competing from one country to another.

Certainly all the European countries have been more or less extensively supplied with armaments by the United States, without this endangering European technology until now. But if we add to all these new factors, constantly more advanced and developing technology, defense budgets under the pressure of inflation and economic crisis, increased American competition due to the same difficult economic conditions, it is certain that if European industry is not rationalized and supported by international European cooperation and if all the European countries, united, do not grant it a "European preference," the process of purchasing in the United States will become irreversible. Beginning with the countries with a small scale armaments industry, it will finally reach the major sectors (hence decisive for independence) of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France. At first, in exchange for the Europeans abandoning their strongholds, these purchases in the United States would take place in the form of acquiring a license with European production. But once European technology is dismantled (with disastrous repercussions for European civilian industry, for the latter is supported by the advanced military technology), the aggravation of the

economic crisis and certain restrictions on the transfer of armaments to the Third World could lead to the United States not even authorizing licenses anymore, but selling American production directly to a Europe which would no longer be competitive.

The fact that all belong to the Atlantic Alliance absolutely does not prevent this economic competition of Europe with the United States in the field of armaments, no more than anyone would consider preventing, in the name of the same alliance, this competition in the civilian field for the benefit of the American civilian industry.\* Quite to the contrary, the alliance needs a healthy Europe, and Europe will have a healthy economy which includes the defense establishment. Consequently, it is quite understandable no longer in the best interest of the United States to impose their armament industry on the ruins of European industry.

Finally, if this idea is not yet shared by all European governments, examples, some of which are recent, confirm the need not to place our society, both national as well as European, at the mercy of an embargo, if the higher interests of the United States should lead them to it. In view of the lessons of history, Europe cannot accept, even in the hope of a possible better utilization of resources, letting its defense industry be jeopardized, but on the contrary, it is obliged to maintain its capacities, both technological as well as the necessary production for its defense.

The rationalization of the European armament industry cannot actually be obtained by national specializations such as: tanks in the Federal Republic of Germany, planes in France, electronics in the Netherlands, ships in the United Kingdom, missiles in Italy, and light weapons in Belgium. Europe's political and economic situation is positively not ready for the abandonment by any nation whatsoever of strongholds so vital for its defense, which confirms by the way the legitimate interest which these countries have in the independence of their defense establishment. Besides such specialization would risk leading to monopolies.

On the other hand, one of the possible forms of European rationalization by cooperation could be based on the principle of families applied to European industries; each partner thus retains access to

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\*The American legislator himself has voluntarily increased protectionism in the field of armaments since the rates of the Buy American Act ("American Preference") of 6 to 12 percent for civilian industry, have been increased to the exorbitant rate of 50 percent to protect the American armament industry against the European allies. It is only with the union of Europe in GIEP that we have seen opportunities for exemptions appear: Culver-Nunn amendments and various bilateral agreements.

technology. A good example is the quadripartite agreement on helicopters, uniting all the European countries with a helicopter industry, and sharing the total range according to the proximity of the various national schedules for replacing equipment: light helicopter (Federal Republic of Germany with France), medium transport helicopter (France), heavy helicopter (United Kingdom with Italy). A similar formula succeeded fully in the first generation of helicopters among the independent European helicopter producers of the time, for the Lynx WG.13, entrusted to the United Kingdom and for the Gazelle (SA.341) assigned to France, with alternate participation from one country to the other.

## **GIEP**

It is essential to organize European armament cooperation rationally for all these reasons of technological, economic and political security. This realization led the 12 European countries which belong to the Atlantic Alliance to create GIEP at the beginning of 1976, whose charter, signed on 2 February 1976 in Rome by the secretaries of state, declares that the objective of this improved cooperation in Europe is:

To facilitate the effective use of financial resources assigned to research, development and the purchase of equipment;

To increase standardization and interchange ability of equipment, which will also facilitate cooperation in the fields of logistics and training;

To insure the maintenance of a healthy European technological and industrial base in the field of defense;

To increase at the same time European influence in its relations with the United States and Canada.

France attaches a great deal of importance to European cooperation and with its partners has consequently supported GIEP since its inception, whose independent nature and the objectives of the charter mentioned above, cover precisely the main aspects of all European cooperation, which I have pointed out in the summary of cooperations in the first generation at the end of paragraph I.

Of course, the "immediate interests" of the various European partners are not identical. For example: the "less industrialized countries in the field of armament" would like both to be free to get the United States and the European "big powers" to compete blow by blow to obtain better conditions and on the other hand get the latter to make sacrifices to help them to purchase or increase their armament



industry capacity, in the form of automatic compensations "without security," transfer of technology or even use of less expensive domestic labor.

In the same respect, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and France have recognized in GIEP's charter, "considering the legitimate interests of countries which do not have a sizeable armament industry..." but they expect in exchange the support of their European colleagues involved. It is the principle which France had adopted by the GIEP secretaries of state under the name of "European preference."

These basic differing positions are emphasized by other factors. We can say that to be effective, the direction of a European GIEP program will have to be based on one or several countries. (It is the idea of a "pilot country" studied by a special GIEP group). In practice, we notice the actual direction of most projects by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France, due to the almost exclusive financing of developments by these countries (more than 90 percent of European development credits). But it must be quite clear that it is not in competition with GIEP, but on the contrary as an effective executive supplement of the broadest European cooperation to which these tripartite projects must be opened extensively, according to GIEP's principles themselves. Moreover, the examples such as the tripartite mine sweeper which associates Belgium and the Netherlands, or such as MRCA or the 155 cannons which involve Italy, indicate very well that it is not a question of a deliberate policy and that all countries are welcome when they are ready to be committed financially without reservations in development projects. In particular, Italy has a strong armament industry with a high technological level. Not offering it the place it deserves in the production of European armament would amount to driving it towards American armament, which, considering Italian vitality, would create an Italo-American competition in Europe, which is definitely unfavorable to European technology.

Another of these factors can be American pressure which has offered in some NOU [expansion unknown] bilateral agreements recently concluded as the first part of their "transatlantic triad," attractive conditions for acquiring licenses, conditions which in the absence of a "European conscience," could have alienated some of our partners in European armament cooperation.

### European Exports

If European cooperation is the means of pooling financial and technological resources in order to create and maintain in Europe the indispensable development capacity for most defense needs, likewise, as we have already seen in the particular case of France, the total



volume of European armament markets is quite inferior to the capacities now existing in Europe without mentioning the complicating factor that the "less developed countries" are demanding the development of their own armament industry. This total volume of European markets cannot even assure the mere survival of armament industrial production capacities in Europe. If we want the European countries to have the industrial capacities for their defense and their security, then it must be supplemented with some exports outside of Europe.

Of course, as in the case of the French exports, which were made under the sole political responsibility of the exporting country, they should respect the Charter of the United Nations and the disarmament policies approved freely by all parties. Without export of European production, the technological independence acquired by Europe thanks to cooperation, would be meaningless for it would face an industry, which had lost a crucial portion of its production capacities. This is why, even if European cooperation is highly desirable, it can only be justified and accepted if each one of the European participants respects the sovereignty of its partners and accepts a relatively liberal policy about the latter's exports. For we now notice unfortunately, a lack of understanding by certain countries, with a domestic policy opposed to exports, which really is their own privilege, of allowing those cooperating with them to export when the latter are European. Such an attitude is all the less admissible for the exporting countries since the opponents have a smaller share and for this reason, in addition to the fact that they generally demand 100 percent compensation, do not contribute any advantage to cooperation, offsetting the loss of exports. Moreover, it would not seem fair on the part of these countries opposed to exports that they impose restrictions on their European partners, which they have not even attempted to bring up with the United States in the case, for example, of the F.16 market! And the height of inconsistency, the countries, which would refuse to participate in these European cooperations open to export, would only have as an alternative purchasing American equipment subject just as much to export.

Facing these great difficulties and these incompatible factors in Europe, it is clear that GIEP's creation must be considered indispensable and welcome, for this initial arrangement is the only one where the Europeans can come together and seek pragmatic solutions to insure all independence and the survival of their national defense system. Of course, pessimists would like to judge GIEP hastily by the tangible results of cooperation achieved in its 4 years of existence. But, on the other hand, on the date of its creation, all the opportunities of short and long term cooperation had been exhausted in other solutions (the most recent was the important tripartite mine sweeper program) and on the other hand, cooperation programs are not started every year, but in accordance with replacement

schedule needs and no program has been started either outside of GIEP since its creation. The important future programs are now in the incubation stage and they are now discussing in GIEP whether it will be for example, the future tactical combat plane, the antitank devices, the helicopters or air-air missiles.

Far from being affected by some people's pessimism, GIEP must fully play the role for which the European countries have created it and make concessions on both sides: in exchange for the "European preference" and a liberal policy on exports, the "countries less industrialized in armament production," will obtain from their European partners, the transfers of technology and the necessary compensations.

#### IV Transatlantic Dialogue

However, all the European development budgets, even well rationalized, will not be sufficient in the future to cover the entire range of armaments (of course, it involves the conventional weapons, France on its part continuing to insure domestically all the financing for its deterrent force to guarantee its absolute independence). The share of developments which cannot be covered in Europe will have to take place in the United States. Under these conditions, the transatlantic dialogue<sup>a</sup> appears as a complement of European development.

For this dialogue to develop in the best interests of the European countries, it consequently is necessary, after having organized European cooperation as we have seen above, to choose among the Europeans the strongholds which Europe is interested in maintaining on a priority basis (that is to say where it is indispensable to protect our defense systems) and those which, on the contrary, in view of its financial limitations, it decides to entrust to the United States. It is clear that a united Europe will have much more influence in its negotiations in this field with the United States. We saw in paragraph I that no European country has succeeded individually in cooperation with the United States. The fact is that GIEP's founders were foresighted in its fourth organizational objective of "increasing Europe's influence in its relations with the Americans."

Mr Callaghan's American theory of a big "transatlantic armament market" is unacceptable to Europe for it would prevent it from choosing independently the security fields where it intends to keep control.

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<sup>a</sup>For geographic reasons and similarities of industrial structures, Canada has been combined with the United States as opposed to Europe in the definition of "transatlantic dialogue." In fact, the difference in size of European countries with respect to the United States, which we said above was an obstacle to bilateral cooperation with it, operates in the same way for Canada, and we can say, to a certain extent, that in the "dialogue" with the United States, Canada could have a community of interests with the European countries.

On the other hand, Europe in the search for a transatlantic complement for its programs should unanimously seek an agreement with the Americans on a distribution of three types of equipment replacement schedules:

Developments assigned to Europe alone;

Developments assigned to the United States alone;

Parallel developments in Europe and the United States.

This last category is justified both by the considerable advantage of diversifying some weapons' systems to frustrate the counter measures of a potential enemy, as well as because it would not be practical to expect America to abandon the entire range which Europe would be capable of developing (as besides it is not realistic today for the Americans to believe the opposite). We have seen in paragraph I that the United States has a tendency to duplicate certain developments for the advantage of both inventive and financial competitiveness. The category of parallel developments in Europe and the United States could achieve the same objective where European development would replace one of the competitive American developments. It is obvious that equitable distribution for Europe of these three categories would require considerable European pressure, which will not have a chance of success, unless Europe has first succeeded in reaching an understanding in GIKP.

As in intraEuropean cooperation, the concept of "families" is valid and probably will encourage the development of a transatlantic distribution of responsibilities, allowing the parties not to abandon some technological strongpoints.

Once a distribution of the above type is obtained, Europe will then have to negotiate reciprocal guarantees according to the first two categories:

A pledge not to compete;

Agreements on the necessary licenses including:

Transfers of technology,

Free disposition in every case of national forces

A realistic export policy.

Regarding this last point, it must be well understood that it is not a question there of a desire to export from Europe equipment developed in the United States, but, quite legitimately of not seeing



the export of major European equipment compromised by a United States veto on a component or a duplicate because it was developed in the United States.

For example, a small American antitank missile, a plane, a ground-air missile like the Hawk, produced under American license in Europe, have never aroused an absolute need of reexport by European countries.

On the other hand, in the case of an American antitank missile on a vehicle, if Europe was forbidden to export it, it would prevent it from arming its helicopters or its ground vehicles for export, and consequently would deny Europe the practical right to export vehicles. Such a situation could only lead Europe not to acquire an American license under these conditions, to preserve its freedom to dispose of its own developments, as seems advisable.

Moreover, this concern is mutual, for it is difficult to see the United States not demanding the same guarantee for reexport for the programs which they would have agreed to entrust exclusively to Europe. Moreover, it is perhaps this "reciprocal" nature which will make it possible to get an acceptable solution from the United States.

## V Conclusion

European cooperation has proved its worth in the last two decades.

More than definite economies (however, not insignificant), it represents above all the opportunity to cover a considerable part of necessary developments with individually limited facilities and, in thus preventing the abandonment of vital strongholds for our defense policy, it is the only alternative to buy American.

GIEP was founded to make it possible to improve European armament. This improvement demands mutual sacrifices: transfer of technology and labor costs on the part of the "rich," in exchange for "European preference" and a realistic export attitude.

When GIEP will be able to speak with one voice and only then, "transatlantic dialogue" will be the rational counterpart to the European effort, by means of formal guarantees for transfer of technology and free disposal.

The guidelines, which are indispensable for western security facilities, seem simple to express, but they show in fact the two characteristics of international armament cooperation which I mentioned in my introduction:

Fundamental interest

Very great difficulties

This is what France, with all its partners, is interested in achieving to guarantee the freedom of the people involved.



## TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROVERSY VIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 80 pp 149-154

[Article by Gerard Vaillant]

[Text] On 3 May, our fifth missile launching nuclear submarine (SNAE), the Tonner, set out on its first patrol, thereby increasing our country's strategic strike capability by 16 megatons (1); the nation will now have three submarines in operation most of the time. This fact alone would be sufficient proof that France's military nuclear effort has not let up for the past 20 years. In addition, the first group of strategic missiles at the Albion Plateau is beginning to receive the S3 megaton-range missile, and in 1985 a sixth SNAE, l'Inflexible, will go into service as the first to be equipped with the M4 multiple-warhead nuclear system. Finally, four of the first SNAE's will later be modernized and will also receive the M4; this will mean a sixfold increase in the number of objectives susceptible of being treated by our strategic naval force.

It is also known, first, that the government is preparing to select a new element for our strategic nuclear force, probably in the form of a mobile ballistic missile, and second, that some of the Mirage IV aircraft will be updated to remain in service during the 1990's, as they will be equipped with the ASMP air to ground intermediate range nuclear missile, which will increase their range and reduce their vulnerability to enemy air defense.

Present planning also includes tactical nuclear weapons, with the extended-range Super Pluton being scheduled beginning in 1990. Furthermore, according to information which appeared (2) after Gen Mery, army chief of staff, appeared before the Assembly's National Defense Commission, the general is said to have admitted that the neutron bomb might correspond to certain defense needs, but he is supposed to have declared that there was no question of producing neutron bombs exclusively, and that there would be no change in the concept of French deterrence.

Notably, Gen Mery explained that "nuclear deterrence remains above all a dialogue with the enemy, so as not to have to use the nuclear weaponry (...). Once the neutron bomb has been used, nuclear threshold warfare would rapidly become uncontrollable." He added that "it is therefore a concept which is different from that of the American general staffs." (3)

This is an authoritative declaration, coming from someone who is the designated generalissimo, and who was the President's particular chief of staff. Such authority is needed, judging from the variety of views recently expressed on the same topic, notably by Gen Gallois on the one hand (4) and Sam Cohen and Marc Geneste on the other (5).

Samuel T. Cohen, an American atomic scientist often viewed as the father of enhanced radiation weapons, and Marc Geneste, retired colonel and former collaborator of the Military Applications branch of the AEC, have been conducting a relentless campaign for years, in the United States and France respectively, for adoption of the neutron bomb as a weapon which makes it possible to rehabilitate the use of tactical nuclear weapons, support for which they both feel is insufficient on both sides of the Atlantic.

After the first Soviet nuclear explosions of the 1950's, the Americans and Gen Eisenhower recognized that a substitute was needed for the mass retaliation to which they no longer had exclusive access, and which threatened to turn against them. They found this substitute in tactical nuclear weaponry, and they emplaced, mostly in FRG, some 7000 nuclear warheads of this type at storage sites to which they held the keys.

According to the defense concept then adopted for NATO, the alliance's conventional military forces were to serve as trip wire for the tactical nuclear warfare, in the event that they suffered aggression which threatened to engulf them.

While President Kennedy, urged by his advisers and notably by Mr McNamara, did not rescind this decision on emplacement, he did in fact abandon this concept of tactical nuclear warfare, because it seemed to him to lead inescapably to escalation of strategic nuclear exchange, ending with destruction of American and Soviet cities; instead, he adopted the concept of flexible response, which implied prolonged resistance on the part of the alliance's conventional forces, delaying as much as possible the accession to the fatal nuclear threshold. It must be said that at the time, the allies of the United States were apprehensive about a deluge of 7000 tactical nuclear weapons being lightheartedly launched, as they saw it, in NATO's fictional exercises, and that they were aware that this meant the destruction of their territory well before that of the aggressor. Therefore, except for France which then withdrew from NATO, they accepted gradual response even if it implied, for their conventional forces, the impossible mission of forward defense.

Gallois, Cohen, and Geneste concur in the opinion that this strategy is a delusion because it lends the potential enemy the courtesy of an attack conducted initially with conventional means, and reserves for the defender the privilege of choosing his time for recourse to nuclear fire. This goes against everything we may read in Soviet military writings, which all affirm the need, prior to any major military action, for destroying the enemy's nuclear vectors through massive and brutal strikes. Thus there is no doubt for either Gallois or Geneste that the aggressor will have the initiative of nuclear fire. After this initial postulate, which they share, they diverge radically.

For Cohen and Geneste, the nuclear war can and must be won, and this objective is within our reach thanks to the neutron bomb, while for Gallois it is lost beforehand. Gallois bases himself on a technological consideration, namely that today

it is possible, for the side which has the initiative of attack -- and in his view it will never be the case for NATO forces -- to disarm the enemy through very accurate preventive nuclear strikes, which would cause only limited if not zero damage to urban concentrations and which therefore would not justify recourse to strategic strikes. In this way, airfields, army posts, nuclear weapons storage depots, as well as the Pershings and Lances stationed on German territory would be eliminated outright: it is only then that the "red army" (sic) would go on the move, certain of victory. The only thing which would be certain to prevent it would be strategic nuclear forces, at least those which are invulnerable at present: the SNLE's.

According to Gen Gallois, it is a mistake to think that the Soviets might engage in conventional-type operations in Europe. They would then have to achieve concentrations which would alert the Westerners and would constitute, for the latter's nuclear weaponry, the objectives desired. It is therefore in vain that -- I quote-- "NATO is devoting money and men to the most improbable and even the most foolish of wars. Moscow is not in the habit of entering into such adventures." On the contrary, the real Soviet military doctrine would be as follows:

"Using surprise, to destroy at a distance, with accurate ballistic weapons, the enemy's combat means taken unaware at their stations;

Then to advance toward disarmed territories, occupy them, and install then maintain 'appropriate' conditions."

The author concludes that we must therefore modernize our strategic nuclear forces, which should boast 8 to 12 missile launching submarines, and develop a second category of deterrent strategic weapons which can be:

Either ballistic missiles in silos or buried deeper underground than at the Albion Plateau, so as to force the enemy wishing to destroy them to identify himself by using very powerful ground strikes, which would cause radioactive clouds very likely to be carried east by prevailing western winds;

Or carriers for ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

He feels that this latter solution is better than mobile ground missiles of the American MX type, because, on a territory and in an open society with high population densities, such as ours, the trajectory of such devices strikes him as problematic.

What then should be the function of short range nuclear forces? The author does not totally reject them, if only because the aggressor would be faced with the problem of their preventive destruction, and in any case, because he would be prevented from presenting himself in conventional arrays; but the author says that their use must be accompanied by strict constraints:

In his view, these are not battle weapons -- and Gen Gallois here aims explicitly at the term used by the President in his 1 June 1976 conference before the Institute for High National Defense Studies -- but deterrent weapons; the battle would be lost before it was begun; and "in view of their small numbers, they are



deterrent weapons only if linked to strategic forces whose use they would trigger; and also on condition that their deployment configuration remove them from simultaneous and preventive destruction";

They must be under the same command as the strategic weapons, that is, a political-military command;

To escape preventive destruction and remain deterrent, the French ANT (Tactical Nuclear Weapons) must be put into action by specialized light mobile units on permanent alert and totally distinct from conventional formations, divisions, air squadrons, which serve them today: this mixture of conventional organizations and nuclear fire, even of low intensity and short range, is no longer conceivable."

This being said, they must "be as numerous as allowed by the budget and by a territory whose available space is closely measured." Finally, weapons depots must be deep underground.

In the final analysis, what Gen Gallois disavows is not short range nuclear weaponry but tactical nuclear weaponry, and the use which some people want to make of it in warfare. And if he also condemns the enhanced radiation weapons, it is not because of their neutrons but because of the finality which supporters of this weapon assign to it: the finality of superartillery ammunition; it would have done wonders in the past against Hitler's Panzers. But today, in Europe, tank battles are over. Once again, let us not mistake one war for another!

No battle on sanctuary ground, and even less beyond its borders! Gen Gallois then goes on to condemn the future Super Pluton now under consideration: "The considerable extension of its range would ultimately threaten, from the national territory, an enemy whose aggression would not be aimed directly at us." Besides, Super Pluton or Pershing II, "the belief that they would counterbalance the Soviet SS20's is just in the mind's eye. No land based weapon can provide this balance. There can be no 'balance' between those who have the initiative of recourse to force, and those who are the target of this force."

It can be seen that these views are diametrically opposed to those of the authors of *Echec a la Guerre* (6). The writers, especially Marc Geneste who wrote the military portion, start from this question: what if deterrence failed? We would then be quickly reduced to the "all or nothing" dilemma: "all" being the use of strategic nuclear force in exchange for the guaranteed destruction of our own cities; or "nothing", in other words capitulation. Not that Geneste and Cohen disavow the existence of the strategic nuclear force; they want to retain its threat "in the background" but they want to achieve a more credible deterrent in the eyes of the enemy and prove to him that whatever he does, he shall not pass.

They claim that the enhanced radiation weapon provides the means for this defensive action. The nuclear warfare which so frightens Westerners becomes disastrous only for the attacker, whose armored equipment no longer protects him against neutrons; it is sufficient, and this can be done at little expense, for the defender to be sheltered 1.50 meters underground. A sort of Maginot line would thus have to be established, without flaw this time, and at a certain depth. In this shelter, the



defenders would maneuver the trajectory of enhanced radiation weapons, while the units sheltered underground until the moment of action would come out of their holes to destroy those of the enemy tanks which had managed to get through.

Both these theories can be faulted for excess. Gen Gallois is excessive in his condemnation of any tactical nuclear armament linked to maneuver forces. As was pointed out to him by Pierre Messmer during the 29 March colloquium at which the general was presenting his report, the dissociation of conventional forces and short range nuclear forces would deprive the latter of what is called "acquisition of objectives." This means the tactical procedure which generates enemy concentrations, tracks them, and identifies the zero point for the nuclear explosion at the optimum time. As long as nuclear forces lack a satellite system affording such instant identification, the symbiosis between nuclear power and the land forces which provide its environment and security will remain a necessity. Why do the major powers of the Warsaw Pact organically have such nuclear vectors? Similarly, longer range tactical nuclear weapons such as the ones launched by Jaguar, Mirage III E, and in a few years by Mirage 2000 ASMP, Super Pluton, are indispensable to assure what is known as interdiction, namely the destruction of objectives located at the enemy's rear, and particularly the mandatory transit points essential to the arrival of its reinforcements, its supplies, and its concentration of forces. The neutron weapon can be useful, in conjunction with the accuracy of the new systems, to handle such objectives in cases where agglomerations or certain infrastructures have to be spared.

Marc Geneste's theory is also excessive in another sense, not so much because it sees the enhanced radiation weapon as the miracle weapon which would rehabilitate nuclear battle, but because it advocates building a fortified position, unfortunately likely to be skirted by air, airborne, and naval actions. Theoretically his plan is very enticing, a "nuclear Verdun" where the armored aggressor would have the most difficult role, but there is some doubt that this aggressor would ever play along. The supporters of this concept argue that this is all to the good, as deterrence is then guaranteed! We do not believe this: the walls of this new Jericho would tumble from other blows in any case.

And then, where would this new Maginot line be drawn? What population of France or the Rhineland will accept being thus designated as the upcoming objective of the holocaust? And would it not be another mistake to thus signify to the enemy that beyond the nuclear boundary line he is in no danger? On the contrary, is it not more indicated to distribute ground or air nuclear vectors through the depth of the territory, and to give them a certain degree of invulnerability through mobility, so that if the aggressor wants to destroy them, he has to engage in frequent and powerful fire, which would then be hardly distinguishable from strategic strikes and would bring down on him, without any doubt this time, retaliation in kind?

In his report on the 1980 defense budget in the name of the Assembly's National Defense Commission (7), Jacques Cressard took a moderate stand in affirming our land forces' need for available equipment to match the threats which they would have to face. Faced with the threat of a powerful enemy having upset the allied forces, he expressed his fear of the inadequacy of our conventional means and continued: "The use of the tactical nuclear weapon then seems inevitable. Where it is concerned, the futile debate which tends to turn it into either a political or a battle weapon must stop. It cannot help but be both at the same time. It is

political by virtue of its nature and its power. But what discredit would attach to our deterrent policy if our tactical strike capability were to be ineffectual? It must therefore be militarily effective. Stopping the enemy, it can at the same time avoid recourse to the threatened use of our strategic nuclear force, except in answer to a threat of the same type."

The decision to use nuclear fire cannot arise out of a vacuum, nor can it be indefinitely postponed while pursuing a battle which would exhaust the nation's strength. To the political sphere belongs the fearsome decision and choice of the moment when the fateful threshold has to be crossed. To the military belongs the duty of doing battle efficiently.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Or about 1000 times the power of the explosion which destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.
2. LE MONDE 25 April 1980.
3. LE MONDE, *ibid.*
4. In his report to the colloquium organized by the periodical PARADOXES on 29 March 1980 and presided by Michel Debre, on France's military policy.
5. *Echec a la Guerre: the Neutron Bomb*, Ed. Cosernic, 1980.
6. See also DEFENSE NATIONALE December 1979, Marc Geneste's article: "From Anti-Cities to Anti-Forces".
7. Appendix No 54, Volume I - Defense: General Considerations - pp 156 ff.

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SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Oct 80 pp 45-57

[Article by Ship Captain Hubert Moineville: "Submarine Changes and Naval Strategy"]

[Text] The following article expresses only the personal opinion of its author, Ship Captain Moineville. He gives us his thoughts on the evolution of the submarine and the progress made by its natural enemies--surface vessels, airships, and other submarines--which leads him to an examination of a war that these two categories of mediums might indulge in. In this context, there are some basic asymmetries, not well known to nonspecialists. An SNLE [Missile Launching Nuclear Submarine] type submarine, which continually disappears, is practically nondetectable, if it is located in a sufficiently vast maritime area. A submarine that must be an offensive one, that is, an attack submarine, gives tell-tale indications and manifests its presence. It then becomes vulnerable.

Be that as it may, one must indeed agree with Captain Moineville that new fields are open to maritime strategy, even if one may debate this or that point in his explanation.

A relative newcomer on the scale of naval history, the submarine in a few decades has acquired major importance among those who participate in naval war. In a parallel way, its advent has stirred up strong reactions. At what point this course is today and what its strategic consequences are--such are the questions to which we would like to reply with some points.

On the one hand, the submarine has made giant strides; on the other, combat counter-measures between the submarine and its adversaries have continued to grow in breadth and complexity. During World War II it could be defeated only by a combination of naval and air means, capable of reducing its ease of operation and of engaging it in all the stages of its short life, on the stocks, in transit, on patrol, and at the time of its final attack, and yet it was only a submersible boat rather than a submarine. Today, the gamut of the means needed to realize this kind of combination is becoming broader and tomorrow it will take on gigantic proportions. We will try to draw up a picture of these adversaries of the submarine before being concerned with the development of a war under an air-sea dipter.

As for the submarine, itself, as a carrier, the main fact is the advent of nuclear propulsion. It releases the submarine from the necessity of fueling its propellant machinery in the open air. It gives it the kind of technical autonomy that frees it from the need of refueling and the duration of its sorties at sea is limited only by the endurance of the crew and by maintenance requirements. It has thus become a real submarine.

Having also a big reserve of power, it has become as rapid, and often more rapid, than surface vessels. This completely changes its strategic mobility and the means of combat against it. Through technical progress, it is capable of submergences of several hundreds of meters and consequently much more mobile in the third dimension.

Finally it is making progress in the matter of silent acoustics and later on we will see the very great military importance of this factor. It must again be specified that it is a question here of highly developed technologies that are costly and well guarded and that there is a great variance among the competitors in the race for silence.

Sensors have also been developed, which make it possible for submarines to be informed.

Still principally concentrated upon acoustics, these sensors doubtless are not the object of as spectacular a change as the carrier, but they are making progress in performance and diversity. Exploitation of the information that is perceived is improving to the point of opening up new perspectives.

Progress in detection is based on improvement of the processing of signals, on a more expert understanding of the diffusion of sound which, combined with the greater vertical mobility of the submarine, makes it possible to optimize monitoring conditions. These types of progress are also tied in with the advent of new types of very low frequency monitoring sonars, through the use of towed linear networks (TASS). Simultaneously, there is progress in the exploitation of these means, thanks to the development of techniques of analysis and of classification, based on the capabilities for calculation that one has available today.

There, too, there is a difference between the upper end of the range of the aptitude for detection of other submarines and the lower part of the gamut.

For this carrier, informed by its sensors, to become a fighter, it must have suitable weapons. Well, the submarine has suffered a long time from a real failing: the range of its weapons was very inferior to that of its means of detection.

Weapons that can be switched from one use to another have radically altered this state of things. Under their strategic form—the strategic sea-ground missile—these weapons supply a basic innovation: the sea becomes capable of striking directly at the heart of a land. Under their tactical form, they are the Subroc, SS.N.15 and 16, or SM 39, with ranges that are reckoned, or will be reckoned, in tens of nautical miles.



Along with nuclear propulsion, this doubtless is the most revolutionary new fact with respect to the submarine weapon. It revives the strategic role of fleets; it renders many tested AMS (antisubmarine) tactics null and void; and increases the complexity of the latter by introducing a factor that has to do with the conflict against its air adversary. It also introduces a new element of differentiation between the countries that can be equipped with such costly weapons, whether it is a question of the operational SNLE (nuclear submarine missile launcher--American equivalent: SSBN) or the SNA (nuclear pursuit submarine--American equivalent: SSN), and others.

It being a question of a tactical weapon, it poses a difficult political-military problem--that of the head to be placed on such weapons. Technically speaking, a nuclear charge is indispensable, but one can easily imagine the problems concerning conditions and decisions for use that it poses, at least as long as the world is in a state of "nuclear virginity."

Thus the submarine has become a formidable instrument of war. Does this mean that it can do anything and at all times? Not yet. If the submarine has freed itself of the need for air and from hand to hand combat, it is much more difficult to extricate itself from some other constraints that are militarily cumbersome, which are its vulnerability to attack, its difficulty in cooperating with other participants because of problems of transmission which are not easily resolved and which are very costly, and the inferiority of direct view which, in spite of everything, retains its means of elaborating a tactical situation and of interpreting it. With regard to other strategic "pawns," it also retains the drawback of not easily being able to lend itself to ostensible demonstrations of strength.

In order to fully evaluate the role of the submarine in naval strategy, it is not enough to analyze the technical progress realized by the expression of its greatest accomplishment, the highly developed SNA. Another phenomenon is that of the spread of the submarine weapon worldwide.

It is in fact impressive to ascertain that the number of nations that possess combatant submarines is much greater than during World War II, for example, and this will increase. The operational freedom of traditional naval craft will suffer from this.

Not all of these numerous submarines will have all of the new capabilities that we have just described. There will thus be a hierarchy with a great disparity, at the bottom of which diesel submarines equipped with torpedoes will continue to figure, whereas the summit will consist of super-silent submarines, with nuclear propulsion, equipped with missiles that can be switched from one use to another, or that can even be used in two different ways, more or less able to work in liaison with other air-naval elements.

Today's submarine thus thoroughly exploits the possibilities of the sea, politically international but technically not very penetrable. It can go everywhere for a long time, with formidable military capabilities both at the strategic level, where it constitutes the essential element for a second strike capability, and at the

tactical level. But it is very difficult to realize it in its finished form, and very expensive. Thus achievement of submarine capability is a very selective task.

On the other hand, submarine progress has resulted in progress on the part of its adversaries. The feature of the submarine being its secrecy, the main thing for the adversaries is to penetrate this. We will thus begin by discussing anti-submarine detection, and then we will examine the carriers, to determine their capacity for implementing the means of detection, and finally antisubmarine weapons.

With respect to the detection of submarines, let us first point out the obvious fact that diesel submarines are still subject to radar and visual detection each time that they have to surface any appendage whatsoever, like putting a schnorkel out into the water, recharging their batteries, using a periscope or radar. Orthodox means of detection thus retain their value in any situation where the adversary possesses such submarines; they consequently have some good days ahead of them.

More important, however, is the development of the detection of completely submerged submarines. It is always carried out on two, and only two, physical dimensions in connection with submarines: its magnetic field and above all the sounds that it radiates or reflects. As far as one can ascertain, it does not seem, as a matter of fact, that other phenomena can, in an intermediate period, be the object of an operational exploitation.

The process based on the exploitation of "magnetic anomalies" engendered by the submarine is experiencing, and probably will experience, some further progress, but its range will not go beyond the needs of classification, of tracking, and of the attack of a submarine, the first detection of which will have been provided by another means. Although limited, this function in other respects is important enough to require a parallel progress in the demagnetization of submarines.

One must dwell at greater length on the multiple forms that acoustic detection takes on at present. There is no spectacular scientific or technological penetration here, but the persistent effort that has been sustained in this field for so many long years, especially by the American navy, is bearing fruit little by little.

The active sonar is being perfected, specialized, and diversified. Big resurgence sonars or sonars that reflect on the bottom, and sonars hauled at great depth, all at low frequency, can attain a range of several tens of thousands of meters.

Passive monitoring at very low frequency is being greatly developed; but, to tell the truth, not much data concerning the operational efficacy is being passed along to the public. The American navy is contributing a great deal to its development, both in the form of monitoring lines that are hauled by surface ships or submarines, and in the form of fixed monitoring networks that are capable of supplying over great expanses some preliminary detection of noisy submarines. This form of detection is inseparable from a thorough knowledge of the sound wave spectra of the vessels to be detected and great means of analysis and classification of the detection obtained. It has already accelerated the race to silence, and it is probable that it will lead to what one may term the "acoustic war," along with the "electronics war," that is, a complex involvement of active countermeasures and of

passive countermeasures.

One can thus perhaps see the beginning of vast combinations of means capable in the long run of providing silence in specially equipped areas to submarines that would be noisy, either because of construction or tactical error. If these combinations should see the light of day some time, they will have cost a gigantic technical effort and financial means.

The possible carriers of these means of detection are the airplane and the surface vessel, which in this connection retain the qualifications and the faults that they have always had.

The advantage of the airplane is speed, the incomparable extent of its field of radar and optical detection. It is also capable of MAD (magnetic airborne detection--airborne detection of magnetic anomalies) but, penalized by the fact that it is completely out of the water, it can have access to acoustic detection only through the intermediary of costly buoys that necessarily are of limited capacity.

The surface vessel, astride the air/sea dioptra, has the advantages and the drawbacks of this situation. In part an air situation, it benefits from radio liaison that is suitable for communication with the other participants in the antisubmarine conflict and for the "natural" living conditions of its crew. In part submerged, it can obtain acoustic data in the area of the carrier ship, but this access is not optimal, because the instability of the surface and the slight submergence make it difficult to keep it silent, and force it to carry out burdensome hauling complications in order to choose a place for the submergence of its sonar.

A relative newcomer, the helicopter today is a good sonar carrier. In a stationary position, it can "dip," without causing the water to move; it thus is in favorable acoustic conditions. But its relatively limited carrying capacity prevents it from handling very big sonars. Nevertheless, it is prevalent on numerous medium and heavy tonnage ASM ships (ASM: antisubmarine; one also finds the American acronym, ASW: antisubmarine warfare).

Among carriers with ASM detection means, the submarine, itself, has made considerable progress. Since its adversary is in continuous submersion, and is subject only to a first acoustic detection, it is well placed to realize the latter in excellent conditions, because it is perfectly integrated in the carrier area. It, too, must have operational equipment and it must be very quiet. One thus witnesses here an operational performance and know-how contest between the pursuer and the pursued, with all the advantages that the winner can derive from them.

With respect to fixed monitoring sensors, the idea of a carrier is replaced by that of a network to be realized under good conditions of security and of exploitation.

Before leaving the subject of carriers-detectors, one must examine the advantages that could be offered with respect to this topic, the new weapons that we refer to as "nonconventional ships" (ships on an air cushion, with or without lateral keels, hydropters, etc.). It appears that no ASM experimentation with these ships has yet



been brought to public knowledge. After all, the ships in question are themselves far from having arrived at maturity. It is thus quite difficult to anticipate an eventual contribution from these weapons to the ASM contest. The advantage that one might expect from them seems to reside essentially in their speed, which could give the surface combatant that is pitted against the submarine a maneuverable superiority which it today has lost, provided that it has the characteristics of silence and of stability that a good acoustic detector needs. Perhaps one of these types of ships, for example the ship with lateral keels, will make a breakthrough in the future if it meets these conditions, but today nonconventional ships have not yet entered the lists of ASM combat.

The adversary of the submarine must be able to strike it. Therefore it must have weapons. The panoply still consists of short-range jet weapons, increasingly effective torpedoes launched by submarines, surface vessels or aircraft, and missiles that can be switched from one use to another, to which must be added fixed weapons consisting of mines that are also being perfected, or more complicated weapons like the American CAPTOR which releases an ASM torpedo in the path of a submarine in its vicinity.

The main innovation at the same time raises a question that has already been mentioned with respect to the submarine, itself: will the nuclear head which appears on the ASM weapons of certain countries become widespread? Assuredly realizable by any nation having a nuclear capability, it brings an answer to the formidable problem posed by the attack of submarines that have become rapid, because the increase in the dangerous volume of the weapon that is used could offset the increase in the uncertainty regarding the position of the target. Its use still depends on the political constraints that pertain to the nuclear weapon in general.

This examination of the development of the submarine and of its adversaries normally involves a study of the evolution of what we will call the "war under the air-sea dipter."

Today's combatants are far from where they were at the time of the last conflict that saw a war of this kind, World War II. No colonial or peripheral war has contributed information on the realities of their confrontation. The present era, however, brings to maritime nations partial experience in the matter of problems of detection because, in addition to the exercises, we are living in a regime of continuing tension at sea, with real operations of getting under way, of patrol, and of the return of the SNLE's, and one can exploit all possible opportunities to localize unknown submarines.

Nevertheless one would have to thoroughly consider the forms that a war under the dipter would assume now and in the future. To organize the latter, it is necessary to start from the three categories of missions that are the constants of war at sea. Political and technical vicissitudes only vary the quantity or the priorities, but not its basic nature. They are the attack and defense of national territories, the attack and defense of property at sea, the attack and defense of forces at sea.



Today submarines, if equipped with strategic missiles, can strike at the heart of enemy national territories. The adversary's possible defense can concern itself with either the missile or the submarine.

A detailed examination of antimissile defense is beyond the scope of this article. Let us remember only that no radical manifestation of a penetration of strategic ballistic missiles seems to be appearing in an intermediate period, since the latter are correctly equipped and sufficiently numerous.

On the contrary, possible undertakings by the adversary against the submarine, itself, are at the heart of our subject. What is its vulnerability in such undertakings?

The answer comes from the analysis that we have made of the capabilities of a present-day nuclear submarine, and from the characteristics of the mission of strategic dissuasion. The latter is a static mission, during which a submarine waits, hides, avoids all risks. It is thus silent and safe from passive detection. If it has sufficiently long-range missiles, its possible patrol areas are extensive enough to make its chances of being discovered by an active search practically nil. Its only moments of relative vulnerability are at the time of departure and arrival, when its ease of operation is limited. That is why two periods of activity must of necessity be surrounded with precaution.

Today the submarine thus appears in advance to be the victor in its mission of a strategic attack against an enemy national territory, but obviously one must ask oneself about the development of this position of strength. If the submarine's adversaries are numerous, operational, and judiciously complementary, they will be able in the long run to challenge the submarine, at least in the fixed or mobile areas where complex ASM systems will have been constituted.

This indicates that the security of the SNLE on patrol will depend a great deal on the range of its missiles. With a 6,000-nautical range, the greatest part of the oceans becomes a possible firing zone against any country. At the moment, one does not see how an effective search apparatus, even a future one, could be constituted on such a scale. With much more reduced ranges it might in time be otherwise, but the strategic missile benefits from a big lead.

On the other hand, one can imagine that the periods of departure and return offer certain opportunities for offensives. But it is fitting to make a very important comment here: during these particular periods the submarine is really not, or no longer is, on the dissuasive chess board: it is covered by the SNLE's that are on patrol. The matter thus concerns a relatively marginal process, one that most likely involves a crisis situation and nondeclared combat. For a nation that wishes to ensure the safety of the goings and comings of its SNLE's, a solution would be to reinforce the protection that it already provides for its movements, and perhaps to realize under the diopter, in the necessary areas, a complex ASM system of the type that we have referred to above. The adversary can evidently think of forcing this. There would then be a battle, and such battles for or against the freedom of operation of the SNLE's are conceivable but, once more, one

can hardly see how they could result in a pre-emptive first anti-forces strike that would disable at one stroke all of the adversary's means of a second strategic strike. This battle nevertheless merits consideration.

The attack and defense of property at sea formerly involved only merchant or fishing ships, and maritime history is full of the accounts of such battles. Today merchant ships have taken on considerable importance because of the volume of international trade and the dependence of numerous countries on this trade. In addition new equipment is appearing at sea; for example, all of the installations for research and the exploitation of marine resources, of which we have seen only the beginning. The nuclear attack submarine appears as a formidable threat to all of the above mentioned new equipment. Its mobility, together with the means of observation provided by the satellites which some countries now have, partially invalidate the evasion tactics which were a means of essential action against the former slow submarines.

In the attack phase, this same mobility permits it to present itself on the entire horizon of its objective and no longer only in the former sectors. This already considerably increases escort needs. The range of new submarine weapons makes it possible for the submarine to attack from far off, and makes it necessary to greatly increase the extent of protection.

The protection of maritime traffic from the SNA's thus requires gigantic means. This, together with the increasing dependence of numerous countries on this traffic, is today a major preoccupation of the naval strategist.

In the matter of protection of property, this is not the only one. In addition to the perfection of highly developed submarines, there is the proliferation of diesel submarines. Secondary nations can thus provide a threat to property at sea, even if they are far from enemy territory.

The atmosphere of perpetual crisis in which we live, aggravated by the appetites that have been revealed for appropriation of the sea, is thus another subject for hard thought.

However, the dependence of countries on the maritime transportation that we have just mentioned is not uniform. For example, it is very great for western countries and slight for the USSR. It is one of the major asymmetries that exist between the continental power and the chiefly maritime countries.

The attack and defense of forces at sea concern first of all that which has to do with SNLE missions. We will not return to this because this covers also the case of approach operations.

It is quite evident, however, that it is rather difficult, for the sole requirements of this account, to isolate the war under the diopter from the war above the diopter. We will therefore consider here the matter of a naval force attack on the open sea or a far-off outside operation and its defense.

A submarine attack against a naval force on the open sea includes many elements in common with an attack against merchant traffic. The differences are above all differences of degree.

Normally the naval force will be more rapid, more maneuverable, better equipped with acoustic means for war, self-defense, and counterattack than a merchant convoy. In particular, combat vessels will some day be equipped with the means of engaging submarine/surface missiles in flight.

If one can think that at present an SNA is superior in a duel with an average surface vessel, this superiority diminishes considerably, and can even be reversed, if the naval force that it attacks is conceived in such a way as to constitute a coherent and operational ASM system.

Nevertheless, in many cases the SNA will offer a possibility of attack from the weak against the strong, and reciprocally even a powerful naval force will always have to reckon with a submarine threat. With the proliferation of submarines, this becomes true even if it is a question of operations that concern only secondary nations. A landing, for example, will be increasingly less able to do without anti-submarine protection.

At the end of this rapid examination, it seems possible to conclude that the broadening of possibilities provided by the use of the third dimension opens some new domains to naval strategy and revives some of its orthodox problems.

Being able today to strike massively and directly at the heart of enemy territories, even with a second strike, thanks to the strategic missile on board the nuclear submarine, submarine forces henceforth play an immediate and determinant role with respect to world strategic balances.

The great threat of the nuclear attack submarine to merchant vessels dramatically imposes on nations that are dependent on merchant vessels the old problem of the protection of merchant traffic in time of war.

With respect to these two major themes, all aspects of naval warfare are affected by the development of submarine and anti-submarine warfare techniques. This development is one of the sectors where competition among maritime nations risks becoming the most acute.

If fixed monitoring systems prove their efficacy, one will perhaps see the emergence of an important new fact in naval strategy, a new form of "geographisation" of the naval war. By this we mean that the great freedom that fleets have always had in seeking each other out and in fighting against each other, no matter where in the oceans, will be curtailed because, militarily speaking, the sea will no longer be uniform.

## QUEBEC PAPERS COMMENT ON POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS

## Prime Minister's Decision Questioned

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 18 Oct 80 p A6

[Editorial by Marcel Adam]

[Text] Prime Minister Levesque has decided to extend his 4-year electoral mandate, which according to custom expires next month, by several months and perhaps even by as much as a year.

And this contrary to the provisions of the Quebecois Party program which requires that elections be legally held every 4 years, which leads us to believe that one of two things are true: Either the Pequistes [member of Quebecois Party] program is unrealistic (since Mr Levesque boasts of the current regime's "flexibility") or the party's democratic ideal has sacrificed it to Mr Levesque's election concerns.

We may indeed legitimately ask whether Mr Levesque would not have thought of his mandate as early as this fall if the opinion polls had favored his party. Would the major reasons he invokes today to postpone an election have been as unplanned as he makes them out to be?

What are these reasons?

He says that we find ourselves facing a constitutional coup that in a way creates a crisis situation. Also that it is not in our best interest to immediately hold general elections that would inevitably lead to partisan interests and confrontations' at once filling the "political landscape." The Quebecois would concentrate exclusively on this problem and be sharply divided during these particularly crucial weeks whereas they ought to try to maintain among themselves a common front to counter an unprecedented attack on our most fundamental rights.

And because there are still a lot of people "who have not yet grasped the fundamental importance of what is at stake and of the struggle to finish what that imposes on us," he added, it will be necessary for everyone to have a chance to see that clearly as soon as possible. That is, to try to assemble in Quebec the largest number of citizens and groups aware of what is going on, and this beyond partisan lines which would otherwise risk weakening the Quebecois position. Also party leaders will meet while the Council of Ministers will prepare and announce concrete actions and the National Assembly will be quickly convoked.



Summed up, these are the official reasons that made Mr Levesque decide to postpone elections.

Does Mr Levesque really believe he will succeed in creating a common front while the Liberal Party is geared for war and will remain so until J-day? Does he think that Mr Ryan will go any further than the minimal support he has already extended him and which has more to do with the method chosen by Mr Trudeau than his objectives?

For example, Mr Levesque wanted to avoid having Mr Trudeau and his followers shuffle the cards in Quebec in a fall election, in other words having them prevent this coalition of public opinion so sought after by Mr Levesque by means of a campaign to get the public attuned to his way of thinking and a debate in the legislature.

We know that Mr Trudeau and some of his colleagues are soon to begin a tour of Quebec to explain and justify their unilateral action. Now these interventions by federal officials, as moreover those of Quebec Liberals who are going to continue to attack the credibility of the Pequist government and sow doubt as to its intentions, to say nothing of the positions assumed by Anglo-Quebecois groups that support the federal initiative, all this will provoke a big public debate which will of necessity divide the population. But since this debate will not lead to an appeal to the people, the government will not gain from it the political authority it at present lacks, while the federal deputies from Quebec will see in it a confirmation of their feeling that they express the aspirations of the Quebecois better than anyone else. A feeling that current opinion polls in part support.

And Mr Trudeau will not fail to repeat to the Quebecois what he said to them yesterday over the airwaves: Mr Levesque and some other provincial prime ministers have chosen to settle this political problem through the courts because they know that the public is not with them in this matter.

Something an election would very probably have brought out into the open.

It would, of course, be preferable to hold a referendum, but the Levesque government has rejected this device, and for good reason. At any rate, he believes it to be less worthwhile to consult with the Quebecois today than to convince them of what they have always been presumed to be convinced of. Odd.

#### Levesque's Decision 'Bold Bet'

Quebec LE SOLEIL in French 17 Oct 80 pA6

[Editorial by Marcel Pepin]

[Text] The parliamentary tradition requires that a government submit itself to a popular verdict once every 4 years. The tradition also teaches us that governments that ignore this custom are punished by the voters. Mr Joey Smallwood learned this at his own expense in Newfoundland. Mr Pierre Trudeau confirmed the fact in May 1979.

In deciding to postpone the next general elections to an undetermined date in 1981, Mr Rene Levesque is therefore making a bold bet. People will accuse him of hanging

on to power, of unduly prolonging a preelectoral climate hardly favorable for energetic governmental action, of fleeing from the judgment of the voters.

Only an exceptional circumstance can excuse a violation of this tradition. For Mr Levesque, the unilateral action undertaken by Mr Trudeau to modify the Constitution constitutes precisely the exception that justifies postponement of the elections. In the name of the higher interest of Quebec, it seems to him irresponsible to create a power vacancy. It is time for unity among all Quebecois, he maintains, not for partisan battles.

This argument will convince neither those who feel that the Levesque government lost its credibility last 20 May nor those who maintain that the government ought to be supported by a clear mandate to sustain the struggle against Ottawa. But at least he has the merit of being noble and apparently at least of setting himself above partisan interests.

The government's strategy basically consists of exploiting his defeat in a referendum. Without the no [vote against the referendum] victory, Mr Trudeau would in fact not have undertaken, with the haste we know he did, the partial and provocative reform which has aroused the House of Commons. Mr Levesque can now play the dedicated missionary who proposes to defend the Quebecois before thinking of his party.

He could not very well have achieved this within a month. By extending his term of office, he counts on raising a vast popular opposition movement, mobilizing groups and organizations to flock to his side and forcing the Liberals to choose between Ottawa and Quebec. It will obviously be easier for the government to dramatize the situation by exploiting the resources of the state and the rostrum of the National Assembly "in the name of the higher interest of the people of Quebec."

Mr Levesque could have chosen the opposite approach by immediately requesting a clear mandate to toughen his opposition to Trudeau's proposal. But that would also have meant risking defeat. He has succeeded in harmonizing his partisan interests with the general interest. His opponents will grumble, but will have to recognize his adroitness.

If, during the next few weeks, Mr Levesque in fact succeeds in convincing the Quebecois that the federal initiative constitutes "an unprecedented attack on our most fundamental rights" and that he is the man best equipped to limit the damage, he will, to all intents and purposes, have wiped out the 20 May, which would be no small achievement.

The stakes are enormous. Mr Levesque is facing up to them with the energy engendered by a last chance, promising to reply to federal propaganda, to mobilize groups and organizations against Ottawa, to do battle in the name of Quebec rather than in the name of the Quebecois Party in the hope, to be sure, that citizens will finally come to the conclusion that he indeed heads "the real government of real Quebecois," as a well-known slogan puts it.

Right now, this strategy has the advantage of making people forget the association with the supreme authority. Instead, it assumes the continuation of the fight between Trudeau and Levesque, a struggle Mr Trudeau is not in the habit of viewing lightly.

In short, Mr Levesque has found a noble and elegant pretext to defer a risky deadline. He will very quickly find out whether the people share his feeling of urgency or whether they receive this outburst of patriotism with skepticism.

What with the federal election and the exhausting referendum campaign, the Quebecois are experiencing a quite natural lassitude toward election campaigns. Perhaps Mr Levesque is simply saying that the people have had enough of voting for this year.

To get people to forget his violation of tradition, Mr Levesque ought to without delay activate the machinery of government and lead the way to a productive session. His profound conviction that the interests of Quebec are threatened constitute his best trump in shaking up a bureaucracy that has been waiting for a year now.

#### Levesque's Action Defended

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 18 Oct 80 p 18

[Article by Jean-Claude Leclerc: "Levesque Is Right"]

[Text] Stepping into the limelight, the head of the Quebec government has postponed the general elections normally expected to be held this fall. Having arrived at the decision announced Thursday, Mr Rene Levesque nevertheless was inclined to favor a poll to be held some time during the regular 4-year term of office. It would have been necessary for the central government to indulge in a coup for him to revise his evaluation of the political situation and avail himself of the 5-year constitutional limit. The National Assembly will therefore soon be convoked for the purpose of mobilizing Quebecois opinion in the test of strength engaged in in opposition to the Trudeau plan for unilaterally modifying the Canadian Constitution.

The Levesque government would, however, be sadly mistaken if it too exclusively engaged in a sort of reverse referendum campaign and neglected to prepare, for the National Assembly and the next general election, the legislative program that must be completed if the 1980's are not to be marked by serious setbacks in all sectors in Quebec. In connection with this, it is somewhat disturbing to see the head of the Liberal opposition, frustrated in gaining the power he believed to be within his grasp, talk of the need for a strong government in Quebec at the very moment when the renewal which he promised in ide his party is showing signs of running out of breath.

First of all, if we are going to talk about a Quebecois political context, the sad truth is that the 20 May referendum has put all of us into a position of inferiority and weakness. Caught in the trap of its program, the Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ) proposed a Maximalist option that led it straight to defeat. On the other hand, forced to obtain a victory for the federalist option, Mr Claude Ryan had to appeal to allies for whom the future of Quebec is the least of their concerns. No time has been lost in specifically turning the result into a new federal invasion of the already precarious prerogatives of the only government on which the French-speaking Quebecois and French Canadians can rely. Feeling its strength with the 60-percent no vote, which it quickly tied in with its aims to centralize the country, the Trudeau government set itself the task of stopping both Rene Levesque and Claude Ryan.



Now instead of plugging this dramatic gap, the head of the PLQ would have preferred to plunge the province into a partisan struggle which he might have won but whose real victor would very probably once again be the federal government. Now who indeed could have been made to believe that, in voting for the PLQ and its *Beige Book*, the Quebecois would have amended the no vote of 20 May, disavowed the Trudeau plan and thrown the weight of their political determination behind Claude Ryan's constitutional option?

The political naivete and presumption of the PLQ is astounding. There would have been no reason for complaining if the risk had not been so great that these factors might lead to greater deterioration of the balance of power between Quebec and the rest of the country. In fact, while Mr Ryan is slamming the party door on the former prime minister's fingers, federal Liberal Party strategists are no longer even concealing their haste in wanting to get rid of the former manager of *LE DEVOIR*.

If the PLQ is to again become one of the chief political instruments open to all Quebecois and not just a moral guarantee under which nest-featherers of all political colors can again snatch power and contracts away from Quebec, it would be best for its leader to demand that elections be held at some time during the next 6 months. Perhaps he ought to take a closer look at the list of aspiring candidates who "reform" party conventions and customs. Between the reds of Ottawa and the castoffs of the old guard, has the PLQ really reformed its people and its ideas to such an extent that it can claim to be the incarnation of a new leadership for Quebec? The least one can say is that this is not obvious.

We might console ourselves if at least the PLQ's troops, morale and ideas were in better shape. This is far from being the case, even if we discount the demoralization that followed the referendum defeat. Despite a positive legislative balance sheet, the Levesque administration's performance as a "good government" exhibits flaws that are as disturbing as those of the Olympic pole. The mess is starting up again, for example, in the construction industry. The reprehensible — not to say criminal — practices that have become ingrained in it as in other industries (clothing, for example) hardly appear to shock the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Quebec Criminal Investigation Department. The Ministry of Education has practically ceased being a progressive force in Quebec. And this to say nothing of the Treasury Board which has no shortage of funds to squander on prestige, but which in defiance of the most elementary rights has taken it upon itself to cut back Welfare Department allowances.

A colossal effort of recovery is therefore required, and in short order, if the PLQ wants to preserve the substance of the changes it has contributed to and which constituted the hope of Quebec in 1976, and especially if it wants to, with or without the power, remain a political force for progress in the hard years to come.

Among the bitter comments he voiced on hearing that he would have to be satisfied with partial elections, the head of the PLQ nevertheless hit the nail on the head when he spoke of the weakness of the Levesque government in constitutional debate and opposition. While an election campaign could not serve as a timely cure for this serious shortcoming, the adoption of a common position by Quebecois representatives in the National Assembly, which is to be convoked soon, should be of even greater help. It is a miracle that other governments in the other provinces have not been crushed by the federal steamroller. It has never been more obvious than



during the past few weeks that the "Quebec problem" weighs less than nothing on the scales of Canada. Starting with Ontario Conservative W. Davis, the people of the other provinces have been completely reassured as to the crushing of this nationalist threat, just as those who voted no, after having also been grossly tricked and manipulated by Ottawa, have become more or less silent.

This is why, just as the Levesque government should not slyly prepare for its election under cover of the "crisis" instigated by Ottawa, the Liberal opposition should fly its Quebec colors. The message must be sharp and clear and reach Fredericton, Toronto and Winnipeg in an unambiguous fashion. If, after having deceived Quebec ("We are going to stake our seats on this," they said!), federal Liberals are successful in dividing and disorganizing the other provinces, negotiation on the Constitution will be blocked for a generation if not more. So, Claude Ryan may very well replace Rene Levesque, but this would only be to carry as much weight as Prince Edward Island. Quebec must speak with one voice in Canada as well as in London.

If this battle is won, the quest for a mandate from the electorate can only make more sense and produce stimulating results. In the spring or later.

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## GERMAN CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS PROBLEM ENDS

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 17 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] Nicosia--Officials from the Democratic People's Party, the Association of Newsmen and the Turkish Cypriot Federation of Labor Unions have taken part in a conference that was held in West Germany and that focused on the problem of Cyprus. The officials have indicated that the Greek Cypriots have not taken part in the conference on the grounds that it has allowed equal participation by the Turkish side.

In a declaration made yesterday, DPP General Secretary Ismet Kotak stated that at the conference on Cyprus it was argued that no "Government of Cyprus" existed. He said that this prevented them [the Turkish side] from having a voice at the conference table. Kotak said that the Greek and the Greek Cypriot representatives failed to come to the meeting because it involved the participation of Turkish representatives and that Kyprianou's representative was prevented from participating in the conference. Kotak stated that the participation of the Turkish side in such meetings was necessary to disprove Greek Cypriot claims and to prevent the adoption of decisions advocated by the Greek Cypriot side. Kotak added that during the conference they had the opportunity to tell those who brought up the presence of Turkish troops in the island that the Greek army has had a presence on the island since 1960. He also said that the decision taken by the Federated Assembly on 5 December 1976 and pertaining to the resolution of the Cyprus problem was incorporated into the proceedings of the conference.

The conference was entitled "The Cyprus Problem." Resat Akar who is secretary general of the Turkish Cypriot Association of Newsmen represented the association at the conference. He was accompanied by Oktay Oksuzoglu who is a member of the association. In reply to questions by the TAK news agency, Resat Akar deplored the absence at the conference of representatives from the Greek Cypriot Association of Newsmen, from political parties and other Greek Cypriot organizations. Resat Akar stated:

"The Greek Cypriots do not participate in any conference where they would be on an equal footing with the Turks. However, they participate in every meeting in which they are assured of a majority and for which they harbor hopes."

The following question was among the ones asked by the TAK agency: "There are various rumors concerning the identity of the organization that put together the conference. What is the actual situation?" In reply, Necati Akar who is secretary general of the Turkish Cypriot Association of Newsmen stated the following:

"The invitation to the conference had been made by an organization called "The Association for Adult Education." We are saving the letter of invitation. Upon our arrival in Germany, however, we found out that the actual name of the organization was Asme-Humanitas. When we asked them about this conflicting situation during our first meeting they replied as follows:

"As we were organizing the conference, the first person from the Turkish section to whom we talked to was Orker Oezgur who is chairman general of the RTP. Oezgur stated that it would be possible for them to participate in the meeting but that if the invitation was to be extended in the name of Asme-Humanitas, other organizations in the TFSC would be prevented from participating by the Turkish authorities. For this reason, we as a branch of Asme-Humanitas used the name "Association for Adult Education" in going ahead and extending the invitation."

Akar stated that the decision of Asme-Humanitas to donate medicine worth 200,000 marks has been greeted with satisfaction. He added that in the days ahead the representatives of the political parties, unions and other delegates from the TFSC who participated in the conference will meet together to determine an appropriate organization to receive this aid.

The chairman general of the Turkish Cypriot Federation of Labor Unions, Nejat Taskin, made a written statement yesterday concerning the meeting that he attended in Iphofen with his assistant, Nihat Elmas. (This is the conference that this article is about.) He indicated that the Greek Cypriots did not participate in the meeting so that certain truths can remain hidden and that the two sides do not meet on an equal footing. He said that efforts are underway for the convening of a meeting that would be attended by representatives of Greek Cypriot organizations.

Necati Taskin stated that RTP Chairman General Orker Oezgur had given misleading information to the organization in question. He said that Oezgur had made a practice of vilifying the constitutional framework in the TFSC that provided for the existence of his party. He added that Oezgur focused on foreign organizations in particular in misportraying the freedom and democracy that existed in the TFSC. Taskin strongly deplored this situation.

## CALL FOR COMMON EFFORT IN ECONOMIC STRUGGLE

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 19 Oct 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has broadcast a message on the occasion of the Festival of the Lamb. In it he said "all our resources are being stretched in the struggle to increase the community's production and to bring prosperity to our people."

Prime Minister Cagatay stated that in this struggle, the Turkish Cypriot Community had not yet attained certain awaited objectives. He said that for the struggle to be won, all components of society must participate in it by achieving a consensus among themselves that would reflect agreement over fundamental issues.

Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay's message on the occasion of the Festival of the Lamb reads as follows: "We are celebrating the Festival of the Lamb which is a testimony to the importance attached by Islam to sentiments of mutual help and solidarity. Through its profound significance, the festival provides a reply to humanity's yearning for peace and love. The most important as well as established concepts in the life and existence of our community are mutual help, solidarity, peace and love. These strong sentiments have played a large role in making it possible for us to go through difficult periods and to come to this day. Our resistance in spite of most unfavorable conditions has had its roots planted within the richness of these sentiments. It is true that we have not yet attained the long awaited objectives of our struggle. Operation Peace of 1974 has in all its joy provided a firm guarantee for our existence as a community and our Federated State has been founded in the midst of an atmosphere of security. It is necessary that the political and socioeconomic objectives of Operation Peace be attained as well, if our state is to survive until eternity and if its citizens are to be happy and prosperous. Our greatest source of inspiration in the struggle to attain these objectives will again be the traditional spirit of the days of our resistance. This spirit is the creation of our affinity for peace, love and mutual support.

The fact that the political aspect of the Cyprus problem remains unresolved will not daunt us or drive us to despair. On the contrary, this situation should make us wage the struggle for the resolution of our socioeconomic problems with greater vigor and determination. This must be so because the possibilities for resolving the political impasse are largely dependent upon the resolution of our socioeconomic problems. We firmly believe that



a Turkish community that has resolved the problems of its state and secured its future from an economic standpoint will be the strongest guarantee for a permanent peace and a lasting solution on Cyprus.

For these reasons, it is necessary that all components of our community contribute their efforts towards ultimate victory in this struggle, regardless of their viewpoints and from a level of consensus over fundamental issues. Despite differences of opinion, we must join in the struggle waged by our community and view one another not as adversaries but as brothers. In our relations with one another, we must give room only to love, mutual support, respect and peace. To friend as well as foe we must demonstrate and prove that we can defend diverging viewpoints with the maturity of democracy, through sentiments of brotherhood; and that we can unite within an atmosphere of common destiny in waging the struggle of our community. In the past, we gave an example of this during the difficult days of resistance and war. It is necessary and unavoidable that we give this example during this new phase in the struggle of our community. Feelings of hostility become graves to all things beautiful while feelings of brotherhood are the sources of beauty and joy. We must be guided by this principle in resolving personal problems and in our interpersonal relations as much as we would be in addressing the larger issues of the community. Another important attribute of this joyous holiday is the opportunity that it gives us to look at events, the past and the present, with simple reason and tolerance. Pessimism is neither justified nor necessary. As we look back at the past, we can say that as far as the community is concerned, "we are better off than we were yesterday." We can take pride in our determination to become self-sufficient as a community and to defend our liberties and our democracy. Within our economy we are obtaining results that are worthy of our confidence and our satisfaction. Our imports are decreasing and our exports are increasing. Agricultural production is on the rise. Following citrus products and potatoes, grapes have joined the ranks of our export products. We are in the midst of a planned process of increasing exportable products so that our need for foreign currencies can be met. All our resources are being stretched in the struggle to increase the community's production and to bring prosperity to our people. The tangible achievements of these projects will enter the picture in the near future. We will come upon happier days by working together with resolve and patience, in a unity of mind as well as body. May the sacred Festival of the Lamb be an auspicious and joyful occasion for our people, for the Islamic and Turkish worlds, as well as for our Peace and Security Forces who are the undaunted guardians of our national existence and independence."

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## CITRUS PRODUCERS BECOME POLITICAL FORCE

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 17 Oct 80 pp 1, 6

[Text] Nicosia (TAK)--The Council of Ministers has welcomed a move by citrus producers towards the acquisition of legal status and has decided to call upon the producers to speed up efforts in this direction. According to a statement made to a TAK correspondent by Hakkı Atun, the minister of economics and finance, the Council of Ministers plans to discuss in the future the most appropriate format for Cypfruvex once the producers assume legal status and become an organization having legal authority. The Council of Ministers has decided that a five-man consultative committee made up of producers be created for the purpose of reflecting the viewpoints and problems of producers until a formal organization can be formed. According to the impression obtained by the TAK correspondent, these efforts will allow producers to play a more important and productive role in the activities of Cypfruvex.

The Council of Ministers met during the past day under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay. The meeting and the activities of the council lasted from 0900 hours to 2000 hours. In addition to its other work, the Council of Ministers determined during this meeting the instructions and scope of authority to be given to the delegate who shall represent the Ministry of Economy and Finance on behalf of the Development Fund of the Assembly of the Turkish Community. This delegate is to participate in a meeting of the Cypfruvex General Council and has received instructions concerning the stand that is to be taken for the conclusion of the previously postponed council meeting.

In yesterday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Economy and Finance Hakkı Atun and Ministry of Industry and Commerce Taskent Atasaya informed the council of the steps that remain to be taken in the light of earlier decisions concerning payments to grain producers and citrus grovers. In reply to a question, Minister of Economy and Finance Hakkı Atun stated that payments amounting to 60 million Turkish liras have been made to citrus grovers since the beginning of last week. He also stated that in addition to the 60 million Turkish liras owed to grain producers, efforts are underway to find a source for 200 million Turkish liras.

Yesterday's meeting of the Council of Ministers also saw the approval of the Agreement on Social Security concluded between Turkey and the TFSC. During the meeting, minister of labor and social security provided information to the council concerning his contacts in Turkey and the agreement on social security.

## CDU/CSU WEIGHT CHANGING VIEW OF OSTPOLITIK

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 3 Nov 80 pp 27-30

[Article: "Like a Shirt--The CSU Opposes Attempts Originating With the CDU to Change the CDU/CSU Foreign Political Course"]

[Excerpt] Since the CDU/CSU election defeat, CDU/CSU politicians everywhere have been taking the floor with self-critical commentaries--Stuttgart Chief Mayor Manfred Rommel in the lead. Always good for something unconventional, Rommel demanded that the opposition "define its liberal stand more clearly, particularly in foreign policy."

Rommel's Land chairman, Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister-President Lothar Spaeth shortly thereafter detected an "unmistakable weakening of contact" with the East, which he said "aroused the suspicion among the citizens" that "the CDU/CSU did not want to talk with the communists--in other words, was opposed to detente." A similar tune was sounded by Spaeth's Lower Saxon counterpart, Ernst Albrecht, who told DER SPIEGEL: "In the past few years we have simply cultivated too little contact with the Eastern states."

CDU Secretary General Heiner Gieseler went even further, admitting that one also had to recognize the successes of Ostpolitik--"for example, we simply have to acknowledge the fact that the CSCE conference in Helsinki with its decisions also helped the people in East Europe."

Just as the Social Democrats did at one time, the CDU and CSU now ask for the taking of an inventory and greater togetherness in foreign affairs. This, says CSU Land organization chief Friedrich Zimmermann, is to "draw a line" under the confrontations about Germany policy and Ostpolitik which have extended over a number of years.

Just as Brentano did at one time, those in power are now opposing the attempts at rapprochement by the opposition with condescending skepticism.

Togetherness, says State Secretary Klaus Boelling, while "certainly desirable," is "no value per se"; the CDU/CSU would first have to "acknowledge the fact that actually there is no other way than the one we have gone."

The opposition is far from doing so, however. Most of its people for the time being are above all imbued with the harsh realization that it was wrong for them in the past years to have let themselves be pushed "time and again into a position of a party predominantly saying no" (Albrecht).

CDU/CSU leaders meanwhile have made it sufficiently clear that at present it merely is a question of correcting the party image. Addressing the CDU Presidium last Monday, Kohl warned overly precocious party friends that "a change of course a la Godesberg" was not under discussion. And in writing the chairman let it be known that the CDU was "not prepared to assume ex post facto joint responsibility for the past Ostpolitik and Germany policy of the federal government."

Almost identical tones were sounded at Wildbad Kreuth at the end of last week, where the CSU people had gathered for their traditional postelection review. In a speech lasting an hour and a half, defeated candidate for chancellor Franz Josef Strauss lectured to the detente strategists of the sister party saying: "Policies cannot be put on and taken off like a shirt." Nor was there any reason to do so, for the most recent developments in the Eastern bloc after all had proved him right once again.

Walther Leisler Kiep, flexible in matters concerning Ostpolitik, recently having returned to Bonn and only a short time ago a member of Strauss' election campaign team, was called a "bird of paradise" by the CSU chief who had to be kept away from foreign policy under all circumstances. "It must not be left to people who assented to the Basic Treaty," Strauss said.

Deputy Chairman Zimmermann was appalled at Boelling's reaction to the inventory offer, saying that the opposition simply would have to draw up its own balance sheet--progress in human relief on the one hand, in return for Bonn payments "in marks and pfennigs," and dead people at the inter-German border on the other hand.

The result has already been decided. According to what Zimmermann said in Kreuth, the CDU/CSU does not need a "Godesberg in Ostpolitik." Rather it was up to the federal government finally to display "realism" after "10 years of illusions."

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## FIVE INSTITUTES VIEW ECONOMY IN FALL 1980

West Berlin DIW WOCHENBERICHT in German 30 Oct 80 pp 453, 460-469

[Report on the economic situation by the following members of the Study Group of German Economic Research Institutes, Essen: German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin (institute for cyclical research); IZMVA Institute for Economic Research, Hamburg; IFO Institute for Economic Research, Munich; Institute for World Economics at Kiel University; Rhenisch-Westphalian Institute for Economic Research, Essen; completed in Kiel on 24 October 1980: "The Situation of the World Economy and the West Germany Economy in the Fall of 1980"]

[Excerpt] The Economic Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany

Early this year the Federal Republic of Germany once again experienced a strong demand and production push, caused mainly by the fear of shortages and continuing strong inflation. This was followed in spring by a drop which exaggerated the economic trend downward as much as the earlier push had done upward. The hectic see-sawing overlaid the expected decline in economic development.

The reason for the weakness is to be found in the conjunction of the severe inflation of oil prices and the deliberately induced shortage of money. Though last year higher oil prices had already burdened the economy, the effects on output were delayed until well into the current year by extremely large stockpiling in industry and anticipated purchases by private households and foreign customers. In the result of this year's standard wage negotiations the oil price rise began to affect the development of domestic costs. This may have caused the Bundesbank to keep the expansion of the central bank money supply within the lower half of the target range. In addition there were the deep scars left by the oil inflation in the current account. The Bundesbank endeavored to achieve the equalization of the deficit by way of capital imports. High interest rates were needed to do so and at the same time prevent the devaluation of the Deutschmark. Admittedly it was also necessary to expand the money supply less than would have been consonant with domestic economic needs.

Though in the Federal Republic of Germany costs and prices rose much less than elsewhere, the Deutschmark was not affected by revaluation expectations; indeed it tended to weakness. This is explained mainly by the fact that the European monetary system blocks revaluation as well as devaluation expectations. Changes in the key exchange rates must be unanimous, and some governments are so obviously loath to devalue their countries currencies that operators on the foreign exchange markets consider this an "exchange rate guarantee" and include it in their management decisions.

Capital suppliers therefore tend to invest their money increasingly wherever the highest interest rates are offered, borrowers, for their part, go where interest rates are lowest--with the result that interest rates in the FRG are higher than would otherwise be the case.

#### Goods Exports Declining

Many neighboring countries experienced a development similar to that in the FRG; this is reflected in exports:

- The slackening of stockpiling in the evident decline in the exports of basic materials and production goods,
- The pressure on private consumption in the drop in exports of consumer goods,
- The worldwide weakness in the demand for motor vehicles in lower exports of these products,
- The "robustness" of investments in the slight rise in exports of, mainly, electrical investment goods, office machines and data processing devices, less in deliveries of iron, plate and metal goods and machines.

Analogous to the earlier increase, the decline in exports arose mainly in trade with other industrial countries. An exception were exports to Italy which continued rising probably due to the hefty price increases in that country coupled with a steady exchange rate; another are deliveries to the United States of America, which fell sharply due to the serious recession there.

Compared to the trend after the 1973/1974 oil price push, exports to the OPEC countries recorded only a slight rise. The state trading countries cut back their imports from the Federal Republic, probably because (with the exception of the Soviet Union) they lack the necessary foreign exchange.

#### A Slight Increase Only in Private Consumption

Private consumption was already under pressure in the second half of last year as the result of the sharp rise in the cost of fuel oil. Early this year purchases were anticipated at the expense of savings, in expectation of further inflation. In subsequent months accordingly slackened. Private consumption has been rising again since mid-year, though rather slowly. This process corresponds to the weak growth of incomes due mainly to the unfavorable employment situation. The rise in the cost of consumer loans as well as the increase in interest paid for deposits probably contributed to the higher savings rate by comparison to 1979.

#### The End of the Construction Boom

Demand on the construction market had declined last year, in part due to the fearful inflation of land prices, construction prices and loan interests, in part to the termination of the program for future investments. This trend was interrupted early in the year when public agencies placed contracts which had been kept back before due to the heavy strain on the construction market. Moreover the federal budget as well as the budgets of some Laender were enacted exceptionally early, with the result that orders were placed earlier than usual.

In the spring construction passed its peak. Construction firms evidently endeavored to stretch the order stocks (still plentiful at the time), because they did not expect another upswing soon.

### Flagging Investment Upswing

As far back as last fall the firms participating in the IFO business opinion poll expressed doubts regarding the prospect of continuing prosperity. These doubts gained strength in the course of this year and increasingly affected investment decisions. That is reflected in the decline of domestic orders for investment goods.

Particularly in its final stage the earlier impetus to the demand for investment goods was due to the wish to expand capacities. It resulted in a sharp rise in order stocks, and equipment investments continued to increase until mid-year. Subsequently the rise seems to have stopped. The cooling off of the economic climate thus began to affect investment also. Still, the development of equipment investments benefits from projects serving energy conservation, the development of new energy sources, the application of new manufacturing techniques and the development of new products.

### Much Reduced Inventory Investments

Early in the year inventories were sharply raised once more. In recent months, though, business put on the brake with regard to stock orders. Particularly marked was the cyclical movement in the case of stocks of basic materials and production goods. However, the polls show that industrial firms are inclined to maintain more extensive stocks of raw materials and primary materials so as to be certain of supplies. Industry and trade agree that inventories of finished goods are still unduly high.

### Declining Output and Employment

Overall output quickly responded to the decline in demand. Admittedly, though, this development displayed marked fluctuations. Output fell sharply in the spring, following the push caused by international events at the beginning of the year. Going by the statistical data now at hand this decline did not continue past mid-year, but the demand trend as well as the production plans known from the responses to the IFO polls indicate that output will drop again in the last months of the year. We may assume an approximately 2 percent growth in the real gross national product for the average of the year.

On the labor market the flagging of the economy initially showed up in cuts in working hours by way of the abolition of overtime and the adoption of short time. Finally employment generally declined. Before that it had risen considerably, especially the numbers of apprentices had noticeably increased; at 7.7 percent of gainfully employed persons their share is nearly the same as in the mid-1950's.

Unemployment figures shot up as soon as the rise in the number of employed persons slowed down, because the supply of manpower continued to grow very strongly. Involved here, among others, was the flow of asylum seekers. At the end of September



unemployment had achieved 930,000 (seasonally adjusted). It therefore stood at some 100,000 more than in the spring. At the end of the year and seasonally adjusted it may amount to 1 million. The annual average, therefore, is about 900,000 compared to 876,000 last year; this corresponds to an unemployment rate of just about 4 percent in both years.

### Slackening Inflation

Since the spring inflation slowed down considerably. That was helped by the fact that import prices no longer rose much. In fact the prices of many raw materials and semifinished goods tended to decline. However, this year the reduction in the cost pressure from abroad is offset by a greater rise in wage costs per item, arising in part from new wage contracts, in part from the slow-down in the advance of productivity. At the same time the strong cyclical downswing has made it harder to pass on these higher costs; as a consequence profit margins were under considerable pressure.

The rate of construction price increases, though, did slacken somewhat. Compared to the same period last year, the rise in the second quarter amounted to 11 percent, in public construction to 13 percent. The inflation in the cost of living of all private households is definitely lower since the beginning of this year. The current price rise moderated from an annual 6 percent rate in the first quarter to 4 percent in the third quarter. Compared to the previous year inflation has lately run at just above 5 percent; at the end of the year it will probably be somewhat below that figure.

### Rise in Current Account Deficit Stopped

At the same time that output declined and inventory investment was cut back, imports of industrial primary products dropped quite substantially, especially imports of raw materials; full inventories and conservation resulted especially in lower crude oil purchases. As investment and consumption slackened, imports of finished goods also declined.

Goods exports dropped slightly more than imports, the real surplus in the goods traffic was reduced. In the services sector, on the other hand, the deficit was noticeably lower; higher returns on capital from abroad largely accounted for that result. However, as the deficit in transfer payments rose--mainly due to special factors--, no improvement in the current account was recorded; seasonally adjusted the current account deficit merely stopped rising. The 1980 result will amount to DM25-30 billion, following DM10 billion in 1979.

### Another Sharp Rise in Government Expenditure

Despite fiscal intentions government spending is not rising much more slowly this year than last. It will probably increase by nearly 8 percent, though the rise is lower in the second half of the year than in the first. While fewer personnel were hired, greater standard wage raises and more spending on materials resulted in an even sharper increase in government consumption than last year. Interest payments also are rising faster. On the other hand the growth of investment expenditure slackened; in real terms 1980 government investments will rise by only about 3 percent, following 6.5 percent in 1979.



Government revenues--at 7 percent--were growing somewhat less than in the previous year. The main factor here was the tax relief arising from the 1979 tax amendment law. The abolition of the payroll tax as of 1 January 1980 and the upward adjustment of exemptions from trade tax, for example, relieved private enterprise to the tune of DM3.5-4 billion this year. Government cash revenues are also reduced by some belated effects of the many changes made in the tax law in recent years. A further adverse effect results from this year's increase in the Christmas bonus exemption from DM400 to DM600, which will account for a revenue loss of about DM1 billion. Moreover, the increase in tax revenues is less productive as the result of the business recession.

The 1981 financial deficit is estimated to rise by DM8 billion to DM50 billion. Here the deficit of the territorial authorities will increase from DM41 billion to about DM52 billion, while the social insurance fund is likely to have a DM2 billion surplus following last year's DM1 billion deficit.

In contrast to the Federal Government and the Laender the financial situation of local authorities has definitely improved in the course of this year. They benefit from the upward adjustment (14-15 percent) of their share in revenues yielded by wages and income taxes and also from the 33 percent reduction in the trade tax contribution to the Federal Government and the Laender, which more than compensates the loss of revenues from the payroll tax and trade tax. At 14 percent the growth rate of their tax revenues is therefore much above that of the Federal Government and the Laender.

#### Foreign Trade Problems Plaguing Monetary Policy

Early in 1980 the German Bundesbank tightened its monetary policy and largely maintained its grip until now. Decisive for this line were mainly foreign trade events; the rapid worsening of the current account due to the dramatic inflation of oil prices and the rise in foreign rates of interest following increased monetary restrictions imposed in many countries. Both resulted in a demand for foreign exchange, which exceeded the supply, and the Deutschmark was so much under pressure that it, together with the lira, became the weakest currency in the European monetary system. To keep within the range agreed in the system, the Bundesbank supplied foreign exchange from its holdings. This intervention was also designed to avoid greater devaluation against the dollar. As the Bundesbank wished to prevent a continuous leakage of foreign exchange, it decided to impose relatively high interest rates in order to stimulate the influx of capital. By this policy, oriented to the stabilization of exchange rates, the German credit markets followed American interest trends.

Consequently the expansion of the money supply--a bit livelier again at the turn of the year--began to weaken once more. The money supply defined as cash and sight deposits ( $M_1$ ) stagnated, and that in the further definition  $M_3$ --including also time and savings balances subject to minimum reserve requirements--barely rose after the spring. Though credit expansion was also restrained as the result of the rise in interest rates, it remained high by comparison to the expansion of the money supply--a phenomenon quite usual at times of cyclical downturn.

Last March the central bank money supply still touched the upper limit of the target range limited to 5-8 percent by current expansion rates. By May it had dropped

to the lower limit and, since July, has fallen below it. This trend is incompatible with the principles of potential-oriented money supply control and bound to damage growth and employment.

After the middle of the year the Bundesbank slightly lowered the advance rate, and bank advance borrowing was replaced by somewhat cheaper central bank loans. It is doubtful, though, whether this will suffice to achieve an appropriate expansion of the central bank money supply this year.

#### Outlook

Any forecast of 1981 economic trends is subject to a good deal of uncertainty. The general conditions for 1981 developments are not yet sufficiently clear to allow us to deduce quantifiable trends.

Especially after the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq there is much speculation about the further outlook for oil supplies and crude oil prices. If the conflict stays localized between these two countries, losses of deliveries may well be compensated by greater output in other producing regions and further conservation of oil consumption, and no shortage threatening the production potential in the consumer countries would then have to be feared. The situation on the oil markets generally is fluctuating. For the purpose of this forecast we assume that the price--calculated in U.S.dollars--will rise roughly to match the increased prices of industrial goods. This would not be particularly onerous for the Federal Republic because the exchange rate of the Deutschmark is likely to rise in nominal terms.

The problems encountered on the oil markets also make any assessment of economic development in other countries a difficult undertaking. As far as the Western industrial countries are concerned it is likely that the trend will be upward in the course of 1981, and that world trade also will be on the rise once more.

Given the continuing substantial differences between the rate of inflation here at home and abroad, coupled with the beginning decline in the German current account deficit, we may expect a revaluation of the Deutschmark in 1981. This will not be confined to a higher D-mark value by comparison to third currencies but also within the European monetary system. However, we do not expect that this rise in the exchange rate will--for the average of the forecast period--achieve the complete compensation of differences in the development of cost and prices; as a result the competitiveness of German producers will probably improve.

In these circumstances we are likely to see an expansion in the money supply by the Bundesbank. This should correspond to domestic needs and, consequently, result in lower rates of interest on the money and capital markets. In other words, the endogenous forces for an upswing will have greater scope.

Though important decisions regarding 1981 fiscal policy have already been taken, we are still left with some uncertainty as to the appraisal of the actual fiscal effects. Decided were tax reliefs for private households and additional expenditure to benefit the family. These intrinsically expansive measures are counteracted by the rise in indirect taxation and social security contributions and by the intention to continue restraints on spending. However, the fiscal goal of not allowing the public deficit to rise is unlikely to be achieved. Success here is

counterindicated by the additional expenditure--cyclically recession-related--, which was not taken into account when the spending target was drafted. Spending by regional authorities will probably grow by about 5 percent, more than envisaged.

As to the 1981 standard wage negotiations it is assumed that the two sides will take into consideration the narrow real distributive scope and the reduced opportunities for passing on higher costs. The already obvious weakening of inflation, the increase in unemployment and the narrowing of company profit margins must be expected to act as dampers. In these circumstances standard wage contracts are likely to display far lower rates of increase than in 1980.

#### Exports Bottomed Out

Due to the continuing downturn in world trade the Federal Republic's real goods exports will initially decline further. On the other hand this decline will be eased by the relatively favorable competitive status of German industry by comparison to many other countries (with Japan being the most important exception) and by the specific advantages of the German range of goods on offer, especially in view of the worldwide efforts regarding oil replacement and energy conservation; still, the lowering of real demand abroad will predominate for some time to come.

An upturn can be expected only when the world economy and world trade begin to recover. That should happen in the second half of 1981. The impetus radiating from the Western industrial countries is likely to be accompanied by rising demand from the OPEC countries, so that a speeded-up push in goods exports may be expected in the course of the coming year. On the other hand no impetus for German exports is foreseeable from imports by the other developing countries or the state trading countries, because they all lack the foreign exchange required.

In general real goods exports will probably take until the end of the coming year to regain the level of early 1980. In the average of 1981 they will be slightly lower than this year when, due to the satisfactory result of the first half, it will increase by about 5 percent. Real exports of services--less dependent on economic conditions--will continue to rise in 1981.

#### Public Spending Plans in the Sign of Cuts

In 1981 fiscal policy will try to meet trade cycle requirements on the one hand and, on the other, avoid undue new indebtedness. Income tax, for example, will be lower by roughly DM6 billion; DM6 billion are accounted for by changes in the income tax rate and DM2 by the new provisions on the deductibility of child care costs. Counteracting this reduction is the planned additional tax on spirits and oil--probably as of 1 April 1981--and the deletion of subsidies for the oil consumption of aviation and shipping. Moreover, the revenues of the retirement insurance fund are to be raised by increasing the rate of contribution from 18 percent to 18,5 percent, yielding DM3 billion. The overall relief for taxpayers and social insurance contributors is thus definitely less than that promised by the 1981 tax relief package.

Admittedly tax and contribution revenues will be reduced as a result of the recession: With respect to the wage tax mainly because employment will be lower; with respect to turnover taxes due to the only slight expansion of nominal private consumption and imports. The 1979 assessment of income tax will result in substantial



added revenues. The yield from corporate tax, however, will increase only slightly (if at all); in view of the poor profit situation anticipatory payments will, if anything, decrease while little in the way of additional revenues is to be expected from the assessments. In general tax revenues by territorial authorities will rise by just about 4 percent in 1981, the revenues of the social insurance fund by 6 percent at most.

As for expenditure, the efforts at consolidation are demonstrated in the Federal Government's wish to limit to 4 percent any rise in spending, while several Laender will not permit theirs to rise by more than 4-5 percent. Though this planning is unlikely to be fully implemented, especially by the Federal Government (fixed additional payments for defense, to the European Communities, interest, increased housing and family allowances and payments to the Federal Institution for Labor are unlikely to be balanced completely by cuts in other expenditures), restrained government spending is bound to damp down the economy. We know from experience that this holds true especially when the spending cuts are made less in the sectors of subsidies and transfers than in investments, among which, from the growth aspect, we must include some of the expenditure on government consumption. Already at the time of the 1980 supplementary budget the Federal Government cut investment projects and investment subsidies; as far as the local authorities are concerned, the end of the program for future investments and the reduced Laender allocations are bound to lead to a procyclical investment attitude. In 1981, therefore, real government construction spending will be decidedly lower than in 1980, especially because the expected downward amendment of the tax estimates is likely to trigger further cuts.

Compared to the latest estimate (May last) by the "tax estimate study group," a revenue shortfall in the region of DM6 billion is to be expected for cyclical reasons alone, that is in addition to the fiscal decisions which were not taken into account at that time.

Savings efforts by the territorial authorities will also result in substantial cuts in government spending. In nominal terms expenditure will probably rise by just about 6 percent in 1981, compared to more than 8 percent in the two preceding years. Less obvious will be the reduction in the rise of expenditure of the social insurance fund. In real terms total government consumption will rise by only half a percent less than in 1980.

In view of this development of revenue and expenditure the government fiscal deficit will rise by about DM10 billion and achieve DM60 billion. At the same time the "structural" part of the deficit is likely to decline.

#### Flagging Construction Investments

Affected by fiscal measures and monetary policy real public construction investments and investments in housing construction have declined since the spring. The current trend of construction demand and the appropriations in the budgets of the territorial authorities indicate that this development will continue well into 1981.

Due entirely to the lively construction activity at the beginning of the year real construction investments for the average of 1980 in both sectors will still exceed



the result of the previous year by 1.5 percent. Next year, though, they will be lower by about 4.5 percent. As far as housing construction is concerned the demand for maintenance and modernization as well as improved energy conservation tends to be helpful; however, even these impulses are beginning to weaken.

The increase in commercial construction investments will tend to slacken. If they were to follow economic motivations only, we should have to fear a serious decline because, as a rule, the inclination to embark on expansion investments diminishes very rapidly at times of recession. This argument does not carry much weight, however, because expansion investments were not very prominent at the time of the boom. Moreover, commercial underground construction exerts demand stabilizing effects. In the sector of district heat supply, for example, some contracts remain to be placed and carried out under the program for future investments. Also increasing will be other construction investments for the purpose of energy conservation and substitution. Commercial construction investments are therefore likely to maintain the high level of 1980.

Construction investments generally indicate an initially speeded-up decline which may reverse only in the latter part of 1981, influenced by the more favorable financial conditions and the lower construction price rises certainly to be expected. In the matter of housing construction we should remember that the past boom did not bring any excess production of apartments, so that recovery of demand will not be delayed by the need to reduce "rental mountains."

In the average of 1981 real construction investments will be about 3 percent below those of this year; in 1980 we will achieve a 3.5 percent total growth. Considering the dimension of this development of output, the construction industry will have to dismiss quite a lot of personnel in addition to abolishing overtime.

#### Only a Slight Weakness in Equipment Investments

Apparently largely influenced by disappointed sales expectations and a long period of high real interest, the rise in real equipment investments has definitely slackened; nevertheless we are justified in using the term "robust." Though real equipment investments will decline in the second half, the drop will be far smaller than in comparable recessions. In the average of the year they will probably be about 4 percent above those of the previous year.

There are several reasons for this relatively favorable assessment of investment activity in 1981. The improved export figures and lower interest rates (generally assumed in this forecast) will help encourage investors. Should the next round of wage negotiations end in moderate settlements, the investment climate will also benefit. It is true that company profit margins have declined lately, because the rise in costs--caused by domestic and foreign factors--could not be fully passed on. Obviously, though, business does not expect the pressure on profits to last. Finally investments designed to improve long-term competitive advantages (in the car industry, for example) as well as investments for the purpose of oil replacement and energy conservation are more likely to continue increasing.

At the same time we must expect investment trends to be more sophisticated: A rise is to be expected in the car industry, mining and the energy sector. On the other

hand a decline seems inevitable in the construction industry, farming and probably also the chemical industry.

All this indicates a slight loss for the average result of 1981. It will arise in the course of the year due an initially declining and only later rising trend. The level of equipment investments, therefore, will be high enough to obviate serious losses in the growth of the output potential.

#### Private Consumption Continuing Subdued

The weakness of private consumption continued until quite recently. Toward the end of the year it is likely to revive a little, due to the higher exemptions for Christmas bonuses. However, this year total private consumption will increase by only about 1.5 percent in real terms, in other words achieve only 50 percent of the previous year's rise.

In 1981 the development of private consumption will probably largely correspond to the development of disposable income. Standard wages will most likely rise less than this year. We assume a rise of about 5 percent. However, the volume of work will shrink quite noticeably in 1981: Employment as well as man hours worked will decline. Total wages and salaries paid seem likely to rise by only about 4 percent. Due to tax relief the same percentage increase arises for net wages and salaries paid.

Some of the employment-related loss of earned income will be equalized by higher income transfers, especially increased payments by the Federal Institution for Labor, but also by the anticipated retirement disbursements to the older unemployed. That is the main reason why the rise in the total disposable income of private households in 1981 will be 5.5 percent higher than the rise in the total of net wages and salaries paid.

The future development of the inclination to save is difficult to foresee. The prevailing uncertainty involved in growing unemployment would indicate a rise; the efforts of households to maintain their standard of living point to the opposite. Lower interest rates, making money investments less attractive and facilitating borrowing, actually presage a decline. When considering these different influences we are led to assume that the savings rate will barely change. Should the rise in prices of goods and services for private consumption continue to slow, real private consumption will increase somewhat more in 1981, but in the average of the year it is unlikely to achieve more than 1.5 percent.

#### Current Account Deficit Declining

As the corollary of a generally soft domestic market the import volume will continue to decline. This decline is further emphasized by inventory movements: Following the strong stockpiling in 1979 and the early part of 1980, coupled with the worsening of sales expectations there appears no reason initially further to increase imports. In the course of the winter half the decline in imports will make for stagnation. In the course of 1981 as a whole an upturn is to be expected in conjunction with the likely revival of the economy. This is not going to be very strong, though. The greatest rise is likely to occur in imports of primary products. In the average of 1981 total real goods imports will probably be somewhat lower than this year.

Import prices (average values in Deutschmark) will again rise slightly in the winter half. This assumption is based on the expectation that the exchange rates in the European monetary system will initially stay put, and that the external value of the Deutschmark will generally remain more or less the same. We further assume that world market prices of industrial raw materials will not come under pressure despite the worldwide recession, and that prices of crude oil will increase at only a moderate rate.

In general import prices will probably be less inflationary than export prices. This arises mainly from structural differences. A revaluation of the Deutschmark would serve to have a strong impact, especially on prices of raw materials and primary products, and that affects imports more than exports.

The development forecast for real exports and imports as well as for the terms of trade implies that the surplus in the 1981 balance of trade will once again rise quite substantially. The deficit in services, on the other hand, will presumably show a slight rise. Next year we will see no more than a small increase in the deficit arising from transfers, which rose sharply in 1980, due mostly to special factors such as forgiveness of debts incurred by developing countries. Accordingly the current account deficit is likely to decline from DM25-30 billion this year to an estimated DM20 billion in 1981.

#### 1981: Renewed Output Increase in the Course of the Year

Real total demand will initially decrease but, in the course of 1981, resume a slight rise. In all likelihood the timing of the turning points for the various elements will differ. The first reversal is to be expected in the inventory cycle, the last in construction demand. The progress of output will differ, depending where we expect the turning points of the demand elements and how steeply we assess the downturn and the subsequent upturn. The institutes involved in this forecast are not agreed on this point. For the average result of the year their concepts allow for slight upward and downward divergences from the forecast presented here, assuming a more or less unchanged real gross national product.

In any case, the situation on the labor market is bound further and noticeably to deteriorate. The lowering of the work volume will be reflected in the abolition of overtime and a serious rise in short time as well as a decline in employment. The situation will be worst in the winter half; in the average of the year the figure of gainfully employed persons will be 175,000 (nearly 1 percent) below that for 1980.

Natural attrition will not suffice to achieve the adjustment of the labor force to the lower production level. As the total manpower on offer will again rise by about 100,000, unemployment will definitely rise in the coming year. As a result of the recession this rise will be very pronounced in the first half; it will slow in mid-year. In the average of the year unemployment will increase to at least 1.1 million. The unemployment rate will be about 5 percent compared to 4 percent this year.

#### Inflation Receding

Both the development of import prices and restrictive monetary policies contributed largely to the recent settling down of prices. As a consequence of the restricted



possibilities for passing on cost increases the rise in consumer prices had slackened even earlier, at a time when the internal cost inflation was still growing. That, however, was at the expense of profits.

We may expect this calming trend to continue next year. It will be interrupted in the spring by administrative price rises and the increase in spirit and motor fuel taxes. In the average of 1981, though, consumer prices will rise by only about 4 percent, following nearly 5.5 percent this year. From mid-1981 on the increase--by comparison to the previous year--is likely to drop below 4 percent.

#### Economic Reflections

In the months just past the recession has noticeably hardened. The real loss in income due to the serious inflation of oil prices and continuing restrictive monetary policies has sensibly damped down consumption and the inclination to invest. The weakness in demand is reinforced by inventory cutbacks and declining foreign demand.

In due course the curbing effect of the oil inflation will presumably relax; we expect the correction of unduly high inventories to be completed in the course of the winter half. The timing and strength of the recovery will depend on economic trends abroad, the development of oil prices and, not least, economic guidelines at home.

Monetary, fiscal and wages policies must endeavor to achieve lasting success in the stabilization of price levels and, at the same time, initiate an improvement in the employment situation. Economic policy here is confronted with a series of tough obstacles: Though aware of the risks of high interest rates, the Bundesbank sees little occasion to loosen monetary restraints. That is due to the serious deficit in the current account and the high interest rates abroad. Fiscal policy, again, is confronted with the compelling need resolutely to diminish the high "structural" deficit.

Certainly inappropriate would be "forceful actions" with the aim abruptly to enforce the stability of price levels and budget consolidation, because they would reinforce the decline in employment and increase the danger of a subsequent excess correction toward expansion. At the same time we know from past experience that a short-term stimulation of demand does not result in a lasting rise in employment. Threatened in such a case would be the continuing stabilization of price levels and thereby ultimately also any real improvement in the employment situation.

It would be useful if

- Monetary policy were to adopt a potential-oriented line,
- By restrained settlements wages policy were to take into account the uncertainty about future economic developments,
- Fiscal policy were to be oriented to the assurance of medium-term growth conditions.

Necessary now is a monetary policy which orients the expansion of the money supply to the growth of the production potential and the limitation of the total economic price rise to no more more than the inevitable.



The Bundesbank's foreign trade orientation this year was so overwhelming that it failed adequately to take into account any of these necessities. Continuing defense of the Deutschmark rate of exchange coupled with the substantial differences in inflation between us and foreign countries as well as the persistent high interest rates abroad would do more than increase the danger of worsening the recession, it would also distort the production structure. To ameliorate this conflict it would be advisable to forego the defense of exchange rates. In any case the governments of the countries involved in the European monetary system should be prepared more flexibly to adjust the key rates to the development of the determining factors.

By accepting this assumption--possibly even a temporary devaluation of the Deutschmark--the Bundesbank could begin to orient its policy toward the domestic economy. A gradual reinforcement of the expansion in the money supply would be appropriate to such a line--especially in view of the weak expansion in recent months. At the same time the Bundesbank would have to lower the bank rate.

The quantification of a potential-oriented expansion in the money supply must be based on the assumption that the output potential will grow by 2.5-3 percent. It does not, therefore, seem unrealistic to assume for 1981 an inevitable 3.5 percent rate of inflation, measured by the deflator of the gross national product. This would correspond to the rate of inflation achieved in 1976-1979, in other words before--in the train of the second drastic increase in oil prices--prices and costs shot up at home also. Consonant with the general economic concept the expansion in the central bank money supply should amount to about 6.5 percent in the course of 1981; for the average of 1981 the increase would be about 6 percent. Hand in hand with the expected cooling of the economy and expectations of lower price increases this expansion in the money supply will exert pressure on interest rates. The Bundesbank would be well advised not to resist such a trend but instead flexibly adjust its rates of exchange.

The Bundesbank should make public its conceptions regarding the monetary policy to be pursued in the coming year. It ought to do so soon enough to allow the government as well as private enterprise and labor unions to incorporate these concepts in their planning. The Bundesbank may thus contribute to the avoidance of misconceptions as to the cost and price rises it is prepared to finance. For the same reason it should avoid setting up a range.

By moderate labor contract settlements 1981 wages policy should contribute to an early turn-around in the employment situation and ensure that the conditions for appropriate economic growth are improved. Restrained labor contracts would take into account the fact that there is considerable uncertainty about the strength and duration of the recession. The 1980 standard wage negotiations did not fully consider the fact that the second oil crisis had narrowed the scope for raising real incomes. At that time the soundness of the economy was overestimated. Unless investors are to be given the impression that the deterioration in the profit situation, which began in 1980, is to be permanent, 1981 wage contracts must allow a shift in favor of profits. Continuing wages cost pressure would curtail readiness to invest, reduce growth and narrow the scope of future raises in real incomes; it would also be much more difficult to integrate in the work process the school leavers who will be particularly numerous in the next few years owing to the earlier baby boom.

The government could encourage such a policy by announcing restraints in the public sector. Of course wage restraint should not result in another narrowing of the already poor flexibility of the salary structure. By adopting such a policy the government would also improve the credibility of its promise to reduce the "structural" deficit.

Any diminution of the "structural" deficit will be considerably harder of achievement in 1981, because a great deal of revenue loss is implicit in the tax package. In fact the total deficit is bound to rise, because the recession must result in additional losses of revenue and more spending.

The fiscal planning council expects the loss of revenue arising from the tax package to be balanced by correspondingly lower spending. Accordingly it recommends a 4 percent limit to the rise in expenditure. However, in view of the additional demands arising especially from foreign political obligations, this must be regarded as an unduly ambitious goal.

In fact any medium-term limitation of the rise in public spending would have to be very stringent if it were to adequately reduce the budget deficit--either by itself or in conjunction with not unduly steep increases in indirect taxation. Whether it will be possible in such a consolidation to avoid damaging economic side effects--that is something which will depend on the type of spending to be cut. Should the cuts affect mainly investive expenditure--important for growth--, the disadvantages arising may outweigh the benefits expected of the consolidation. It will therefore be necessary to make the cuts with respect to items which are insignificant or even harmful from the growth aspect. These include some goods and services, subsidies and transfers.

In view of the danger to 1981 growth and employment, any "forceful action" aimed to drastically reduce the expansion of spending would be hazardous from the aspect of the economy and of growth. It would involve the danger of deepening the recession and thus producing another decline in revenues. Given the length of time before interference in economic performance begins to bite, the danger exists that measures resulting in the rapid cut-back of the rise in spending would be taken entirely at the expense of public investments. This would reduce medium-term growth and employment prospects. Any addition weakening of public investments in 1981 could lead to the destruction of capacities in the construction industry, which will be badly needed in the medium term.

It does not seem really possible in 1981 to achieve more progress in the diminution of the "structural" budget deficit. However, it will be necessary to provide the conditions needed for consolidation; we must avoid giving the impression that--for one reason or the other--the project of consolidation keeps on getting postponed. The appropriate reorientation cannot be made credible merely by the respective inclusion in medium-term fiscal planning, because this has been seen not to be a realistic image of future fiscal policy. Instead the spending cuts and revenue increases considered necessary would have to be firmly established by the legislature, in 1981 without, however, taking effect that year. This would provide the basis for establishing confidence without straining economic development at an unsuitable moment.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Though the Institute for World Economy at Kiel University shares in the qualitative description of the forecast for the economy, it estimates the recession to be deeper than assumed by the majority of the institutes. In particular it believes to be more persistent the effects of the restrictive monetary policy which is likely to be maintained for some time yet.
2. The Rhenish-Westphalian Institute for Economic Research, Essen, assesses more highly than the other institutes the possibilities for fiscal policy already in 1981 to limit the rise of or cut in spending with respect to those expenditures which have little impact on growth and employment and may indeed harm it. That is not the only reason, though, why it values lower the hazards of limiting the rise in government spending to the extent recommended by the fiscal planning council. It holds that it would bring a considerable gain in confidence in the government's strength of purpose for achieving the set targets.

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CSO: 3103

## TERRORIST STRATEGY PAPER SHOWS GROWING WEAKNESS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 3 Nov 80 pp 129-135

[Article: Terrorism--Is the RAF [Red Army Faction] Collapsing?]

[Text] Is the beginning of the end of terrorism in sight for West Germans? A strategy paper of the Schleyer kidnapers reveals the weaknesses of the decimated terrorist cadre, and former terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein reports from the underground that a couple of top people of the RAF--Susanne Albrecht and Peter Juergen Boock--have quit.

There was something wrong with the definitions and their classification, most of the sentences were incomprehensible, and whole passages looked nonsensical. It was as if a computer at the Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA), pretending to be mad, had spit out some utterly twisted verbiage.

While BKA code experts normally employed in the espionage sector were still trying to figure out the meaning of the ominous gibberish, a couple of agents of the Terrorism (TE) Division of the BKA uncovered the secret after merely "scanning the material in the hall." They were looking at an encoded position paper from the West German underground in which only words such as "and," "if" and "but" were in clear text while everything else had to be decoded in accordance with a certain numerical system.

The author is unknown and so is the number of the recipients; only a translation of a portion, all in clear text, bears the earmark of presumed terrorist Adelheid Schulz. A sample: "An OFF at various levels...the second line not to be forgotten..."

Terrorism experts in Wiesbaden and Stuttgart have evaluated the document as a "strategy paper" and as the "most important find from the intimate circle of the urban guerillas for a long time." Though only part of a sizable plan, the document reveals the straits of the hard core of the Red Army Faction (RAF). Internal weakness in leadership and isolation from the environment have forced the Schleyer kidnapers to revise their thinking.

Does the document mark the beginning of the end of West German terrorism, or does it merely signal an enforced pause?



According to the initial evaluations, the encoded writing, which one BKA man says contains "both expletives and instructions," exhorts supporters to engage in long-term planning and warns against overhasty actions. The preparation of new topics--rightist extremism in the Federal Republic, housing shortage among students, the protest against nuclear power plants--is to create a better thought out basis, but until then there is to be a break in action.

The author or authors of the document- some think it probably is Christian Klar, while others believe an authors collective is involved--according to the BKA, request, "with a view to heightening the striking power of the RAF, systematic collection and evaluation of any information pointing up weaknesses in the protective system of the security authorities." The "place and time of the next offensive," however, according to the BKA evaluation, do not appear to concern actions in the near future but actions "planned over the long term."

The place where the explosive document was found is the apartment of a Heidelberg student living in the fourth story of a building in Karlsruher Strasse. When she offered her apartment for rent last summer for the duration of a lengthy trip to Latin America (1 July to 30 September) on the university bulletin board, one "Andrea Heim" expressed interest, and a deal was concluded quickly.

When the student returned on 13 October, the apartment had been vacated and was in disarray. All kinds of papers were lying around, plus a large number of banknotes. What the tenant then turned over to the police in various kinds of bags as the abandoned belongings of the ominous Andrea Heim turned out to be terrorist's baggage. Andrea Heim in reality was Juliane Plambeck, who with her accomplice Wolfgang Beer had run into a gravel truck near Bietigheim on 25 July and was fatally injured.

Two weeks after the sensational find, a police action began in Wuerttemberg which even participating police as a "stupid kind of Kiki pursuit" and a "uniquely idiotic action." With tens of thousands of fliers and wanted-persons circulars, police, for instance, in the Wiesloch/Hockenheim area hunted for persons whom the Office for the Protection of the Constitution [VfS]--according to its own, albeit disputed, claim--was "on to," namely Christian Klar and Adelheid Schulz.

According to fingerprints that had been found, this prominent terrorist pair as well as the two persons now dead had used the apartment. "At least Plambeck and Schulz were hanging around together there," said one of the police.

The police activity in Baden-Wuerttemberg, hardly proportionate to what could have been expected to result from it, was aimed at a wounded enemy. After the arrests of Rolf Heissler and Rolf Clemens Wagner last year, the arrest of five suspected women terrorists in Paris in May and fatal accident of Juliane Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer in July, the hard core has shrunk. According to the BKA, these events as well as the discovery of several conspiratorial apartments and the seizure of a new kind of extended-trajectory firearm in Duesseldorf "dealt harsh blows to the association in the field of personnel and logistics and disrupted existing plans."

And what the BKA analysts will learn only from this SPIEGEL issue, on page 135 [interview with former terrorist Klein], is likely to confirm their assessment of the situation. Former terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein, who dropped out of the scene

as early as 4 years ago, reports that two sought RAF members--Suzanne Albrecht, 29, and Peter Juergen Boock, 29 have quit.

The strategy paper now found in Heidelberg, drafted before the car accident at Bietigheim but after Susanne Albrecht and Boock had quit, anyway indicate to the police a kind of call for help by dissolving core. Over whole passages, according to Stuttgart Police Commissioner Alfred Steumper, the document reads "like the Letter to the Corinthians--like a desperate appeal to a scattering community. "Do something, you bastards, for us to get out of our isolation" is the way BKA evaluators casually and briefly interpret it. Assistance is requested from the "legal environment," which is to "catalog the personal data and way of life of potential target personnel."

For some time now the pursuers of terrorists have noticed that the remaining RAF members, in order not to go under altogether, are out to merge with former competitor cadres. Thus, according to VfS people's descriptions, there took place recently a "love marriage between RAF remnants and the leftover '2 June' people." According to one of the security people, young cadres from the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) who so far had used Molotov cocktails and daubed walls locally, were recruited by the RAF and "promoted to officers."

Occasionally also people who had previously steered a verbal guerrilla course in the 10 West German "Antifa" [antifascist] groups have been promoted to helpers in the hard-core cadre. According to the BKA, "these groups constitute the strongest support potential of the RAF, being considered a recruiting area for its legal sphere."

The weary urban guerrilla force would like to become attractive to a new leftist political generation which has no use for the "Bader-Meinhof" formula but approves of such riots against the Bundeswehler [Federal Armed Forces] as took place in Bremen. The BKA anyway sees a danger of "the now newly arising protest trends, from the problem areas of nuclear power plants, squatting and housing shortage, hitting on a terrorist ideology" which "attracts this potential."

Regardless of how the strategy paper will have to be evaluated in the end--whether as a testimony to frustration or as a realistic prognosis of action--in principle the other finds in the Heidelberg apartment also confirm the new course, namely:

- maps and sketches of the NATO airport at Ramstein in the Palatinate and of the Hammond Barracks, a U.S. Army headquarters in Mannheim;
- newspaper clippings containing the data of personages primarily belonging to the SPD;
- topographical maps of Heidelberg and a Falck street map of Mannheim-Ludwigshafen.

Is, among other things, an attack planned against the chemical concern of BASF [Baden Aniline and Soda Factory]--something that Rhineland-Palatinate security authorities consider possible? A BKA expert who has followed the scene for some years, anyway, assumes "no resignation" among the terrorists "but greater organizational maturity."

If one wants to attribute unchanged timeliness to the strategy paper drafted back in spring, the terrorists might have their sights set primarily on the Office of Federal Chancellor and installations of the Bundeswehr, the U.S. Armed Forces and NATO, and further on the Federal High Court, the Office of the Federal Prosecutor, the Federal Criminal Police Bureau, GSG 9 and assets of multinational concerns.

A target of particular importance, because it would hit the political opponent and strengthen one's own striking power at the same time, evidently continues to be the freeing of imprisoned likeminded people. If it is still "inside," the strategy paper states, it should be "eaten as long as it is warm. Time and place continue to be valid."

The finds of financial assets make it clear that at least financially the terrorists are not yet too hard pressed. Juliane Plambeck, who along with Inge Viett of "2 June" was one of those Berlin women who kidnaped Vienna hosiery king Michael Palmers and received DM 4.5 million in ransom, before her death still had considerable amounts of money left from that coup; two brown DM 1,000 notes, 11 DM 500 notes and about 100,000 French francs were found in the apartment.

In a phase in which the RAF remnants are looking for new ways, the pursuers for the time being are relegated to running after old tracks. For example, one "Gerda Kramer, nee Lose" was to stay at the France et Bourgogne Hotel in Le Havre the night of 9 to 10 June but did not sleep there. At "Societe Citroen Le Havre" Car Rentals, she fetched a previously reserved Citroen Pallas car, license plated 686 KG 676. Apparently, as the pursuers now assume, it was the wanted Adelheid Schulz, who had been tracked for weeks last spring by the Hamburg Vfs.

At the ticket office of the Albtal Transport Company in Ettlingen in Baden, at 1615 hours on 6 September, three women bought tickets for Bad Herrenalb but did not arrive at their destination. On the route lies the home of Horst Kuhn, investigating magistrate at the Federal High Court.

Faced with the BKA catalog of photographs, witnesses claimed to recognize two of the mysterious passengers--Brigitte Mohnhaupt, who has also left traces at other places recently, and allegedly Susanne Albrecht, of whom there had long been no evidence of any kind and who former terrorist Klein says has long since quit. (It may be a case of a wrong identification by eyewitnesses such as occurs in the terrorist sphere time and again.)

WE reports of this kind (WE=wichtiges Ereignis [important event]), such as reach the BKA in Wiesbaden almost daily, then are no more than "contaminated traces" as far as leading BKA officers are concerned.

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CSO: 3103

## LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS STRENGTHEN TRADITIONAL PARTIES

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 24 Oct 80 pp 32-34

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "Manu's Edge' Has Slowed Down Conservative Party Campaign, Big Four Race"]

[Text] Waiting for the communal election returns went the same way it often has in the past in the television studio in Pasila.

A coughing computer calculated the parties' national support. And on the basis of this, the biggest winner, Conservative Party chairman Ilkka Suominen, was already figuring out how both the coming parliamentary and presidential elections would go.

But did "Manu's edge" stick in his craw?

At 0400 hours on Tuesday morning, 21 October 1980, some general conclusions on the communal elections could be drawn on the basis of the early returns.

The cold north wind of the right is still blowing across the country. The Conservative Party, a moderate right party, added 2 percent to its support over that it had received in the last communal elections, bringing it to 23 percent.

The Social Democrats carried Mauno Koivisto, evidently with Kalevi Sorsa's support, and succeeded — despite the modest gains they made in the government — in advancing.

His less than 1-percent gain can be regarded as "Manu's edge." The party has maintained a low profile to Manu's maximum advantage, in keeping with the man of the hour, even though it has at times taken a political beating because of it. One could with reason speak of a defensive victory. Support for the party grew to 25.6 percent.

The Center Party just barely got its head above water with a 0.2-percent rise, bringing its support to 18.7 percent. Following firmly made farm economy decisions were setbacks in the cities, the worst of them perhaps in Helsinki.

The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] paid a painful price for its cooperation with the government, the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] split, the hard blows international communism has been dealt and, perhaps topping them all, chairman Aarne Saarinen's clumsy attempt to knock out the prime minister. A defeat of just



under 2 percent, lowering the party's support to 16.7 percent has sobered the comrades up.

The Liberals fell to the brink of the abyss and the Constitutional Right Party and Finnish People's Unity Party have already fallen into it.

The forces headed by the common man's man, Pekka Vennamo, have evidently been talking of switching to the "Virolainen" faction. The Finnish Christian League has gone into a decline, but the Swedish People's Party is nonetheless maintaining its positions.

The current is apparently carrying the big parties along too.

#### An Ever More Middle-Class Finland

Chairman Kalevi Sorsa managed to get to party headquarters from Paris in the evening to sit up and wait for the election returns, but Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto and his wife spent the evening at the Excelsior Hotel in Dubrovnik in Yugoslavia.

Party secretary Ulf Sundqvist, who was still amazed at Aarne Saarinen's words, commented on the election returns from the Social Democrats' point of view.

The fact that there are now 390 nonsocialist communes in Finland in only about 50 of which the left holds a majority gave him nothing to crow about.

Ulf Sundqvist was unable to pass judgment on Mauno Koivisto's visible stake in the election campaign, but the popular favorite's position was hardly a drawback. The party secretary also wanted to point out the amount of support for his party in comparison with that for the other government parties.

The SDP [Social Democratic Party] inched forward just enough for there to be a clear and smelly breach in its ranks in the direction of the attacking Conservative Party, but over there in the Pitkänsilta district they were anxiously keeping their eyes on the Conservative Party.

After the Conservative Party, the SDP has obviously been second most successful in chasing after white-collar workers in their hunting grounds. And that is where political power, which is in general up for grabs, will be divided up in the 1980's.

#### "SDP Broke Through Flank"

Chairman Ilkka Suominen, party secretary Jussi Isotalo, Heikki von Hertzen and also Juha Suominen, who for a long time has been chief editor of UUSI SUOMI, were sitting around the Conservative Party table.

Ilkka Suominen was not being unnecessarily modest when, some time ago during a party administration session, he announced that the Conservative Party was striving to become the biggest party in Finland. So, were the election returns disappointing?

"No, we have caught up with the SDP and the gap has been constantly getting smaller. I am satisfied with the Conservative Party election returns, but we are by no means at the peak of our growth," the chairman believes.

"The SDP made gains at the expense of the SKDL..."

Or did the SDP, after all, lend credence to Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto's popularity and low profile, thus slowing down the Conservative Party attack?

"Yes, we could consider that to be the case..."

The issue was the communal elections, but the consequences are now indeed nationwide.

"I would consider these elections to be communal elections, but of course what happens when they are held certainly also has a national effect. The SKDL defeat is such that Kalevi Kivisto will have to think about how much longer it makes sense for him to remain with the present administration. He said as much during a television interview recently."

"This has to have an effect," Ilkka Suominen said.

"Furthermore, the notion of a popular front has become outdated. In 1966 the Center Party went along with it to reduce leftist power in a Parliament with a left majority..."

Ilkka Suominen felt that the Center Party kept its head well above water in these elections, but was surprised at the Social Democrats' bold election tactics.

"The SDP not only ran neck and neck with the Conservative Party; it went right through the latter's flank. That's the God's honest truth. The SDP's election performance was so middle-class that it was hard to distinguish from ours," Suominen said.

The lads are talking. On the other hand, many Social Democrats are saying that they were surprised when the Conservative Party leader darted past Mauno Koivisto, even past Kalevi Sorsa, from the left.

"Lads Off to a Good Start"

Right after the party convention, neither Paavo Vayrynen nor Seppo Kaariainen could really believe that they had captured the most important Center Party seats. As full-blooded politicians, however, they quickly recovered and, as early as last June on the banks of the Aura River, both of them assured us that the party would now begin to forge ahead.

Now, these elections cannot be regarded as elections to introduce new party leaders, although the speech-making tour of Satakunta that Paavo Vayrynen made in early August and Seppo Kaariainen's flight around the country did to some extent manage to strengthen Alkio's heirs.

"Lads, a fine result to start off with," said program director Pekka Silvola, clapping Paavo Vayrynen on the shoulder, after about 10 percent of the votes had been counted and the stuttering computer showed an increase of nearly a couple of points.

Pekka Silvola ostentatiously denied that he wanted to in this way assure himself of another 5-year term as a Finnish Broadcasting Corporation director.

The closer we got to the south's big population centers in the vote count, the smaller the Center Party's victory margin. In the end, a gain of only about 0.2 percent was recorded.

The Center Party had in the hope of winning entered into election coalitions, primarily with the Conservative Party. While the Conservative Party has at times in the past paid dearly for these coalitions, this time it was precisely the Center Party that it got to pay for it.

"That's how it went. We should never again enter into such coalitions. We ought to participate in the next elections with our own slate only," Paavo Vayrynen snapped, while entering the loss of two seats in one commune in the record.

The Center Party's new top men were hardly rejoicing, but the favorable return was at least a psychological victory. A loss right at the start would have made them bury their heads in the sand.

#### "Inconceivable Statement"

Chairman Kalevi Kivisto, Jorma Henttila and Lars D. Eriksson were sitting around the SKDL table. These gentlemen were left with only the small consolation that in several communes the aggressive "Stalinists" had managed to organize themselves at all.

The preliminary return of 16.7 percent meant a loss of nearly 2 percent.

Kalevi Kivisto was discouraged and he admitted that they ought to begin to reconsider the cost of cooperation with the government. The SKDL could not have taken off to sniff at the wind blowing from the right as the SDP did, aside from the fact that they do not have an adman like Mauno Koivisto either.

"Then too, there were other reasons for the defeat besides cooperation with the government. The international climate, the success of American-style marketing and the hard blows socialism has received also have their effect on us."

Furthermore, the change in social structure has in part slipped out of the SKDL's hands. The SKDL is itself too well aware of the weaknesses in its ability to attract votes in white-collar constituencies.

And then to boot Aarne Saarinen's presidential presentations.

"Inconceivable — and very rash."

The SKDL troika left in the middle of the night "for the league" — to add up and subtract [votes].

The Liberals' Jaakko Itala's shoes are not a good place to be in at the present time. The moment is not a favorable one and the big millstones are grinding away on both sides. And on top of all that will probably be the young people's final frustrations and switching over to the Center Party or the Conservative Party.

Nevertheless, thanks to the final sprint, the vote climbed to nearly 80 percent. That was a favorable development.

The Big Broom also swept them out in many municipal councils. In Helsinki almost a third of the council was replaced by new councilmen.

And in Espoo, that city pledged to regional development, all the "Wild West monarchs," celebrated in the 1970's, were returned to the common herd again, the ordinary municipal crowd.

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## LIBERAL PARTY WEIGHS FUTURE AFTER ELECTION LOSSES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Oct 80 p 17

[Article by Ritva Rennes: "Will the Liberals Get a Final Accounting?"]

[Text] At the end of last week, voters repudiated their fateful elections, deserting the Liberal Party (LKP). The election results showed that the Liberals had lost half of their municipal councilmen. At the beginning of next year, the LKP will still be pondering its future.

Everything is small in the LKP today: The parliamentary group can be seated at a table for four and all the councilmen can be gotten into a country school auditorium.

There is only the past for the great Liberals: K.J. Stahlberg's desk at party headquarters and the five-story party building constructed in Helsinki, which had to be sold soon after it was completed because of the shortage of funds in the 1970's.

The Conservative Party, the Center Party (KEPU) and the Social Democrats have bulldozed the two-president (K.J. Stahlberg and Risto Ryti) party, founded during the early days of independence, into the ground.

In the shadow of the big parties, the Liberals have also faded away alongside the newcomers. That catcher of outlaws and clamor for the rights of the forgotten man, the SPP [Finnish Rural Party], and the Christian League, which shapes party policy with the aid of the Bible, have filled the political openings.

The Liberals, who rely on the white-collar workers, small businessmen and a loose concept of freedom, have shrunk because of their lack of color, their lack of a clearcut policy line.

With the exception of the last presidential elections, the figures on the communal elections defeat were the lowest any party that today calls itself one has received in elections

## Series of Defeats

The first time it ran as the LKP, in the 1966 parliamentary elections, the party captured the biggest share of the vote it has gotten to date, 6.5 percent. Since then, its decline has continued in all elections.

In the communes, the LKP has now fallen into the same class as the SMP and the Christian League. The Liberals lost nearly half of their municipal council seats. The party will begin the new 4-year term with 195 councilmen instead of the previous 328.

In Parliament, with four representatives the old government party is the smallest of all.

If the communal election results were to be transformed into parliamentary seats, the LKP would have gotten only two representatives into Parliament.

### Unlucky Elections

The Liberals feel that the original cause of the disintegration was the 1968 presidential elections.

Backing Urho Kekkonen received no support from the lowest levels in the conservative Liberal constituencies. The first elections for Kekkonen dropped their support to 5 percent and the 1978 presidential elections to 2.9 percent, the worst lowpoint in 20 years.

In the 1984 presidential elections, the Liberals will have to face the following, tougher moment of truth: "Who will the Center Party candidate be? The KEPU is trying to steamroller the Liberals into position behind its candidate. If the party bends, its constituency will wind up in a state of confusion. They should get their own candidate."

The SMP and the Christian League, and earlier the Conservative Party too, had raised support for their own candidates. The last time, the vote count for the Conservative Party, which was a member of the Kekkonen coalition, dropped to the lowest reading in the 1970's.

Election arithmetic, which favors big parties, highlights the Liberals' lack of success. Not even election coalitions have evened out the losses the Liberals have suffered due to the proportional computation system. The mobility of the voting population also plagues the Liberals. According to opinion polls, Liberal voters' party loyalty is rated at 70 percent. For the big parties, it is about 90 percent.

In the 1970's "Stalinist" communism swayed some Liberals. Young Liberals streamed into the radical "Stalinist" ranks.

The most recent youth current has focused on environmental protectionists. The most visible group of environmental protectionists at the communal elections, the Helsinki Movement, is largely composed of former young Liberals starting with Ville Koski.

The Conservative Party, the KEPU and the Social Democrats attracted another segment of the Liberal constituency. The Conservative Party has gotten the lion's share from the division of the LKP booty. Some 50 councilmen or Liberals performing other responsible communal functions flocked to it during the elections.

## KEPU Pressure

Since way back when, the Liberals have been afraid of being pressured by the KEPU.

In connection with the Agrarian League's change of name in 1965, the Liberals were furious with Johannes Virolainen. "When we change the name of the party to Center League, we'll come to the cities and knock the People's Party flat," Virolainen said in the Parliament coffee shop. To stop the Agrarian League, the next day well-known Liberals registered the name Center League for themselves.

The planned division of labor, whereby the Liberals were to concentrate in the cities and the KEPU was to stay in the rural areas, finally came to nought at the end of last week in the communal elections when the KEPU clearly advanced into the cities.

Among other things, on different occasions the Liberals have opposed proposed coalitions with the center.

In the 1960's Teuvo Aura (Liberal) and Paivio Hetemäki (Conservative) unsuccessfully tried to put together a cover organization for the Liberal forces.

But in the 1970's the coalition composed of the three center parties: the KEPU, the LKP and the RKP [Swedish People's Party], was in varying degree condemned by the Liberals. The 1977 party conference firmly forbid party leaders to negotiate a cover organization.

Since then, party conferences have more or less recommended a coalition with the center. However, in its statements the LKP, fearing the KEPU's master's voice, has demanded an independent role for the party.

## Big Dreams

The Liberals have tried to accelerate their growth with big dreams. Current general manager of the Post and Telegraph Administration Pekka Tarjanne, who led the party for 10 years (1968-1978), believed the LKP would grow to be the biggest middle-class party in the country.

In connection with his election in 1978, chairman Jaakko Itälä set the party the objective of attaining a support figure of 8 percent. To achieve this, Itälä tried to herd the middle class together.

"Plead your cause, middle class," the LKP proclaimed when it engaged in its first elections under Itälä's leadership.

Chosen as an ideologist, a charismatic leader and for his television image, the former twice-appointed education minister and operations director of the Mannerheim Children's Protection Association filled the Liberals with expectations.

Things turned out otherwise. After the parliamentary elections, the new chairman was stuck with straightening out the leavings of the Tarjanne administration (9 parliamentary representatives).

Since the elections, the Liberals have remained silent on the middle class.

"If Itala had ever gone to the movies with a young female sociologist, he would have found out that no one wants to belong or feels he belongs to the middle class," says a Liberal who admits that that election issue was a mistake.

The Liberals unanimously praise the four-man parliamentary group that has replaced the former scattered group that used to pull in different directions.

Party chairman Itala, vice party chairman Terhi Nieminen-Makynen (married to engineer Toivo Makynen who has risen to the position of Conservative Party representative in Parliament) and parliamentary group chairwoman Anneli Kivitie stand watch over a common policy line in Parliament. Helvi Hyrynkanas, a rank-and-file representative, keeps the executive group on its toes.

Even-tempered Hyrynkanas has not tried to lead the group into the same differences of opinion as did current leaders before with their own group.

Just before Christmas 1977, Kivitie and Nieminen were giggling in the Parliament coffee shop, enjoying the publicity. From the neck of each of them dangled a pendant with a little vial of perfume.

Shortly before, Parliament had voted on the trailer hitch tax which had divided the government. Kivitie and Nieminen had detached themselves from the government coalition and from their parliamentary group and voted with the opposition to defeat the tax bill.

The bill was passed but the Truckers Association, which had resolutely pressured Parliament, rewarded its loyal friends, first with the pendants and later with election support. Of the former Liberal parliamentary group, only Kivitie and Nieminen returned to Parliament after the elections.

#### Calculated Wrong in Joining Opposition

The crushing defeat suffered in the 1979 parliamentary elections led the Liberals to join the opposition. The decision turned out to be one of the almost constituentless party's final misfortunes.

It is hard for the Liberals to admit this. As the Liberals explain it, continual responsibility in the government consumed the party and led the LKP into the shadow of the KEPU. The LKP is now with the opposition, brightening its image.

According to Itala, the party went over to the opposition because it stood behind the center parties' joint tax program, whereas the KEPU and the RKP gave in to the left.

According to the other government parties, the LKP went over to the opposition because of its own differences within the party. The Liberals promoted former justice minister, legislative adviser Paavo Nikula, into the government. Considering himself to be a better candidate for minister, Itala chose the opposition.



The communal election results indicate that the LKP has not been capable of making use of its position in the opposition. Chairman Itala charges that the party did not get enough publicity.

According to Itala, publicity is more important for the Liberals than for other parties because the Liberals constitute the only middle-class, progressive alternative. Without the Liberals to guide the middle class, the nation would lapse into socialism.

#### Bankruptcy of Ideals

Only a few grieve over the decline of the Liberals.

In the governments of the 1970's, the Liberals irritated their partners in the government. Anything could be expected of the Liberals. Because of the Liberals, the government majority shifted now to a center majority, now to a left majority. The government parties did not perceive any other kind of liberalism. In the government, liberalism displayed a conservative image.

In Parliament, the Liberals annoyed their government partners with their fickleness. In addition to the trailer hitch bill, among others, the Liberals frequently changed their stand on one of the decade's most controversial legal reform bills, the agrarian package.

In the opposition, the LKP remained alone. The centrist government parties maintained no ties with the Liberals.

The Liberals have not even gotten support from the other opposition parties. The nuclear power interpellation which the LKP tried to push through last fall came to nought since the party could not get 20 representatives to back the motion.

A prominent former Liberal figure, now retired mayor of Helsinki Teuvo Aura, feels that the party's decline is due to the wave of conservatism that has hit Finland later than the rest of the world.

According to Aura, other parties have also espoused Liberal ideals and the LKP has been unable to create a clear picture of its policy line.

The Liberals were looking for their line amidst election defeats throughout the 1970's. At party conventions, liberals, teachers, white-collar workers and small businessmen demanded a clarification of objectives. However, the constant search in different directions obscured the [real] direction. Just before the last parliamentary elections, Itala proposed technical coalitions with the Conservative Party.

#### Future of the Liberal Movement

The communal election defeat has set the Liberals to pondering their situation. The party administration has called for a special party convention early next year to deliberate on the future of the party.

Young Liberal chief secretary Petri Haukinen has proposed that the Youth League separate from the party because it has betrayed the Liberal movement. Because of his statement, Haukinen was relieved of his functions and the Youth League will discuss Haukinen's fate in a couple of weeks.


The Liberal constituency has also thought about a change of name. When the party was founded, they managed to reject the term "liberal" as being of foreign origin. However, the first chairman, the present Archbishop Nikko Juva, managed to introduce the designation Liberal People's Party in 1965.

Liberal activists have been suddenly taken with the idea of a change in the chairmanship. In the opinion of many, Itala's charisma dwindled immediately after he was elected chairman. Itala himself has explained the election defeat as a challenge and intends to think about staying on even after 1982.

Paavo Nikula, the party's present vice chairman, who was elevated to his position "as a colorless Liberal" in the Sorsa II-b government, has been contemplated as Itala's successor. A second alternative is vice chairwoman Terhi Nieminen-Makymen.

The founding of a center-party coalition has also acquired new impetus. The Center League, which foundered in the 1950's, has been dug up as a provisional name. A coalition will probably be the most important item on the agenda at the LKP special convention.

#### Support for Liberals in 1966-1980 Elections



Key:

1. Parliamentary elections.
2. Presidential elections.
3. Communal elections.

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CSO: 3107

## JAN-MAGNUS JANSSON: CONDUCT OPEN PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 14 Oct 80 p 10

[Article by Timo Lipponen]

[Text] The outside experts of day-to-day politics are not submitting themselves to the "hush-hush line" followed by certain party leaders in the matter of the president's successor. They are also calling for a discussion of the president's ascendancy and the mode of election.

"The presidential election discussion needs to be more open," says the [HUFVUDSTADSBLADET] editor-in-chief, professor Jan-Magnus Jansson.

According to Jansson, the general political framework of the 1984 election should be laid out within a reasonable period of time.

He says that the parties should have the courage to launch a discussion on whether Urho Kekkonen will still be retained or not, whether there will be a normal election or not.

"It certainly must be possible to discuss this matter," notes Jansson.

His own starting point is that it will be a normal election of presidential delegates and that the generational changeover will take place.

## Exception Statute in 1984?

In his editorial in the Sunday [12 Oct] issue of HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, Jan-Magnus Jansson repeats the fact that both the Social Democrats and the Communists will have their party conventions--the last ones before the presidential election--already next year. It would be quite peculiar to leave the smaller party organs to conduct the presidential discussion and selection of the candidates.

The party chiefs Ilkka Suominen (Conservative), Aarne Saarinen (Communist), and Paavo Vayrynen (Center) have intimated that President Kekkonen's term of office might continue beyond 1984, and this gives reason for Jansson to conclude:

"They will also have to be ready to continue Kekkonen's term of office by an exception statute."

It is hardly realistic to imagine that the president will want to participate in an election race of the ilk of 1978's.

Jansson, however, denies that he is himself proposing an exception statute. He only stresses that all alternatives have to be considered in the discussion.

#### "Will not Disturb the President"

The party leaders have explained that one reason for their reticence in discussing the presidential succession question now is that a debate would only disturb the president's work and weaken his position.

"I see no reason whatsoever why the political solutions we are facing should not be discussed," comments Chancellor Veli Merikoski, an expert on constitutional law.

"The political leaders don't feel free to discuss the presidential question," quips Jaakko Uotila, professor of constitutional law at Tampere University.

#### "Hush-Hushing"

Jan-Magnus Jansson appears to be of the same opinion: the parties don't know what to do, so they try to postpone the decisions.

He attacks in his editorial this "hush-hushing" by pointing out that if one bears in mind the president's power in foreign policy, it is obvious that the new president could not veer away from Kekkonen's line.

In addition, Jansson points to the events of 10 years ago when the president said he was going to retire from his high office. This incident had no effect on his position, in fact Kekkonen's authority grew greater than ever before.

These reasons have been noted also elsewhere. The Social Democrat presidential game is fouled up by Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto's popularity; the Center party debate is restrained because of the internal division there.

#### The President Feared

Both Veli Merikoski and Jaakko Uotila are in favor of a normal presidential election.

"In my opinion, it would be wise to redefine the president's position soon," Merikoski says. According to him, this view enjoys also wider support.

"No active politician is going to start the discussion. He would end up on the wrong side of the President," suggests Merikoski.

Also professor Jaakko Uotila claims that "As far as we know, the president himself has not exactly been pushing the constitutional reform."

Merikoski and Uotila are strongly supportive of Jan-Magnus Jansson's counsel: there is a need for investigation of the basic principles.



## COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES SKDL POTENTIAL

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 12 Oct 80 p 15

[Excerpt] Ele Alenius was the finance minister of a historically significant government. After the end of the cold war, it was the first government of a capitalist country to have communist ministers.

It was the year 1966, and the country had elected a leftist majority to the diet. Ele Alenius was the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] secretary-in-chief and the chief director of a family enterprise, Artegrafica Oy.

The 16th representative meeting of the SKP [Communist Party] was also held that year; Aarne Saarinen was elected to power there, and the SKP was faced with dispersal.

The following year Ele Alenius was chosen as the chief of the SKDL.

## Cover Organization

The outbreak of the Cold War in the beginning of 1948 had a decisive effect on the SKDL function--it got narrower so that the SKDL was in the difficult years only the cover and election organization for the SKP.

After Ele Alenius became the SKDL chief, he tried to foster the cooperative character of the organization. This became one of the central concerns of the new chief in addition to the fact that he continually investigated and developed the socialist ideology, for Ele Alenius never was a communist.

"I don't want to commit myself to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. I emphasize the socialist world view in general and the democratic way to socialism." Alenius also says, purely on Marxist grounds, that there is a certain conflict in that the first socialist state was created in Russia, in an underdeveloped country which also had no tradition of democracy, instead of in a capitalist country in an advanced state of development as Marx had predicted.

"It is wrong to equate the concept of socialism with the prevalent system in the USSR and the East European countries--it is one type of socialism, born of the circumstances there."

"Marx assumed that a capitalist society is a step forward from a feudal society and that it is succeeded by socialism as the next step."

"Socialism is a much larger matter than the present so-called real socialism. And in order to realize socialism in Finland for instance, a completely new road will have to be constructed."

These were the fundamental ideas for which Ele Alenius was working through his chairmanship period. He is now ready to admit that much was left undone and still remains so.

Discussion inside the SKDL is still not sufficiently open. The SKP split has deterred discussion. The minority influence was at its strongest in the years 1973 to 1975. After that, its clout diminished.

However, Alenius can count as his own achievement that the SKDL has become well-established as a government party. In Alenius' opinion, this gives it necessary practice also in how to work in a democracy.

Alenius is now especially interested in following the Polish development.

"I hope that Poland will be able to make reforms in peace and quiet, that there will be no accident...."

[Question] Would this accident be domestic or coming from the outside?

[Answer] Let's say that it could be both....

"Poland is an interesting example in any case; it will certainly have important consequences for the development of socialism."

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## CP MAJORITY-WING ORGAN: ELECTIONS LOSS DUE TO INFIGHTING

Helsinki KANHAN UTUSET in Finnish 22 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Results"]

[Text] The results of the communal elections were in many respects surprising in terms of prior opinion polls.

The four big parties garnered a bigger portion of the votes cast this time than they did before.

The government parties beat the SEDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] without exception. Thus the election results were not merely a protest against the conduct of government policy in a substantive sense.

The Conservative Party, which has been sailing with a favorable wind for some time now and has changed its image onto a more liberal, more moderate one, further increased its support in the elections. The growth in its political strength is the most alarming feature of the election results and signals a challenge for the worker movement and the democratic forces.

Support for the Social Democratic Party grew beyond what it was in the previous elections. The slight growth in its support is a fact. However, the increase is not numerically very significant. When the SEDL suffers more or less the same-sized loss, it easily gives rise to the thought that what has happened is a down-right shift among these parties. No doubt this would be too easy an explanation. For example, the results in the capital would indicate that a considerable number of the votes cast for the SEDL before were not cast at all this time.

As a result of this election, there is still a middle-class majority in some particularly important worker centers. This time, for example, Turku and Kerava, which changed back into left majority districts, constituted exceptions. The fact that the city of Kajaani changed over to a middle-class majority is regarded in northern Finland as one of the more distressing election results.

The SEDL suffered an election defeat. Its election support once again returned to the level that prevailed during the years between 1969 and 1971.

Making an objective and overall appraisal of all the reasons behind the election defeat is the most important precondition for being able to stop the downhill trend and open the way to an uphill one.

It would be very simple to charge the movement's government policy with the defeat. No doubt there is a basis for the observation that the SKDL was actively involved in the construction of the policy responsible for launching the boom. The fruits of the boom, however, were of very slight benefit to the poor districts and this led to disappointment. On the other hand, for example, the successful fight to improve the employment situation may be considered to have been responsible for increasing support for the movement.

Due to the effect produced by many factors, on the eve of the elections the so-called political climate had shaped up in a way that was unfavorable for the people's democratic movement. There were also international factors among these, the recent processes of development in the socialist countries among others. They could not take their course without negatively affecting the movement which has been striving to achieve socialism.

The people's democratic movement's frequent internal development phenomena were no doubt in part also responsible for the negative results. The serious internal separatism that has been going on for such a long time and the infighting that is a part of it have introduced with them negative effects on the masses. Some of the movement's active workers remained on the sidelines of practical organizational chores. Violations of organizational democracy based on internal factors are also evident. While active members may have guessed this at some point during the phase of internal dispute, it has long been clear that the dispute has nothing but negative effects on the support the movement derives from the masses. Often the new, more urgent problems of today do not receive enough attention in organizational work.

In this sense too, the message these election results convey to the Communist Party and to other people's democratic movements is clear and indisputable: They must strive to carefully analyze and eliminate the serious shortcomings that have now appeared in organizational and mass activities. Most important of all, in the party and people's democratic movement districts they must seriously strive to achieve real, not just formal, unity and the concomitant political and organizational practice of same. This is the key to better election results in future.

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STALINIST CP ORGAN: GOVERNMENT ROLE HURT PARTY IN VOTE

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 22 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Election Result"]

[Text] The communal elections have produced a lesson on the noble art of political performance that should be written up in the records. As has been said a thousand times before, participation in a poor policy puts weapons in the hands of others and leads the People's Democrats and Communists to defeat. And that is exactly what happened this time. Unfortunately. Changes in structure and other such protests are both nearly as pointless as one another. They would not have to come up with such complaints now if they had only given even slight ear to the voice of reason concerning jobs, local unions, pensioners, young people and underpaid workers, the unemployed and the different working and poor segments of the population. People are smarter than those in elevated positions think.

It is pointless to say that the elections have produced no major changes. A major change could be measured in terms of percentage points as well as the constant decline of the People's Democrats. A major change which we would expect no progressive individual to doubt and regard as insignificant was the fact that the Conservative Party made so great an advance that it, along with the Social Democrats, became the big election winner. It is precisely this that is the danger produced by the elections.

Hopefully, we will not now fall into the trap that has been shrewdly laid to bring the People's Democrats to ruin. The trap works like this: The government parties win and government policy will therefore be continued and in concentrated form. The People's Democrat defeat was merely the exception that proves this rule.

The People's Democrats and the Communist Party ought to reach the conclusion that people already have: They cannot go on as they have before. The machine has run out of power. Support is fast becoming nonexistent. Out of the sheer goodness of our hearts and out of political shrewdness, let us raise the issue of the four big [parties], to which group the Communists and People's Democrats also belong, to as high a position as possible. But whether the SDLP [Finnish People's Democratic League] belongs to some group or other is in the first place determined on the basis of the relationship that exists between the People's Democrats and the Communists on the one hand and the Social Democrats on the other. Since one of them, that is, the SDF [Social Democratic Party], has the support of a fourth of the nation and since the SDLP has a support base of 16.7 percent, the SDLP cannot call

itself a very big party. It is only big insofar as the Social Democrats permit. So the fat is in the fire. Of course, if the SDLP garners a number of votes, that represents significant strength, but only in the event that it appears as independent strength, as such strength in all alliances too.

The lesson we have learned from the communal elections therefore requires of us that we sit in the classroom of political performance and change all our political behavior in the direction demanded in the resolutions adopted at the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] convention.

The preliminary returns received from many districts indicate that, in supporting the masses through its unconditional, flexible and class-based policy, the people's democratic movement's mercilessly neglected party saved the people's democratic movement from a still greater defeat.

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CSO: 3107

## MAVERICK SOCIALIST PROFESSOR QUESTIONS FOREIGN POLICY LINE

Helsinki SUOMEN KIVALEHTI in Finnish 24 Oct 80 pp 2, 54-56

[Article by Antti Blafeld: "From Leader Cult Only a Step to Racism"]

[Text] "There are no prefascists. Rather during periods of social upheaval an atmosphere may be created which provides a foothold for the growth of fascist ideas, in a perhaps fully unconscious and undesired way. That's what happened in the 1920's. The danger exists again now.

"The belief that people are creatures subject to natural laws feeds racism, leader cults. Therefore, sociobiology, a form of thinking that calls itself neorealist, is dangerous."

Osmo Apunen is the Don Quixote of foreign policy debate. From time to time, he attacks windmills like a whirlwind. This time, his target is our foreign policy leadership.

In early October Osmo Apunen, professor of international politics at the University of Tampere and a well-known Social Democrat, complained about neorealist ideas that "come close to the prefascist tendencies of the 1920's."

What did Professor Apunen mean by this? Who is a prefascist? Why did Finland's well-known and recognized foreign policy expert and former ministry official decide to dig the most violent and detested issues out of the political arsenal? Has the debate on foreign policy in the 1980's begun?

The University of Tampere's professor of international politics, Osmo Apunen, is the enfant terrible of foreign policy. In the columns devoted to Finland's Social Democratic opinion, he blasts out with unorthodox ideas which almost without exception vehemently offend others.

Two years ago, Apunen jabbed away at Finland's initiative in striving for a Northern Europe free of atomic weapons. Last summer, in a program prepared by Astrid Cartzi, he presented challenging views on the Soviet Union's right to conduct operations in Afghanistan. He drew lines between the Afghanistan affair and Finland's eastern policy. Apunen demands that Finland draw its own conclusions from these situations.

His statement was regarded as a blow below the belt, a superficial interpretation which is unfounded. The debate over the statement is still going on outside the country.

At the Tampere University 20th anniversary celebration, Apunen tackled neorealism. He maintained that this way of thinking comes close to the prefascist tendencies of the 1920's. The allusion was clear. In early September, Undersecretary of State Keijo Korhonen published in KANAVA the text of a talk given by him in the History Department at the University of Tampere, which was entitled "The Confession of Faith of a Neorealist."

Now who are the neorealists in Finland?

"I don't know, but I would like to know. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is the practice to submit all texts prepared by ministry officials to the secretary of state for approval. Are we to therefore understand that Korhonen's talk reflects the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?"

In his talk, Korhonen criticized research conducted in the field of international politics for "confusing what is and what ought to be."

"I, on the other hand, confess that I have been able to understand what goes on and have received help in so doing from the roots of the situations that arise, from their backgrounds, from historical connections, from a study of the real variables and the relations between the different power factors. Let's go so far as to say that I admit that I am a supporter of neorealism," Korhonen wrote.

"There is also good reason for posting a wanted notice for humility [which we seem to have lost] in dealing with people as biologically and ecologically conditioned beings, as one kind of animal," Korhonen maintained.

#### Ship Without a Destination

"Neorealism is like sailing without a port. There are certain goals, like national independence, which is about the same as saying that the ship manages to remain afloat. Otherwise, we navigate by visible shoals and buoys from sea to sea without knowing where we are going," Apunen criticized.

Apunen feels that, as a phenomenon, politics is composed of both perception of the prevailing circumstances and the objective. "We have to know what the situation is and then we have to figure out what it should be like. If we do not accept this view, we are plunged into chaos. What else, for example, is environmental protection but recognition of the state of affairs and the obvious objective: a clean natural environment.

"In Finland foreign policy debate is turned into a banal kind of going along with 'official foreign policy.' It is very much subject to controversy and can be used to meet many needs.

"We determine our official foreign policy line only at a general level. At the level of practical policy, unanimity is very questionable indeed. That is why we do not want to discuss the forms our policy takes; we would rather talk about results as a gauge of its effectiveness.

"We separate the political parties and the decision-making machinery from our foreign policy. The parties do not shape our foreign policy line; they merely go along with it.



"The lessons of neorealism are already visible in our foreign policy. One example of this is the line of thought according to which Finland recognizes only states, not governments. Because of this, Finland cannot take a stand on some regime's intolerable abuse of human rights. However, here we forget that it is one thing to recognize a state and quite another is the question as to whether we maintain diplomatic relations with it. Even though Finland cuts off diplomatic relations, the state in question is not removed from the face of the earth. Instead of this, Finland could offer its opinion as to the proper handling of matters. The Nordic countries' democratic opinion carries a surprising amount of weight. It has propaganda value even when a stand is not taken."

#### Levels of Debate

"In Finland debate on foreign policy is horizontal. Citizens discuss it among themselves, politicians among themselves and officials among themselves. The pressure of the debate does not exert itself vertically. There is one exception. On the issue of development aid, public opinion has bypassed 'the official line.' This is a historic exception."

In Finland we guard against public opinion's carrying too much weight in the handling of foreign policy. We are afraid that the circumstances of the moment, spontaneous expressions of opinion, might throw our foreign policy off the narrow path of neutrality. In the background are the difficult postwar years when our foreign policy sails were reefed to follow a new tack. It is felt that it was then that public opinion fell into step with foreign policy leaders.

"No one knows what the opinion on foreign policy really was in the 1940's. No one can say that the people of Finland wanted the confrontation with the Soviet Union to continue. The issue was the conflicts between the new and the old leaders of foreign policy in which public opinion was used as a weapon.

"If foreign policy leaders then boldly directed public opinion against the national interest, why then are we so frightened over even small changes in foreign policy registered by Gallup polls today?

"Behind the facade of official unanimity lie concealed differences that there is good reason to bring out into the open. Public opinion cannot be stifled for very long. That is why there are reasons for bold, open discussion of the forms, content and goals of foreign policy.

The postwar period represented an exceptional situation. But now exception has become the rule."

#### Politics and the Natural Sciences

"Conformity to the laws of natural science cannot be made subject to political studies. Even in the natural sciences mere results are no longer a universal criterion. For example, in the field of medicine genetic studies have come up against a serious question in connection with the shaping of human characteristics: Where is this leading us to?

"A line of thought based on sociobiology lends support to the emergence of a leader cult. The people choose a leader and the leader's role is to decide how to manage affairs. If we accept the notion that leadership is a specific human characteristic, we might as well line people up and measure their skulls. It is but a short step from this to racism.

"These ideas offer fascism a foothold from which it can grow, give senseless ideas soil [to grow in]. That is why they must be interfered with.

"Our political future also offers fascism a basis for growth. When we consider the fact that our parties are incompetent, in decline, seeking leaders who can guide the nation. The belief in a common shaping of opinions is wavering.

"In Finland we are now trying to create some sort of divine system. It is not a question of the president's right to govern, but of his way of thinking, of the responsibility leaders have to the people. The president's right to govern is determined in accordance with what we understand by leadership."

#### Challenges Over the Decades

"Finnish foreign policy has never deviated from the line followed by Europe. But now, this aimlessness is avenging itself on us.

"These past few decades, Finland has to a certain extent been in the mainstream of international politics. The East-West axis runs right through Europe.

"But now, East-West relations have more to do with areas outside of Europe. The center of gravity of international politics has shifted to an area in which we have no prospects. The only contacts we have had were the attempt in the 1960's to get more closely involved in trade with the nonaligned countries and our relations with some of the OPEC countries in the 1970's as a result of the oil crisis. Both connections were, however, of a purely practical nature: We sought support for our neutrality policy from the nonaligned countries and imported oil from the OPEC countries.

"Through passivity, we can bring on our ruin, which is its revenge on us."  
"Forms Are Important"

Osmo Apunen is also a maverick in his own party, the Social Democrats. "The party has always dissociated itself from everything I have said that is controversial."

In the SDP [Social Democratic Party] sociobiology is by no means an unambiguous matter. "I ask, what role does security behavior play in the biological well-being of people and particularly in the present-day cultural evolution of people," Alko [State Liquor Monopoly] general manager Pekka Kuusi recently inquired at the Finnish Committee for Promotion of European Security (STETS) 10th anniversary celebration. As an achievement of biological evolution, as a thinking animal, as a being that can understand, man has succeeded in nature," Kuusi asserted.

Apunen justifies his opinions as a man of science. "It has been a matter of principle for the University of Turku and its predecessor, the Institute of Social Sciences, to participate in debate. I cannot close the door to my research office to ponder over Plato's ideas on the state while our society is in a state of crisis.

"My predecessor, Yrjo Ruutu, actively participated in the debate as early as the 1920's and 1930's." Ruutu greatly influenced the political atmosphere in the 1920's and 1930's.

Apunen defends a culture of forms and customs. "It is a part of life. If we give it up, we will go into decline in the field of foreign policy too.

"When French noblemen ascended the steps to the guillotine, they took great care to see to it that their wigs were properly combed."

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## SCHOLAR DISCUSSES FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY POLICY

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 24 Oct 80 pp 57-58

[Article by Martti Haikio]

[Text] How does the international situation look to Finland's foreign affairs leaders? What are the main issues of Finnish foreign policy today?

In honor of President Kekkonen's 80th birthday, an anthology entitled "Points of View on Finnish Security Policy in the 1980's" (Otava), composed of articles by 18 officials who handle Finland's practical foreign affairs, will answer these questions. But there are also questions about which the book remains silent.

Doctor of political science Martti Haikio, who serves as the chairman of the Foreign Policy Institute's Security Policy Committee, here appraises the open views expressed in this work.

According to the book, the domain of international activity is marked on the one hand by political repercussions experienced with detente and on the other by control over a weapons technology that is getting out of hand. A great deal of attention has also been paid to pressures for change that have appeared in the U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, particularly the notion of a counterforce, which would indicate the possibility of a limited atomic war.

Ballistic missiles are considered to be a primary political factor affecting the Soviet military budget rather than a significant military innovation. According to Rear Adm Jan Klenberg, "the most that can be expected of us (in terms of ballistic missiles) is probably that we take care of our territorial inviolability as effectively as we do our environment and other sectors that become involved." As far as we know, anti-ballistic-missile weapons have not yet been developed anywhere.

According to Klenberg, from the military standpoint we ought to direct our concern to the 2,400 air-to-ground missiles rather than to the 464 Euro-ballistic missiles, some of which are located in areas quite far to the south of us.

In terms of regional importance, the military center of gravity is considered to have shifted from the southern Baltic to the Barents Sea and the Kola and Norwegian coasts. NATO's interest is aroused by the Soviet Union's most important naval base and, in connection with that, its nuclear counterstrike credibility.



While understanding Leningrad's security needs has traditionally been a part of our foreign policy strategy, in the light of what this book has to say, it would seem that Murmansk has taken Leningrad's place. It would have been logical for them to have included an article in the volume totally devoted to the Soviet Union's arsenal in the north, the strategies for using it and especially the importance of the northern regions in terms of the Soviet Union's global strategy.

Our knowing how the Soviet Union thinks and operates militarily has been and will continue to be the single most important issue for our security policy.

#### Foreign Policy Initiatives

"The aim of Finnish foreign policy leaders has been to investigate the possibilities there may be of influencing affairs through international organizations such that the threat to Nordic-country regions and populations posed by the new weapons technology and strategic thinking based on the philosophy of a limited atomic war, which has been evolving, would at least not grow." This is what Undersecretary of State Keijo Korhonen writes.

In other words, it is obvious that Finland does not regard the possibility that big-power relations may come to a head in the north as being to its advantage nor that of its neighbors. This has given rise to the idea of "disengagement," on which initiatives calculated to keep the North out of disputes between the big powers have been concentrating.

Korhonen reminds us of an initiative aimed at Norway by President Kekkonen in 1965: "If, as Nordic-country neighbors, Finland and Norway, naturally in keeping with security-policy commitments, were each capable of in a credible manner keeping their respective territories under the control of their own troops only, the Arctic regions of the Nordic countries would not constitute objects of nuclear attack."

Then too, an old proposal for a northern belt devoid of nuclear weapons has received a new name: the Northern Arms Supervision Organisation (PAJ). The idea is born of those dangers that arise when atomic weapons are located in regions where there were none before.

For natural geographic reasons, Finland's main interest therefore centers on Northern Europe and secondly on initiatives involving more extensive development of a climate of detente, like the CSCE or the European disarmament program. In this area, Finland is apparently still living through the aftermath of the CSCE, which is understandable since the CSCE was "a broadly based foreign policy venture which Finland has been engaged in throughout the entire historical period of its independence," as Juhani Suomi asserts.

#### Preparation for the Worst Contingency

Aside from providing for operations during a normal "peacetime situation," a security policy also covers preparation for the worst alternative, or an armed conflict contingency. Examining the grouping of troops in Central Europe, the rate at which they can be moved and their size as well as opinions on the use of tactical atomic weapons. Jan Klenberg estimates that "the regular combat phase of a potential war could last several days or at the most in the neighborhood of about a week."

"Politically and economically, of course, the crisis situation could be a lengthy and exhausting one. The maintenance of a state of heightened military preparedness could also then prove to be a lengthy affair, lasting for months. But if we prepare to defend our country or protect it against an attack directed across it, we can calculate that the threat of an atomic war would allow the attacker only a little time and, accordingly, limited military reserves. Preventing such an attack is fully within the possibilities of our resources if we resort to our own independent defense system and those necessary, limited parts of the weapons technology we have developed."

Lt Gen Ermei Kanninen describes the Finnish defense system, claiming that our military reserves do not allow for the defense of "our borders or coastline." In other words, the basis of our defense system is the exploitation of our entire territory and defending ourselves against the enemy by slowing down his advance, scattering his forces and making the most of situations favorable to us.

In these surveys, political factors are left open. If they are thinking of using the Finnish interior for regular armed combat, how will our society otherwise function in such a situation?

A comparison with two other quite different solutions involving action at the time in Nordic countries inevitably comes to mind. Faced with a German attack in April 1940, Denmark voluntarily surrendered and concentrated on keeping the nation's vital activities in Danish hands in a sort of "autonomous" form. Norway, on the other hand, immediately got ready for armed combat, which led to the flight of the government, fighting on Norwegian soil and a resistance movement.

On the basis of Finland's own experiences, the most effective solution was probably the war in Lapland. In a really surprisingly concrete way, it realized the Finnish concept of how military operations should be applied under the terms of the mutual aid and cooperation agreement. With its own forces and remaining on its own territory, Finland repulsed the Soviet enemy from its soil. The Soviet Union stayed on its own side of the border and had to be content with consultations affecting the course of events.

#### Political Unanimity

The book gives the reader cause to ponder our basic trade policy, energy provision, UN policy, changing the nature of our diplomacy and many other issues relating to Finland's field of foreign policy operations. On the generally smooth relations between Finland and the Soviet Union referred to in several of the articles, worthwhile mentioning is chief editor Arto Mansala's discussion of the deadline for the next renewal of the mutual aid and cooperation agreement.

The book has had a controversial reception among the political parties. SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI (SSD) chief editor Aimo Kairamo leads us to understand that the book has given rise to too much defensiveness in the Center Party (SSD 30 August 1980) and Prof Osmo Apunen also sees in the book "a political message that is as direct and clear as the nose on one's face" (SSD 13 September 1980). Although neither critic specified which authors or which parties were omitted from the book, it is worth our while to examine it from this point of view as well.

The contributing writers are all officials. Emerging clearly as the core group are Keijo Korhonen, who has already appeared in earlier books on the subject, ambassadors Risto Ryvarinen and Jaakko Iloniemi, Lt Gen Aimo Pajunen and department head Klaus Tornudd. It is hard to tell how these writers were chosen, whether the aim was impartiality or bias in terms of party politics.

Even in the book's contents we find no (party) political bias other than Secretary of State Matti Tuovinen's closing article, "A Breakthrough in the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line." In it the Agrarian League and Center Party are presented as infallible and unerring, whereas the article only hints at the other parties, presents historical events in a biased light and, as such, weakens the otherwise professionally high standards of the subject matter of the book.


Instead of Tuovinen's article, for example, the book might have included an article on the Finnish parties' participation in foreign policy decision-making and debate. That would have been important for the simple reason that the real — not just imagined — ability to cooperate that exists at the party level is one of the most important requirements for a successful foreign policy.

11,466  
CSO: 3107

## PERSONNEL CARRIER ORDERED FOR ARMY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 12 Oct 80 p 6

[Text] In order to facilitate mobility of the troops placed in Northern Finland, about 16 million marks worth of personnel carriers with equipment will be ordered from Sweden for the Defence Forces. The new carriers will be ordered from AB Bofors Forsvarsmateriel company and the deliveries will be spaced between 1981 and 1984. The procurement is based on the statement in the state budgetary proposal for 1980 which indicates that the northern Finland troops will have to be supplied with the kind of equipment that is dictated by the region's special conditions. Also the previous carriers which are used for instance in Lapland, are Swedish-made. They are however beginning to be too old. The pulling end of the old carrier would have been [as published] manufactured by Volvo. The new Bofors carrier By 206 will accelerate to 55 kilometres per hour and adapts well to the terrain. It also moves on the water with its own propeller. The carrier's maximum water speed is 3.5 kilometers per hour.



Bofors carrier By 206. 16 million marks worth of these are going to be procured, and they will replace the earlier carrier, also of Swedish make. The two-part rubber-tracked carriers will adapt especially well to arctic conditions and the difficult Lappish terrain.

9571

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## TRIPS

**SUGAR PACT WITH CUBA**—Havana (ITT)—Finland and Cuba have reached agreement on the remaining shipments provided for in the sugar contract signed in 1979. The freight agreement between Finland and Cuba, which guarantees Finnish products a favorable freight rate to Cuba, was also renewed during the Finnish-Cuban Trade Union businessmen delegation's visit. Finland will annually purchase 60,000 tons of unrefined sugar from Cuba. And Cuba will import medicines, metal and lumber-industry products from Finland. Last year Finland showed a nearly 150-million-mark trade balance deficit. During the delegation's visit, Cuban Foreign Trade Minister Cabrera and foreign affairs adviser Veijo Sampojaara of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed the development of trade between the two countries, correction of the trade imbalance and pending plans of interest to Cuba. Suomen Sokeri Oy general manager Martti Turkola headed the delegation and its members chiefly represented the sugar, metal, mining and chemical industries as well as the lumber industry. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Oct 80 p 30] 11466

CUB: 3107

## ENGINEERS, TECHNICIANS LEAVING IRAN, IRAQ WORKSITES

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 13 Oct 80 p 49

[Article: "French Worksite Being Vacated"]

[Text] Hundreds of Frenchmen work in Iraq and Iran. Most of them have been repatriated via Kuwait, Jordan or Turkey. Air France evacuated more than 200 from Iraq between 25 September and 6 October. They are safe and sound. Only some sites of public works or construction (maternity hospitals and dwellings) continue working slowly. The offices of French companies in Teheran and Baghdad remain open in case that...

## IRAN

PROJECT	CONTRACTOR	COST IN MILLION FRANCS	SITUATION
Thermal power station at Tabriz	SGEE Alsthom- Atlantique	1,000	60 persons evacuated 4 persons remain in Teheran
Modernization of the Teheran- Bandar Khomeiny Railroad	Spie- Batignolles	10,000	Personnel repatriated
Two railroad equipment factories	Spie- Batignolles		Practically completed. No more French personnel.

## IRAQ

PROJECT	CONTRACTOR	COST IN MILLION FRANCS	SITUATION
Baghdad Airport	Spie- Batignolles Fougerolles	4,000	Personnel repatriated

# IRAQ

PROJECT	CONTRACTOR	COST IN MILLION FRANCS	SITUATION
Subway in Baghdad	Dragages et T.P.	90	Continues
Bridge in Baghdad	Dragages		Continues slowly
Project of 1000 dwellings north of Baghdad; T.P. worksites	Bouygues	300	Work in state of suspended animation. 140 persons repatriated
Badoosh Cement Factory	Spie- Batignolles	600	Personnel repatriated
Steelworks at Khor al Zubair	Creusot-Loire Enterprise	1,800	Inaugurated end of July. 162 technical assistants repatriated willingly. 15 volunteers remain on site.
GPL production complex, 50 km southwest of Bassorah	Technip	1,000	Worksite opened early July. Civil engineering stage. All 16 Frenchmen and 70 Filipinos have been evacuated.
Hilla-Diwaniya Highway	GTN and Dragages	1,000	The worksite, just opened continues in operation.
GPL production factory at Kirkuk	Technipetrol (Italian affiliate of Technip)		50 Italians and 270 Filipinos evacuated
Aluminum semi-products factory at Nasiriyah	Secim	450	Inaugurated last January. All 10 French technical assistants have been evacuated
Constructed of six maternity hospitals	Renault Industry Equipment et Technique	550	Work continues slowly. Part of personnel have been repatriated.

9341  
CSO: 3100

## POLL: OPINIONS TOWARD USSR BASED ON AGE, JOB, POLITICS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 12 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Charles Rebois: "The Defiant French: A Poll by Figaro-Sofres on Conditions in the Socialist Bloc"]

[Text] At a time when there is opening in Madrid the conference on freedom, which confronts two fundamentally different concepts of society, it was interesting to know the opinions of the French regarding the countries of the East and the relations of these countries with the western world. The poll which we publish today deals with this concern.

A first important indication emerges from a comparison with a poll conducted in 1972 and which involved two questions which we have used again: the image of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies has deteriorated a great deal in the past 8 years. Some 28 percent considered the overall balance sheet of the socialist system to be positive in 1972; only 14 percent hold that view today. The invasion of Afghanistan and the events in Poland may explain this negative judgment which--and this is an important point--is shared by 30 percent of the communists polled.

The poll presents several points of interest. It makes it possible to know, to the extent that one can through such an inquiry, how communists, to mention only them, react to the problems of the countries of the East; also, how the French regard the policy of the president with regard to these same countries.

The detailed responses, broken down by political preferences, provide a revelation which, for some, will be only a confirmation: many communist voters reject the style of society of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies. At a time when the conference in Madrid is being held one thus learns that only 25 percent of the persons being interviewed who call themselves communists consider that public and individual freedoms are respected in the countries of the East.

However, in two respects the balance sheet of the people's democracies appears to be positive: access of all persons to health care and equality of opportunity in the field of education. Most often listed against them, beyond the absence of personal freedom, is their low standard of living.

The poll teaches us also that the most favorable responses to the USSR do not always come from the workers. Upper-ranking officials and managers, to whom one can add



the intellectuals, at times express fewer reservations than manual workers. That should make the PCF reconsider some of its targets.

In a general sense women, more than men, reject the concepts of the countries of the East, when they dare to express an opinion.

Age also determines behavior. Those between the ages of 18 and 24 and those over 65 show a less favorable attitude towards the USSR and its satellites. On the other hand it is those 25 and 34 who adopt the least critical positions.

With regard to political preferences, and always considering the questions as a whole, the communists are naturally more inclined to express favorable judgments, without, however, showing much enthusiasm. Socialist responses are clearly more hostile. In the majority of cases it is the supporters of the RPF who denounce the practices of the countries of the East with the most vigor.

Two questions in the poll concern social problems. The sympathy felt for Lech Walesa and his associates and the hope of seeing their cause win influenced answers without a doubt. Some 34 percent consider that free trade unions are acceptable in the people's democracies, and 40 percent express the contrary view. Similar percentages are found with regard to questions on the exercise of the right to strike.

Independent of these more or less qualified answers, the poll found that 57 percent of the persons questioned held the following view: the political regimes maintained behind the iron curtain only exist through the presence of the Soviet army. Only communist responses do not join in the clear unanimity shown on this question.

Therefore, it is necessary to abandon the countries of the East to a sort of marxist hell? The French don't want it that way. Some 34 percent of them believe that, in the next few years these countries will evolve toward more democracy. It remains to know whether this evolution could take place with the consent of the existing regimes and under pressure from the masses or as a result of external factors. The latest developments in the uprising of the Polish workers do not allow one to hold great hopes for the prospects. Moreover, Poland has always constituted a special case.

After this note of hope one returns quickly to a more somber reality when problems are raised touching on the free movement of people and ideas throughout the world, a central theme, a few years ago, of the Helsinki conference and today of the Madrid conference.

Some 73 percent consider that the Soviet Union does not respect the agreements signed in Finland, against 5 percent holding contrary views. Some more overwhelming figures: 48 percent of the communists think that the country which is presented to them as a model is not respecting the promises which it undertook at Helsinki, as opposed to 22 percent who hold an opposing view, 30 percent prudently stating that they have no opinion on the matter. This certainly provides proof that there is not always unison of views between the party of Georges Marchais and communist voters and that, in the last analysis, a communist vote does not necessarily imply support for marxism.

In these circumstances was it agreed that France should participate in the Madrid conference with the objective of seeking at any cost agreements with the Soviet Union to safeguard detente? In an outburst of spirit 68 percent answered yes, and only 14 percent thought that France should have abstained from participating in the conference to show its firmness with regard to the USSR.

It was thus demonstrated that the French remain, in spite of everything, convinced partisans of the need to seek an understanding to avoid a conflict with the East. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing will find in that a justification for his foreign policy and approval after the fact for his meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw, which brought him much criticism from our partners and among political observers.

On this subject public opinion is not content to adopt a position of principle. It goes beyond that in wishing that France and West Germany--both of them specifically mentioned--should provide financial aid when a country of Eastern Europe encounters serious economic difficulties, in order not to place the stability of the world in danger. This wish is shared by all categories of France, whatever their age, their professional category, or their political preferences.

While noting that a large number of our fellow citizens think that the Soviet Union and the countries of the East are presently more powerful than the countries of the West in the military sphere, one may ask the question whether this wish for conciliation is not dictated by fear.

The spirit of Munich in that case would not be dead! It is not without interest to note that those least disposed to share this view are women, young people, and, for other reasons, communists.

The poll ends with a satisfactory mark for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing who, in the relations between France and the Soviet Union, follows a "proper" policy, which is hardly too conciliatory.

The results of this poll could give the impression of reflecting a certain incoherence of public opinion which we might review. A more careful examination shows, on the contrary, that the behavior of the French toward the USSR and the countries of the East is in accordance with a certain logic.

First, they show that they are not duped, that they have no illusions regarding the countries of the East. Their attitude is based on specific facts: the absence of freedom and, to a lesser degree, the economic failures. To a certain extent the French communists recognize these defects, which their leaders hide by referring to what they call, "a positive, overall balance sheet."

Further, the French remain, in spite of Kabul, in spite of Warsaw, or perhaps because of Warsaw, convinced partisans of detente. By a majority they support the efforts undertaken in this sense by the president of the republic. However, if they do not play with fire, they are no less severe in their judgments. They condemn, but their verdict is subject to appeal.

Some people will deplore this attitude, which is not marked with the seal of heroism. They will refer to the popular verdict which President Carter has just suffered, to which they will oppose the determination on which Ronald Reagan has shown. But there are no heroes in the streets in these times of austerity.

Technical Details on the poll from SOFRES

--Poll carried out for LE FIGARO.

--Date of poll: 23 to 29 October 1980.

--National sample of 974 persons, representatives of the whole of the population aged 18 and over.

--Method used: quotas (by sex, age, profession of the family head) with a breakdown by region and type of city or town.

Question: If you prepare a balance sheet on the socialist system as it functions in the Soviet Union and in the people's democracies, does this balance sheet appear to you to be rather positive or rather negative?

	<u>SOFRES-ORTF POLL - 1972</u>	<u>NOVEMBER 1980</u>
-- Rather positive	28	14
-- Rather negative	43	59
--no opinion	<u>29</u>	<u>27</u>
	100%	100%

Question: If you think of countries like the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, would you say that, in each of the following categories, the socialist system is rather a failure?

	<u>SOFRES-ORTF POLL - 1972</u>			<u>NOVEMBER, 1980</u>		
	<u>Success</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Success</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
- Economic Development	39	29	32	26	46	28
- Participation of Workers in Management	33	26	41	25	42	33
- Reduction of Social Inequality	34	31	35	28	43	29
- Access by All to Health Care	--	--	--	47	16	37
- Equal Opportunity for Education	--	--	--	40	25	35

SOFRES-ORTF  
POLL - 1972

NOVEMBER, 1980

	<u>Success</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Success</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
- Respect for Public and Private Freedom	14	58	28	8	70	22
- Improvement of Living Standards	43	30	27	20	53	27

Question: In the countries of the East do you think that, for the existing political regime free trade unions are acceptable or unacceptable?

- Acceptable	34
- Unacceptable	40
-- No opinion	<u>26</u>
	100%

Question: Do you think that, for the existing political regime the right to strike is acceptable or unacceptable?

- Acceptable	39
- Unacceptable	41
-- No opinion	<u>20</u>
	100%

Question: Regarding the political regimes of Eastern Europe we have obtained the two following opinions. With which one are you more in agreement?

- The political regimes in the people's democracies are only maintained in power by the presence of the Soviet army on their territory.	57
- The people's democracies are maintained in power because the citizens of those countries are in agreement with the regime under which they live.	21
-- No opinion	<u>22</u>
	100%



Question: Do you think that, in the coming years, the countries of the East will evolve towards more democracy?

- Yes	34
- No	21
-- No opinion	<u>25</u>
	100%

Question: When a country of the East has serious economic difficulties and asks a capitalist country, like France or West Germany, for financial aid, do you think...

- that it is better to give it this financial aid in order not to increase its difficulties and not place world stability in danger.	52
- or that it is not desirable to give it financial aid because, after all, that only serves to reinforce the governments of the countries of the East.	25
-- No opinion	<u>23</u>
	100%

Question: You know that agreements were signed a few years ago in Helsinki (in Finland) among the principal countries to ensure free circulation of people and of ideas throughout the world. Do you think that, for its part, the Soviet Union respects or does not respect the Helsinki agreements?

		<u>Soviet Union Respects Helsinki Agreements</u>	<u>Soviet Union Does Not Respect Helsinki Agreements</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
<u>Sex</u>	Total: 100%	5	73	22
- Men	100%	6	79	15
- Women	100%	4	67	29
<u>Age</u>				
- 18 to 24	100%	7	69	24
- 25 to 34	100%	5	78	17
- 35 to 49	100%	2	74	24
- 50 to 64	100%	7	69	24
- 65 and over	100%	5	71	24

		<u>Soviet Union Respects Helsinki Agreements</u>	<u>Soviet Union Does Not Respect Helsinki Agreements</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Total: 100%				
<u>Occupation of Family Head</u>				
- Farmer, farm worker	100%	1	60	39
- Small merchant, artisan	100%	3	76	21
- Senior official, liberal profession, industrialist, large-scale business	100%	3	82	13
- Civil servant, employee	100%	4	81	15
- Manual worker	100%	8	63	27
- Inactive, retired	100%	4	73	23
<u>Political Preference</u>				
- Communist Party	100%	22	48	30
- Socialist Party	100%	7	73	20
- UDF	100%	1	81	18
- RPR	100%	1	91	8

Question: You know that there is soon to be held in Madrid a conference among the principal countries of the world on international problems. In this connection we have obtained two opinions on the participation of France in this conference. With which of the two are you more in accord?

		<u>Preferable that France participate to seek agreement with the Soviet Union and protect detente at any price</u>	<u>Better that France not participate to show firmness towards Soviet Union</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Total: 100%				
<u>Sex</u>				
- Men	100%	74	14	12
- Women	100%	63	14	23

		Preferable that France participate to seek agreement with the Soviet Union and protect detente at any price	Better that France not participate to show firmness towards Soviet Union	No Opinion
<u>Age</u>	Total: 100%			
- 18 to 24	100%	67	17	16
- 25 to 34	100%	69	18	13
- 35 to 49	100%	72	11	17
- 50 to 64	100%	63	15	22
- 65 and over	100%	69	10	21
<u>Occupation of Family Head</u>				
- Farmer, farm worker	100%	59	13	28
- Small merchant, artisan	100%	61	20	19
- Senior official, liberal profession, industrialist, large-scale business	100%	76	13	11
- Civil servant, employee	100%	76	13	11
- Manual worker	100%	67	16	17
- Inactive, retired	100%	66	13	21
<u>Political Preference</u>				
- Communist Party	100%	78	8	14
- Socialist Party	100%	78	13	9
- UDF	100%	71	14	15
- RPR	100%	59	31	10

Question: Do you think that, in the relations of France with the Soviet Union Mr Giscard d'Estaing shows himself....

		<u>Too Conciliatory</u>	<u>Not Conciliatory Enough</u>	<u>About Right</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	Total: 100%	23	5	51	21
<u>Sex</u>					
- Men	100%	26	5	52	17
- Women	100%	21	5	51	23
<u>Age</u>					
- 18 to 24	100%	17	8	48	27
- 25 to 34	100%	29	7	43	21
- 35 to 49	100%	20	4	58	18
- 50 to 64	100%	24	5	54	17
- 65 and over	100%	24	1	53	22
<u>Occupation of Family Head</u>					
- Farmer, farm worker	100%	21	4	49	26
- Small merchant, artisan	100%	31	5	44	20
- Senior official, liberal profession, industrialist, large-scale business	100%	32	3	44	21
-- Civil Serant, employee	100%	25	3	51	19
-- Manual Worker	100%	18	8	55	19
- Inactive, Retired	100%	24	3	53	20
<u>Political Preference</u>					
- Communist Party	100%	10	14	55	21
- Socialist Party	100%	28	5	52	15
- UDF	100%	24	2	64	10
- RFR	100%	45	4	42	9

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CSO: 3100



## PCF'S GREMETZ OPENS EAST BERLIN REVOLUTIONARIES' MEETING

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 22 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Bernard Umbrecht: "The Demand for a New World Order"]

[Text] Maxime Gremetz stresses the importance of struggles to achieve more just and democratic relations among nations.

Berlin, 21 October—The 116 delegations from communist parties, other revolutionary parties and national liberation movements that are meeting at the headquarters of the People's Chamber in the GDR capital are conducting their proceedings divided among three committees. Monday, Maxime Gremetz, a member of the PCF's [French Communist Party] Political Bureau, presented one of the three opening statements.

First of all, he stressed the "very great importance" of this "broad assemblage where each participant is invited to express himself without any formality whatsoever on the basis of the revolutionary experiments conducted in his country and in terms of his own appraisal of them."

The presence of a very large number of representatives of parties and movements of different parties throughout the world is a sign of the "profound convergence of interests and of action undertaken by these revolutionary forces."

Starting with the experience of the PCF, its delegation submitted a certain number of observations for discussion. These had to do with "that major demand of our time, as expressed through the struggles for more just, more harmonious and more democratic relations among countries and nations, that is, the creation of a new political and economic world order."

This demand emerges within the overall context of the international class struggle in a world that, to be sure, moves in a complex, nonlinear way but in which, nonetheless, the main tendency is toward the development of progressive forces in the world.

#### Modification in Favor of Peace and Socialism

Maxime Gremetz emphasized that the aspiration for a new order "is a participating factor in the modification of the balance of power in favor of peace and socialism."

It is "expressed through force by the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean who yesterday were enslaved. Today, they are politically sovereign and determined to be the masters of their own destinies.

"It finds an echo in the 'Group of 77,' countries in process of development and UN members.

"It is manifested in the action of countries that are constructing socialist societies.

"It is expressed through the social and political struggles of the working classes and of all those popular forces in the capitalist countries that are combatting exploitation and all the effects of the imperialist system, to achieve structural reforms in all sectors, for democracy, for socialism in their own countries."

The struggles for the establishment of a new order assume universal dimensions.

In the face of the social and political struggles traversing the world, confronted with a crisis that strikes at its very foundations, imperialism is striving to react to perpetuate its organizations of plunder and oppression. To that end it finds aid in the policies of the social democratic parties and the Socialist International. Maxime Gremetz demonstrated that "the gap that exists between ideological words and deeds is thrown into relief by, for example, the positions adopted by Willy Brandt, president of the Socialist International, within the framework of the International Commission on Problems of Aid and Development formed on the initiative of Robert MacNamara, president of the World Bank."

#### Independence and Sovereignty of Nations

Thus Willy Brandt in that organization "vehemently denounced the arms race but did nothing to oppose NATO country enterprises to amplify their military potential in Europe and in other parts of the world." The examples can be multiplied. In a general way, Willy Brandt invites the peoples of the world to engage in "solidarity with the chief objective being to attempt to quell the class struggles which on the international scene converge on the imperialist system, now in a state of crisis."

The demand for a new political and economic world order is "at the crossroads of the struggles of the working classes, peoples and nations. 'It' is first of all based on the nations of the world's demand for independence and sovereignty." "The establishment of a new order," Maxime Gremetz added, "will come through recognition of each country's right to freely determine its own destiny, without interference from outside, but by granting itself the means of assuring its security and independence."

The representative of the PCF played up a second point, the "close, almost organic link between the struggles for a new order and the action for peace, disarmament and security."

Profound democratization of international life is necessary and concrete steps must be taken for "the elimination of hunger and all the effects of underdevelopment on a planetwide basis."

"It is indeed inadmissible that in our time, one marked by the advances of the scientific and technical revolution, hundreds of thousands of men, women and children are victims of starvation, malnutrition and disease... The successes the socialist countries have had in their efforts toward development are proof that the persistence in our time of these plagues, in particular in Africa and Asia, is the result of an exploitive social system, capitalism."

Furthermore, we must investigate "solutions of mutual interest" in the domain of raw materials and energy and "a radical recasting of the international monetary and financial system" is on the agenda.

11,466  
CSO: 5100

## POLITICAL TIES BETWEEN PSF, CGT DETERIORATE

## PS Criticizes CGT Leader

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct 80 p 38

[Article by Joanne Roy]

[Excerpt] Several sharp reactions were elicited by the statement published by the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] on 29 October in which the confederation expressed its indignation over the insulting remarks made by Daniel Percheron, member of the PS [Socialist Party] directorate committee, about Mr Seguy. At the same time, the confederation accused the socialist leader of calling upon members of his party affiliated with the CGT to leave that trade union organization. "The CGT leaders know full well that there is nothing to this," the press was told on the evening of the same day by Pierre Feuilly, member of the confederation's executive committee. Feuilly and other activist socialists intend to carry the debate before the next CGT committee meeting on 4 November.

Other CGT officials, who are not politically involved, have also expressed disapproval of the confederation's 29 October statement. This was particularly true of Jacqueline Lambert and Rene Buhl, members of the bureau (which they are leaving at the end of the year for personal reasons). Disagreeing at least with respect to procedure, they did not participate in the debate. Gerard Gaume, the only socialist in the confederal bureau, refused to make any comment. For its part, the PS executive bureau, at the end of its weekly meeting, stated that it rejected a "polemic harmful to the interests of wage earners." In a text unanimously adopted, the PS executive bureau noted: "PS relations with the CGT were good so long as the confederal directorate gave priority to trade union actions on partisan political concerns. It is up to the CGT leaders and to them alone to establish normal relations with the Socialist Party which within its organization practices trade union pluralism." "It is obvious," the communique adds, "that no leader of our party would think of inviting activist socialists to leave the CGT."

The CGT bureau notes that Daniel Percheron, member of the PS directorate committee, first secretary of the Pas-de-Calais federation and deputy to the European Parliament, "during a demonstration by that party, took the step of grossly insulting the secretary general of the CGT. Brutally attacking the CGT per se, he called upon activist socialists to leave the CGT."



Expressing its indignation, the bureau said, "Percheron's call to trade union socialists brings back a memory which we hoped was dead and buried, when the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International] directorate demanded that socialists leave the CGT and excluded those who continued to perform duties in our organizations. The directorate of the Socialist Party per se owes the CGT a clear, public statement on this attack. Of course, this situation will have no effect on Socialist Party members or sympathisers who are members of the CGT, are active in it and perform duties at all levels," the bureau goes on to say, in the development of this theme with reference to the 40th CGT Congress.

#### Percheron: The CGT Wants an 'Abscess of the Anchorage'

The demonstration brought into question by the CGT was the Festival of Roses which was held in Angers on 21 September. Percheron told us, as he brought up the subject of strikes by Polish workers and the statements made by the secretary general of the CGT, that he had said, "Edmond Maire was the pride of French trade unionism, and he allowed everyone the right to judge Georges Seguy." According to information at our disposal, Percheron had added, "One does not change a Stalinian apparatus from the inside."

"It is not my place to call upon socialists to leave the CGT," Percheron also told us. "The socialist federation of Pas-de-Calais is daily confronted by a CGT whose local leaders are all members of the PC [Communist Party]. This party is exercising all its influence with an eye to the elections. The fiction of the CGT's independence, from the political standpoint, does not exist for us. The CGT wants to create an abscess of the anchorage." [to precipitate a crisis among the rank and file?]

It is true that relations are very tense in the Pas-de-Calais between the Socialists and the Communists. At the time of the demonstrations organized on 28 October by the CGT on behalf of its radiobroadcasting station, Noel Joseph, PS representative, like the Communists, denounced police intervention but also criticised the PC by saying, "Radio-Quinquin has become a radio in the service of the Communist Party...over which there are unending attacks against the Socialist Party and its elected officials. It is not possible to ask for our support and to ceaselessly attack us." (LE MONDE 30 October).

#### CGT: The Presence of Socialists Spreads Confusion

The incidents which, during the Manufrance demonstrations in Saint-Etienne on 18 October, erupted between members of the CGT's order service and PS representatives are another illustration of the deterioration of relations between the two organizations and are not unrelated to the latest statement by the CGT bureau.

On the eve of the Saint-Etienne demonstration, Rene Lomet, CGT secretary general, had written to Claude Geron, PS national secretary (and also member of the CGT executive committee) to tell him that the Socialist delegation could take its place at the head of the group, with the other political

parties. "However," Lomet added, "we want to call your attention to the feelings created by Percheron's statements in Angers which the silence of your director seems to sanction. We do not exclude the possibility that the workers may be led to demonstrate their feelings."

It was under these circumstances that, upon his arrival in Saint-Etienne on 18 October, Germon sent a letter to Seguy which the PS described as "translating its position perfectly." The PS, Germon wrote, deplored the fact that it was the target of insults too much to adopt the same methods. Every Socialist is free to choose his trade union. That is why, the national secretary added, the Socialists are deploring the discriminations of which their members are the victims by virtue of their accepting duties within the CGT.

The CGT leaders' statement shows that they are not at all pleased with this letter. "It is intolerable that the PS is participating in the demonstrations organized by the CGT," some confederal leaders feel. "The PS in this way is exculpating itself for its drift to the right. That is spreading confusion among the workers."

It also seems that irritation is resuming against the signers of the petition "For Union in Struggles."

#### Efforts at Reconciliation

Paris LE MONDE in French 2-3 Nov 80 p 13

[Excerpt] A statement by Henri Krasucki, confederal secretary of the CGT, which was published in the 1 November edition of L'HUMANITE, seems to mark a certain degree of improvement in the relations between the labor confederation and the PS, relations which had seriously deteriorated after the "insulting" remarks against Georges Seguy made by Percheron, member of the directorate committee of the Socialist Party.

"As a matter of fact, the PS directorate answered the questions raised by the CGT positively," Krasucki said on 31 October, making reference to the communique adopted earlier by the PS executive bureau. "If it had made its point of its own accord after Percheron's statements or even after the public reply by Georges Seguy, the confederal bureau would have had no need to make the statement which brought about this response," Krasucki continued.

"That being the case, the executive bureau of the PS would have gained by stopping at that point, which is appropriate to the subject and the measured tones of the CGT statement, which avoided any judgment on the politics of the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party's executive bureau found it expedient to allege, in the same reply, that the CGT confederal directorate would give priority to partisan political concerns with respect to trade union action. Thus it puts itself in very bad company and exposes itself to replies which the very character of the confederal bureau's statement aimed to avoid.

## MRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN TO MAKE FINAL BREAK WITH PS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Oct 80 p 7

[Article by Jacques Fleury: "Michel Crepeau (M.R.G.): Break the Pack of Four"]

[Text] The steering committee of the Radical Left is meeting this weekend to put the final touches on the party manifesto, "The Future Facing Us," and especially to approve Michel Crepeau's battle plan for the presidential campaign. From the beginning of November, the deputy mayor of La Rochelle, who still suffers some ill effects of his recent auto accident, is going to visit all 21 regions to try out and popularize the themes of his campaign, essentially centered on three points: the new growth, the independence of Europe in relation to the two great powers, and the problems of security.

In a parallel matter, there is no longer any doubt at the MRG that this electoral campaign will provoke the rupture of the last links which still joined the movement to the PS. No one has any illusions any longer about the future of the movement and especially about its future presentations to the National Assembly without the support of "its socialist big brother." So everything is centered on this presidential election, with the immediate goal of making a better showing in the polls which currently give no more than 2 percent to Michel Crepeau.

Last June when the congress of the MRG chose Michel Crepeau to enter the race for the Elysee Palace, the deputy mayor of La Rochelle accepted "this honor" with scant enthusiasm. He had at that time, moreover, surrounded his candidacy with so many conditions that it appeared improbable that the MRG would finally be represented on 26 April 1981.

Today it is an enthusiastic Michel Crepeau, one who will see his pledges through to the end, and who is launching himself into the campaign. "It is true," he says, "the polls show us little interest. But we have not yet made known our determination. What encourages us is to note that, in these same polls, 50 percent of the French refuse to declare themselves. It's because they are refusing the pack of four (PC, PS, UDF and PRP) and they are waiting for a real change. Never have we had at our disposal such an opening. Never has the situation been so favorable to us."

It is the evolution of the political situation, the quasi-definitive rupture of the union of the left, the "demobilizing" internal quarrels of the PS, but also the

differences at the heart of the majority, which give Michel Crepeau hope for the re-birth of a powerful radical party regrouping all the forces of the left. "The Socialist Party wants to convince us that it represents the only alternative for change. But between Francois Ceyrac and Georges Marchais, there are a lot of people. On the other hand, Valery Giscard d'Estaing tricks the French by making them believe that he is the center left. That center left, it is we the radicals who are the incarnation of it.

#### New Majority

The future, for the present of the MRG, is the appearance of a new majority by causing "the break-up of the pack of four" which has got society locked up. An evolution which can come from the ballot-boxes and which, like a "mayonnaise", will start off with "three ingredients: a little social democracy a la Rocard, some new society of Jacques Chaban Delmas and some liberal manifesto of Michel Crepeau."

A cocktail to recreate a society of the "Mendesist" type. After all, notes the leader of the MRG, "the tradition of Gambetta has nothing to envy that of Jaures." It remains to be seen if a new experiment of the Mendesist type could be attempted in the respect of institutions.

For the time being Michel Crepeau thinks that the presidential election is going to favor the reunion of the radical family. "The reunification will happen in the ballot-boxes," he says, "since I am the only candidate of all the radicals. Moreover, one cannot see how the Valoisians are going to be able to continue to advocate voting for Giscard, all the while criticizing the government more and more sharply."

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## TERRORIST SEPARATIST GROUP FLNC ENTERS NEW TACTICAL PHASE

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct 80 p 40

[Text] Marseille--Seven banking establishments were the object of explosive attacks in the center of Marseille Thursday 30 October between 1350 and 1430 hours. Very light charges were exploded in front of the branches of the BNP [National Bank of Paris], Crédit du Nord, Sudameris, Société Générale, Caisse d'Epargne [Savings Bank], Crédit Universel, and Crédit Agricole [Farm Credit]. It is reported from a police source that four persons were slightly wounded by broken glass. However, a passerby could have been seriously hurt, since three explosions took place at numbers 82, 87, and 89, Rue de la République. The seven explosions were claimed, in the course of an anonymous telephone call to the AFP [French News Agency], by the Front for the National Liberation of Corsica (FLNC).

On 30 September the FLNC had claimed credit for an attack on the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Marseille, situated in the center of the city.

Ajaccio (from our correspondent P.S.)--It is not the first time the FNLC has committed attacks on the continent. Since the creation of the "Front" on 6 May 1976 a number of actions have been organized outside of Corsica, notably at Paris, against cabinet ministers, banking agencies, and oil or rail installations. The attack on the gendarmes outside the Iranian Embassy on 14 May 1980, in which four were wounded, will also be remembered.

The separatist organization, which defends "the Corsican people's right to self-determination" and "the destruction of all instruments of French colonialism," has chosen clandestine violence because it "has no political means at its disposal for the free expression of its will." The FLNC's strategy has been defined several times by its periodical organ RIBELLU: armed propaganda first, armed struggle next, right to self-determination finally.

ntly the FNLC has passed to the second phase, which involves "defeating and destroying the instruments of colonialism in Corsica, in France, and elsewhere."

t this form of struggle does not mean "a desire to fight France," for "the Corsican problem is political and not military." But, "by the military and political action progressively undertaken by the people, we shall compel the French state to negotiate." Furthermore, "there is no question for us of modeling our struggle on any model whatever (Algeria, Vietnam, Ireland, etc.), but of drawing useful lessons from those and thus avoiding certain errors." Chosen method:

"Using the methods of modern guerrilla warfare adapted to Corsican reality, striking without warning at sensitive points, making our commandos run the least possible risk, and not confronting French military and police power where it is superior in men and materiel."

What, as exactly as possible, are the numbers of the FNLC? The investigators themselves have never been able to determine that; their estimates vary from 100 to 300 persons. It is evident nevertheless that the numerous questions in parliament since 1977-1978 and the no less numerous convictions (50-odd during the last 3 years) handed down by the National Supreme Court do not seem to have struck any decisive blows at the organization.

Thus one may wonder whether the situation with which we are familiar will not continue over an indefinite period, with all the risks that that may involve.

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## FRANCE

### GENERAL, FLAG OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS, PROMOTIONS

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct 80 p 26

[Article. "Admiral Philippe de Gaulle Assigned as Inspector General of the Navy"]

[Text] At its Wednesday 29 October meeting, the cabinet approved the following assignments and promotions in the armed forces upon recommendation of Defense Minister Joel Le Theule.

#### Navy

##### Assignments

Admiral Philippe de Gaulle is assigned as inspector general of the Navy, succeeding Admiral Jean Tardy who has been transferred to the "second section" (special reserve of general and flag officers) and appointed special member of the Council of State. (Admiral De Gaulle, son of the former president of the Republic, was born in Paris on 21 December 1921. From 1971 to 1973 he served on the armed forces general staff as chief of the general plans division. Next he headed the naval test and evaluation group aboard the Henri Poincare. In November 1974, he assumed command of the maritime air patrol service, and in 1975, of the Atlantic Fleet at Brest. He was promoted to vice admiral of the fleet [U. S. equivalent: admiral] in May 1977 and since October of that same year has been chairman of the standing (permanent) committee for the testing of naval ships. He was promoted to fleet admiral on 25 June 1980).

Vice Admiral Yves Leenhardt is assigned as chairman of the standing committee for the testing of naval ships, as successor to Admiral Philippe de Gaulle.

##### Promotions

To vice admiral: Rear Admirals Cyril Herbout and Georges Mouline; to rear admiral: captains Georges Le Cloerac, Claude Darodes de Taillly, Rene Hugues, Jacques Lavoile, and Bernard Klotz. The latter is also assigned as assistant chief of staff for operations of the 3d Naval Region in Toulon.

#### Army

##### Promotions

To brigadier general: colonels Guy Bonduelle, Georges Baffeleuf, and Robert Farret. The latter is also assigned to the main headquarters of the Corps of Engineers as assistant chief of staff.

#### Assignment

As quartermaster of the 4th Military Region in Bordeaux: quartermaster-general second class Fernand Lapotre

#### Armament

#### Promotion

To engineer-general second class: chief engineers Rene Audran and Claude Capelier.

#### Gendarmerie

#### Promotions

To brigadier general: Colonel Lazare Tomasini, also assigned as deputy chief of staff for operations and employment in the national gendarmerie headquarters.

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## ESA SEEN AT ORGANIZATIONAL, FINANCIAL TURNING POINT

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Oct 80 p 18

[Article by J.-P. A.: "The European Space Agency Is Asked By Its Member States To Cut 10 Percent Of Its Personnel For Budget Reasons"]

[Text] The European Space Agency (ESA) is to be reorganized over the next few months. Restructuring, stricter management practices, new programs and the cutting of positions are all included in this 10-year plan, presented by the director general of the agency on Tuesday, 21 October, to the board of directors of the ESA.

The European Space Agency has arrived at a turning point in its existence. The broad programs it is responsible for--the heavy launcher Ariane and the space laboratory Spacelab--are coming to an end and those which it had, for a while, hoped to obtain to replace them have partly slipped out of its grasp. Some of the member states, in particular France and West Germany, which provide the bulk of its funds, have insisted upon the agency's remaining a research and development organization. As for the utilization of space, these countries prefer operating on a national level and through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to a community-wide agreement. That would be the case for the direct television satellites and for the earth observation satellite SPOT and the private company Arianespace, which is responsible for the promotion and commercialization of Ariane, over which the agency retains the right of oversight.

To that can now be added what is now being said aloud and what many were already whispering: the agency must be restructured, must economize and must operate more efficiently and at a lower cost. That is why the French delegation, just as many others, asked that the staff be better adapted to the projects it is responsible for. That situation has led the agency to examine its future. Under pressure from its member states, it has worked out a plan for its activities over the next 10 years.

That task, which was begun at the beginning of last summer, was entrusted to a 58 year old Danish industrialist, Mr Erik Quistgaard, the new director general of the ESA. The drafters of the report, which was presented on Tuesday, 21 October, to the board of directors of the ESA, which is made up of representatives of the member states, aimed at defining the role of the agency for the period 1980-1990, the content of its programs and the level of its budget resources--which will without a doubt be lower than during the period 1978-1979-1980--and also at studying structural reforms which might be applied to it.

One of the first measures might bear on the elimination of the former program and planning management, while a greater autonomy, and consequently a greater responsibility, would be given to individual programs and to the technical departments of the agency. Another, less popular one, would lead to the elimination of about 10 percent of the some 1,400 jobs in the agency.

To obtain an agreement of the member states on the content of the reforms and on programs will not be easy. Because, if all the countries represented in the agency are in favor of improved management and of increased efficiency, their individual points of view may well diverge in a more detailed review. The smaller countries which, unlike France and Germany, do not have the possibility of undertaking national programs, would not like to see the current operation end up in the long run by the break up of the agency, which is the only means they have, they say, of fulfilling their ambitions in space.

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CSO: 3100

MATRA'S DURAND INTERVIEWED ON SATCP MISSILE PRODUCTION

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-31 Oct 80 p 19

[Interview with Emile Durand, director of MATRA Military Division, by AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL]

[Text] [Question] MATRA has been selected by the ministry of defense to provide the development of the SATCP (Ground to Air Very Short Range) system. What does such a contract mean for your company?

[Answer] Our enterprise did need a major development program: if you take the short-term view (especially where studies are concerned), the programs currently in the process of being carried out at MATRA are in fact "extrapolations" of programs undergoing development.

Besides the fact that the SATCP program provides an immediate study assignment of great interest to our company, it is also clear that the latter will eventually be relatively important at the industrial level (particularly where this missile's projected cost is concerned, a projection which we can reach in view of the large quantities to be delivered and of the rapid production rates.)

[Question] As a matter of fact, since you mention large production quantities, rapid rates, and a considerable potential market, can you give us a clear idea of this market?

[Answer] From a purely French standpoint, requirements are of the order of 10,000 missiles -- as most of the press pointed out. Concerning export, I would say that needs are greater than those of our national defense. This is why this program should result in the production of 20,000 to 40,000 missiles. This leeway depends on a number of factors, notably political issues.

[Question] In terms of the SATCP program, you are the general contractor for weapons systems. Does this give you new ambitions?

[Answer] Each time bids were called for, concerning systems where we were qualified, we submitted bids. It goes without saying that this competence can grow. Within our company, general contracting represents one of the main lines of our future development: thus the Military Division has already secured contracts for very important systems or subsystems; our Space Division has also developed in the same direction. Our diversification follows the same policy.

[Question] Through SATCP development, you are going to reinforce your capabilities in the field of small missile production. Are you thinking, for example, of entering the market in competition with Aerospatiale in the antitank field?

[Answer] Certainly, traditionally, Aerospatiale has provided the development of such products. But I think that France one day will have a program of "Fire and Forget" Antitank homing missiles. And in the field of guided missiles, our company is in a good position. The question we ask ourselves at MATRA is whether or not we will be consulted by official French agencies for this type of market.

Concerning anti-tank weapons in more general terms, I think there is a lot to be done in the next ten years. That is why we are closely watching the development of this prospect, in terms of national as well as European programs.

[Question] What is the development cost for the SATCP program, and how will it be financed?

[Answer] There will be several stages concerning the development of this program. Therefore it is difficult to estimate its cost precisely at this time. In reality it is a fixed price contract: MATRA has committed itself to performing a certain task for a fixed sum.

[Question] In the military area, MATRA investments seem relatively low since most of the studies, until now, have often been performed on the state market. But the profits you derive from this activity are very substantial. At this level, are your investments in keeping with the results you obtain?

[Answer] I would like to remind you of this: the Military Division has already developed Durandal. (To be sure, official agencies paid for the firing ranges and the air testing means, but we carried out this program with our own funds). We also developed Otomat.

Today, we accept fixed cost programs. And it is clear that in this respect we will carry our responsibilities for reaching the objectives which have been set, and of course I am thinking of the additional investments which might be needed. In addition we have undertaken the development of the laser guided bomb (the state finances only about 50 percent of this program.) Not to mention our purely industrial investments, which also have an impact on our military activities.

[Question] This summer, England and FRG signed an agreement with the United States for AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles) and ASRAAM (Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missiles). For its part France has decided to take about two years to think it over before choosing its course. What do you think of this?

[Answer] In fact, the DGA [expansion unknown] has examined French requirements for 1990. And while the breakdown of the AMRAAM and ASRAAM systems may correspond to American needs, DGA officials felt that this breakdown would be difficult to reconcile with the type of planes and weapons systems being developed in France.

For this reason, the MICA (Antiaircraft Interception Missile) design, whose technical feasibility study should be completed in about 2 years, has been



worked out. In our opinion this design could be adapted to future French planes, and eventually to second generation weapons systems for the Mirage 2000.

On the other hand, if this preliminary study concludes that cost and deadlines are beyond reach, then we can still adopt the American programs.

[Question] Won't it be too late then?

[Answer] In that case, French industry would be reduced to providing subcontract manufacturing, in view of the close connection between ASRAAM and the weapons system complete with radar... and even aircraft.

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## BRIEFS

**DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS BUDGET**--The economies demanded by Minister of the Budget Maurice Papon will oblige certain ministries to reduce the number of publications they print. High on the list is the Ministry of Defense, which publishes numerous technical reviews. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 17 Nov 80 p 39]

**NEW PCF PROBLEM**--A new rock has shown up in the garden of the PCF with the organization of a meeting on 20 November at the Mutualite (building) by the Committee for the Defense of Freedom in Czechoslovakia, presided over by Artur London. Czech intellectuals and numerous communists, still members of the party, will be present and participating in discussions on the theme: "After Poland, Czechoslovakia?" [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 17 Nov 80 p 39]

CEC: 3100

## KARAMANLIS: BANKING SYSTEM SHOULD MODERNIZE

Athens KLEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 29 Oct 80 p 15

[Text] Salonica, 29 October—"Our banking system needs to be modernized," according to the president of the Republic who hastens to add that this need is "no secret." With this expression, Karamanlis the other day inaugurated the functioning of the Makedonia-Thraci Bank [TMTh].

"The need to modernize the banking system," he said, "is becoming more imperative now that we are about to join the European Community and in this sector, too, we will be facing the effects of free competition." As a new bank, therefore, you should set an example, introducing new organizational methods which will allow the efficient and productive functioning of this institution. In other words, you must be more concerned with the development of our economy and less with the realization of profits. Precisely this criterion must guide the activities of all participants in our economic life, both private and public."

In his speech, bank president Koumvakalis recalled that [among] the pioneers of the creation of this institution is today's Minister of Northern Greece N. Martis who sent a memorandum to the minister of coordination as early as 14 January 1977. The capital of the TMTh was gathered between 16 October and 24 November 1978. Investors totaling 9,700 from all over the country, he added, entrusted us with 1.59 billion drachmas, which with the participation of the National Investment Bank for Industrial Development [NIEVA], the Post Office Savings Bank, and the cooperative industries raised the total invested by shareholders to the impressive sum of 2.1 billion drachmas. The TMTh is, in reality, an example of decentralization. It is the first and for the time being the only Greek bank which has its main office outside Athens. Salonica has many possibilities and deserves many more decentralized jurisdictions and responsibilities.

In 1978, in addition to the Bank of Greece, there were 10 Greek and 12 foreign banks operating in Greece. While the number of foreign banks increases--it is estimated that another four have since been added--the number of Greek banks has increased by one and that one is the Makedonia-Thraci Bank.

In the period from 30 April 1980 to 20 October 1980, the balance sheet of the TMTh (in millions of drachmas) is as follows: assets to liabilities: from 2,506 to 4,082; loans: from 25 to 921; deposits: from 0 to 488; accounts: from 359 to 597; and investments: from 5 to 132.

The branch offices in Komotini, Kavala, Alexandroupolis, Serrai, and two in Salonica are reaching the final stages now for starting operations. We have also started preparations for opening branch offices in Orestias, Drama, and Xanthi. In 1961 branch offices will be opened in central and western Macedonia as well as in Athens.

Speaking to the press, a bank spokesman categorically denied that deputies and ministers played a role in the hiring of personnel by pushing their own friends forward. "I can say in illustration that just for the Komotini competition we spent at least 4 million drachmas. Why should we spend all that money if hiring was to depend on the private recommendations of deputies or ministers?" he said in response to an answer.

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## WEST GERMAN BANK LOANS ANNOUNCED

Athens *ELFTIHEROTIPIA* in Greece 29 Oct 80 p 15

[Text] A new 400-million mark (10-billion drachmas) loan will be given to Greece from a group of West German banks to cover the deficit of the balance of payments. For this reason Bank of Greece Governor Iasonos Zolotas is leaving today for Düsseldorf.

The 1980 deficit will reach 2,200-2,300 million dollars compared to 2,600 million dollars in earlier estimates. This loan completes for this year the extent of foreign borrowing considered by the government as "moderate," which is due almost exclusively to keeping both imports and exports within limits.

## The Drachma

The present policy on the dollar-drachma rate of exchange is reported to continue into 1981 which means that the rate of the dollar will not exceed 44 drachmas. This creates certain problems, as in the last 3 or 4 weeks when the dollar has been going up in the international money market dragging along with it the drachma. But this means that the drachma is going up compared to the mark and the other European currencies. The revaluation of the drachma has two drawbacks:

1. It reduces the competitiveness of the Greek products which are exported to other European countries and
2. It reduces the drachma's exchange rate with the European Monetary Unit (now one EMU equals 59.60 drachmas while in September 1980 it equalled 66 drachmas). This means that correspondingly the EEC contributions to Greece are being reduced.

## The Prices

The policy of liberalizing the price formation will be completed in the 10-day period of November 1980. The Ministry of Commerce is now putting together the third and final list which includes products and services whose prices will remain under price control.

With the publication of the third list the prices of all other goods not included in it will be automatically decontrolled. The prices of products will be determined only under market conditions and will be checked only against excessive profits.

It is expected that following this, the cost of living this year will exceed 25 percent (it is estimated that it will reach 25.3 percent compared to 24.8 percent last year, while in middle levels it will be 24.8 percent compared to 19 percent last year).

The government appears to be determined, following the price increases it approved for dairy and meat products, not to go ahead this year with an increase in the prices for the services of public corporations and agencies (such as the Greek Telecommunications Agency, Public Power Corporation, Greek Water Company, Electric-Powered Buses of the Athens-Piraeus area, and so forth.

The increases in water, electricity, telephone, ticket rates, and so on, will take place most likely in February during the winter "sales" when the consumer index comes down. The percentage of these "sales" will reach 20 percent on the average.

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## MERCHANT MARINE TO BENEFIT FROM EEC ACCESSION

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDRONOS in Greek 2 Oct 80 pp 23-26

[Excerpts from speech by Merchant Marine Ministry Chief Captain Spyros Flyndsano-poulos to the Union of Greek Passenger Shipowners]

[Text] What impact will Greece's accession to EEC have on the country's merchant marine? The Union of Passenger Shipowners [UEEP] has already expressed its concern because, after the induction, economically stronger foreign organisations will change the Greek character of many companies by possibly buying them off and because of the possible competition from ships flying European flags which will have the right to sail in Greek sea areas. UEPP is also concerned with the availability of alien seamen which will result in the elimination or reduction of Greek crews.

The merchant marine is one of the economic sectors extensively discussed vis-a-vis the impact our accession to EEC will have on it. Contradictory views expressed in the past are, in my opinion, due to the lack of a clear notion about the final form the EEC maritime policy now being formulated will assume. My purpose, therefore, is to present an up-to-date picture of the actual maritime developments which have taken place in EEC during the period of the negotiations for our accession. I will subsequently describe the prospects for future developments while at the same time giving my personal views on the anxieties thus far expressed.

In 1975, when Greece applied for induction into EEC, no clear indication existed as to the nature and extent of Community regulations concerning the maritime sector. The Community policy in the transportation sector as defined in articles 74-84 of the Treaty of Rome is limited only to land and river transportation. Moreover, article 84, paragraph 2, provides that for extending this policy to sea and air transportation a unanimous decision of the Community Council is needed. At the time of our application [for accession] no decisions of such nature had been taken. But a year later the European Communities Court had issued its extremely important decision no. 167/1974 on the merchant marine following an appeal by the EEC Commission which charged France with enforcing legislated provisions which prohibited the employment of foreign seamen, and therefore Community seamen, on French ships thus violating the free movement of the working people.

The court ruled against France. At the same time, however, in interpreting article 84 of the treaty, it ruled that only the specific provisions of the treaty's title IV on transportation did not apply to sea transportation in contrast to the provisions of the remaining articles which did apply. The court decided that for the specific subject of sea transportation a unanimous decision by the Community Council was needed.

The court's decision changed the situation and contravened the notion prevailing until then that the merchant marine was outside the sphere of the Community's accommodations. Specific provisions of the Rome treaty such as those on the free movement of the working people (article 48), the right of free settlement of persons and services (article 39), the competition rules (article 85), and the social policy (article 117) were deemed to have comparable applications as concerns shipping and seamen.

#### Lifting the Restrictions

All these provisions envisage the lifting of restrictions and discriminations extant in the laws of a member-country against the citizens of another member-country. Thus, during the period of our negotiations we were asked to eliminate those provisions in our maritime laws which contained discriminations concerning the Greek registration of those ships with Greek majority ownership, ships which run the coastal and domestic tourist lines and which demand that three fourths of their crew be Greeks. The Greek side, however, countered with the argument that all laws of Community countries contained provisions similar to those of the Greek laws. Specifically, the registration of a ship entails concession to the registrant country's nationality. But certain Community members consider that such concession goes beyond the provisions of article 52 on proprietary rights. The Commission does not accept this view. Greece, however, agrees with it since it believes that broad hiring of foreign seamen will be harmful to its merchant marine. It is worth pointing out that during the final phase of the negotiations the Community also raised the question of ship registration in conjunction with the right of establishing maritime companies. However, any Greek commitment on this matter was avoided due to the successful Greek handling as well as to the diverging views of many member-countries. Thus the question remains pending as is also the elimination of the coastal communication privilege which many Community countries, like Greece, are reserving for their own ships. I shall refer to this matter in more detail later.

The discrimination, however, regarding the three fourths crew provision should be eliminated since, moreover, this is dictated by the European Community Court decision. But the 7-year transition to the free movement of the working people allows us to maintain during this period the restriction of the legislation concerning this sector without having to implement the Community regulation 1612/1968 which also includes seamen in its regulations about the movement of working people.

Following the termination of the negotiations the situation is shaping up as follows:

a. The treaty of accession does not at all bind Greece as concerns the merchant marine.



b. Greece is obligated to conform to the Community vested rights, that is, with the treaty's primary rights and with the derived rights which are the result of various Community actions (regulations, guidance directives, resolutions, and so on).

c. Adjustment of our existing maritime legislation to the existing Community vested rights does not seem necessary except perhaps as concerns the legislation regarding the insurance and social protection of the seamen. But even in this case, what is needed is the insurance coverage of the Community seamen who may be serving on Greek ships and the recognition of rights deriving from the services rendered by Greek seamen serving on ships of other Community countries. But such cases are few and are not expected to increase in the near future because of the 7-year transition period. Therefore, no serious impact is expected on the insurance coverage system for Greek seamen.

### Social Allowances

The Community social regulations do not impose on its member-countries a uniform level of social allowances and we are not compelled, therefore, to adjust the level of our social allowances to specific levels. Under the present status we do not expect any changes worth mentioning which will affect the operation of the Greek Merchant Marine and the employment or relief of the Greek seamen as a result of our induction into the Community.

Generally speaking, the Community maritime vested rights gained following the aforementioned decision by the European Communities Court are still limited. But they are under development--a development we have followed closely during the negotiations as well as during the present transition period, following the signing of the accession treaty, through the frequent unofficial contacts with appropriate maritime committee officials.

Up until now the Community members have paid exceptional attention to the formulation of a common position on other maritime problems basically connected with the operation of the regular lines most used by their merchant fleets. EEC's first step in this direction was the decision taken on 13 September 1977 which asked all members to cooperate with each other in an effort to formulate a common policy for the various international maritime organizations. This decision was readily accepted by Greece which, moreover, has been always cooperative with the organizations of the traditional maritime countries.

### Illegal Competition

One of the most important problems the Community has faced was finding a way to cope with the illegal competition practiced by merchant ships basically owned by countries of state commerce [totalitarian]. This competition basically affects the [regular] line ships. When the ships of the state-owned companies in these countries are not accepted by the conference under the terms they demand, these companies establish outsider lines and compete with those of the conference by decreasing the freight charges to very low levels. The Community believes that this decrease in freight charges is outside the limits of [fair] trade competition and succeeds only because of the social system of the eastern countries. It therefore considers this competition illegal and by a resolution it adopted in

September 1978 decided to take measures against such ships. The nature of the measures will be determined following a survey on freight charges the Community is now conducting on the basis of another resolution it adopted in December 1978. The survey is expected to be completed by 31 December 1980 on the eve, that is, of the date Greece will become a full Community member. It appears, however, that this survey will continue beyond that date and therefore Greece will participate in the Council's decision-taking deliberations and will thus present its particular positions.

At this point it is worth pointing out that during our unofficial contacts with the EEC Committee we also raised the question of illegal competition by the state merchant marine in the sector of cruise ships. We stressed that in this case also we have a problem of fares which are fixed at levels much lower than the trade reality allows and within which the Community cruise owners are compelled to operate. We pointed out, moreover, that the tourist enterprises in EEC countries, taking advantage of the low fares of the Soviet ships, are channeling European tourists through such ships from EEC ports at that. Therefore, in considering the measures which it could possibly take for arresting this illegal activity, EEC must also take into consideration the case of the cruise ships.

It is still doubtful if the EEC will take countermeasures for combatting the illegal competition by state-owned ships because, in addition to maritime reasons, the problem is being examined from other aspects also. But if finally the point for a decision is reached, the cruise ship owners should decide jointly with the government if and what measures should be undertaken by Greece for protecting its own particular interests in the cruise ship sector.

#### Safety of Ships

The Community became concerned also with the problem of ship safety. Its interest greatly intensified following the Amoco Cadiz misfortune and it increased further after the serious tanker incidents which were investigated for the safety level of the ships involved and for the protection of the sea environment.

At the same time, the problem of illegal competition by the so-called substandard ships or low safety level ships surfaced. It was felt that the ships which conformed with international standards and whose owners were undergoing considerable expense to maintain them at desired safety levels were at a disadvantage compared to ships whose owners neglected to do so. Two years ago the Community members were called upon to ratify within a fixed time the agreements concerning life insurance for seamen (1974), prevention of sea pollution (1973), the protocols for these agreements as prepared in 1978 by IMO, the IMO international agreement on the training and certification of seamen (1978) and the international labor agreement no. 147 on ship low safety levels. By another regulation the EEC members defined the procedure for monitoring and inspecting tankers reaching Community ports. Finally, a guidance directive asked for the pilots of member-countries who guide their ships through the English Channel to have the proper qualifications based on certifications by the authorities.

Greece, strongly defending the need for promoting international ship safety levels, had no difficulty accepting the above EEC recommendations and decisions. Two years ago it ratified the international labor agreement no. 147 and last April

the international agreement SOLAS of 1974. The other agreements are at the ratification stage. It, therefore, agrees to the decisions EEC has thus far reached with regard to the ship safety sector.

But EEC did not content itself with the foregoing decisions. Having set as its target the elimination of the substandard ships, it recently prepared a draft regulation which institutes a system of inspection of ships of any flag which put into EEC ports. The regulation provides for sanctions and departure delays until the ship which does not meet its requirements restores all serious deficiencies. Basically these requirements meet the obligations defined for all ships by extant international agreements. It is possible, however, for some of these obligations to go beyond those defined by the international agreements.

We had the opportunity to express our opinion on the draft regulation just as other member-states did also. The draft has already been submitted to the Council in an effort to have it approved within this year. It is not yet certain if this effort will succeed. From what we know, certain EEC members have raised objections and this may delay its approval by the Council until next year when Greece will also be a member of the Council. But regardless of when the regulation comes into force, Greece has no objection to the recommended ship inspection. Greece is only asking that the provisions of the regulation conform to the existing international agreements and not go beyond the IMCO decisions. In this position we are not alone. Other member-countries of the Community share our views.

#### Protection of the Environment

In general, Greece will support the Community effort to raise the shipping safety level and to protect the environment. In the final analysis Greece, being a country with a large merchant marine, should be the first to be interested in the elimination of ship accidents since, above all, the lives of Greek nationals are endangered by them. We are also equally interested if not more than other countries in the protection of the environment because of our large coastal areas and their tourist attraction which for Greece is an important source of foreign exchange.

Our support, however, does not imply that measures which do not conform to the maritime reality should be readily adopted or that measures which in any way encourage discriminations should be implemented. If such measures are proposed they will be sure to face Greece's reaction. On the other hand, all of us--state, shipowners, and seamen--must exert every possible effort to limit the number of Greek ship accidents.

Finally, it is worth noting that in a memorandum the French government submitted a few months ago to the EEC Ministerial Council, it has asked for a new number of shipping safety measures and is calling the merchant marine ministers of the EEC countries to a meeting in Paris next December to study these measures. It is not certain to what extent this French initiative will achieve its objective. But it is indicative of the intentions existing in the EEC area which should not be underestimated.



## Code for Regular Shipping Lines

But the most important maritime problem the Community has faced until now has been the ratification by its members of the UNCTAD code for regular shipping lines. This code has a long history.

The code's existence is due to the pressures exerted since 1944 by the developing countries for the development of national merchant fleets. At that time these countries saw the development of their fleets stimulated through the recognition of their national lines' right to participate in the conference regular lines and to transport exclusively a percentage of the conference cargoes leaving their ports.

In 1974, a diplomatic conference held under UNCTAD auspices prepared an International Agreement known as the "Code of Regular Lines" which recognized these rights of national lines and fixed the celebrated percentages of 40-40-20 for the distribution of cargoes transported by the conference lines. At the same time, it defined the conditions for the operation of the conference lines placing under control many of their illegal and arbitrary methods.

The code is not in force yet because it has not yet been approved by the required number of countries having the necessary "tonnage." But the pressure of the developing countries to put the code into force is growing more and more and 4 years ago the Community began to study the possibility of the code's ratification by its members but under preconditions which would allow it to implement this code in the EEC countries in a way consonant with the provisions of the Rome Treaty.

In May 1979, the Community reached an agreement under which the code if approved by its members would be implemented under certain preconditions, most important of which is that the distribution of the conference cargoes in proportion to the cargoes transported by OECD country shipping companies will be done between each other on trade criteria and not on the basis of the code percentages. Another condition is that the code provisions on cargo distribution as well as other provisions concerning arbitration and so on will not be applied to the transportations between the OECD countries. The agreement was ratified by the Community Council which then issued Regulation 954/1979. At the same time, the EEC members assumed a political obligation to ratify the code thus assuring the "tonnage" necessary for putting it into force.

The code question is of primary importance to the maritime policy of the present EEC members. For Greece it has a double aspect. The great section of the Greek Merchant Marine deals with transportation of bulk cargoes. Therefore Greece is not interested in the code. On the contrary, it would prefer to see curtailed the spirit of protectionism the code institutes in the distribution of cargoes and the regulatory intervention of states in matters of trade nature. But the problem of extending protectionism to the transportation of bulk cargoes is another matter which presently is under study following the UNCTAD conference in Manila and the meeting of the UNCTAD Maritime Organization in Geneva. But the code is of interest to the Greek regular shipping lines. If implemented in its original form it has several helpful data for these lines, while use of these data is limited, and, in the opinion of others, is eliminated with the application of the



On the other hand, it appears that the question of passenger transportation was studied under different criteria. In this case the role of the domestic sea transportations to the economic and social life of the islands is fully acknowledged. In member/-states maintaining this privilege, the transportation services are carried out by state-subsidized companies. The cost of the tickets is maintained by the state at low levels for the aforementioned social reasons. In this case, too, fears were expressed that if the privilege is lifted, ships of Community countries will be using the domestic sea lines in an effort to reap benefits during the profitable periods of heavy traffic.

What thus far has been said shows that by lifting the cabotage the Community will derive no worthwhile benefits. However, the notion prevails that if the cabotage is lifted in order to comply fully with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, then proper measures should be first taken to bring into line the cost of the domestic transportations and the competition conditions in order to avoid the unpleasant consequences feared by the member-countries which have the cabotage in force.

#### Greek Merchant Marine in EEC

Let us now see how the position of the Greek Merchant Marine will be defined within the EEC. Our merchant marine which today represents 9 percent of the world tonnage will increase the EEC maritime potential by more than 50 percent in which case the Community will possess almost one third of the world tonnage. If one adds also the Greek-owned ships flying foreign flags [of convenience], then the Community will control more than one third of this fleet. In other words, the EEC will become the world's largest maritime entity thus influencing substantially the international sea transportations with considerable economic and political benefits. On the other hand, the EEC negotiating ability in interstate trading and in international maritime organizations will be strengthened considerably. The Greek Merchant Marine derives benefits of course from the fact that it participates as an equal and important partner in a strong whole. Measures protecting the interests of this whole will also protect the Greek interests.

But to understand better these benefits [for Greece] we must evaluate them not only from the point of view of what we gain and what we lose by joining EEC, but also from the point of view of what would have happened if Greece had not joined the Community. It is a fact, moreover, that regardless of Greece's accession, the Community had decided to proceed with its maritime policy.

The Greek Merchant Marine, by offering its services internationally and therefore within the Community framework also, cannot escape certain consequences of the EEC policy regardless of whether Greece is or is not a member of the Community. The EEC decisions, for example, concerning the UNCTAD code on ship inspections, the flag of convenience, and, in general, the future protectionism of its merchant marines would have affected the Greek maritime interests even if Greece remained outside the Community. And, in my opinion, it is better for Greece to participate in the formulation of this policy than to wait as an outsider for the adoption of decisions which could possibly hurt it. Greece's addition to the Community strengthens those member-countries whose strength depends on the merchant marine factor in contrast to those member-countries which look at the maritime services

The French recommendations for coordinating the seamen's compensation and work conditions are still pending in the Community. From what we know, however, these recommendations were not favorably received by most of the members. Coordination of such nature, moreover, has not yet been carried out in other employment sectors within the Community. Its promotion especially as concerns the merchant marine sector preassumes the previous solution of other national problems of Community members and it should rather be postponed for some years at least.

Ships flying the flag of convenience were also another matter for which the Community has expressed concern in the past following French pressures which continue to this day. Recent developments, however, and especially the position taken by the maritime countries in Manila and the policy OECD has followed against the flags of convenience indicate that the Community may not take measures against them. The Community sees the activities of such ships from its trade point of view also since it is interested in the low cost of sea transportation as achieved through these flags.

The mutual recognition of diplomas, degrees, and so on, is another subject which the Community must deal with. This is a more general and difficult area and any arrangement will not be forthcoming soon. It should be noted that if this subject is not settled, then the free movement of the seamen and of the working people in general will be of a more theoretical and less practical nature.

Previous studies submitted to the European Council and especially those of Prescott and Sheetfield dealt in part with proposals for the coordination of the maritime tax policy but there are no indications at present that the EEC Committee intends to take up this very difficult problem. Such tax coordination may be necessary for balancing the maritime competitive conditions but it cannot be treated in an isolated way since it is linked with subsidies, debt liquidations, and other conveniences many member-countries grant to their merchant marines.

But the problem is difficult and much time is expected to pass before it is considered--if it will ever be considered. For reaching decisions on such matters which are within the provisions of the treaty's article 84(2) the unanimous decision of the Council's members is required. Greek consent for such decisions is therefore necessary, but it will not be given if the Greek maritime interests are threatened.

### Coastal Shipping

I would like to discuss also the question of coastal shipping which is of extreme maritime interest to Greece. As I said earlier, one of the most difficult questions we faced during our negotiations with the EEC Committee was the demand to abolish the regulations which safeguard the right to transport passengers and cargoes between Greek ports, just as Ireland, Holland, Belgium, and Great Britain--all Community members--are doing today. Denmark has certain restrictions which concern transportations to Greenland and those made by ships having a net tonnage of less than 500 tons.

The only countries maintaining this privilege are Germany, France, and Italy--countries, in other words, which have the possibility for expansion of their domestic sea transportation to a lesser or greater degree.

In trying to establish the extent to which the privilege of coastal shipping is or is not reconciled with the Treaty of Rome, we must keep in mind that this privilege introduces the element of discrimination on the basis of nationality. This is in opposition to the provisions of article 7 of the treaty. On the other hand, articles 59 to 66 provide for free services within the Community area. However, with regard to transportation services provided on the basis of article 61, the special provisions on transportations (articles 74 to 81) are observed. They state (article 81(2)) that for the regulation of sea transportations the unanimous decision of the EEC Council is necessary. The conclusion, therefore, is that providing sea transportations in the Community area is not free but depends on the dictates of the decisions the Council has taken thus far. Since, however, the Council until now has not issued a decision lifting the restrictions on domestic sea transportation, it appears that the restrictions on coastal shipping now enforced in Greece and the aforementioned countries are in consonance with the treaty's principles. This is a sound view and is supported by the countries having control over their domestic sea transportations, including Greece of course.

But according to the EEC Commission, in addition to these treaty provisions, there is also article 52 which institutes the principle of free establishment. This principle grants, among other things, the right to any company of a member-country to move into any member-country and to conduct its business activities on equal terms with the local enterprises. Thus, according to the EEC Commission, it is possible on the basis of this principle to establish in Greece a maritime company of a member-country the ships of which will not be subject to domestic sea transportation restrictions. But as is known, the restrictions on such transportations have been adopted on the basis of the flag the ship is flying. In other words, the ships of these companies must first register under the flag of the member-country in order to participate in the sea transportations of the country where these companies are established. But changing flags is a controversial issue with diverging views. Thus the legal aspect of the lifting of the restrictions on domestic transportations is still unsettled. But it is worth investigating the real effect this lifting of the privileges in domestic sea transportations, which are known as cabotage, will have on the Community. Last year, the EEC Committee expressed a desire to investigate the matter and appointed a group to investigate the economic impact the lifting or keeping of the privilege of coastal shipping would have on the Community.

From what we were able to learn, this investigation dealt mostly with cargo transportations and its conclusion was that the Community benefits from abolishing the privilege of such transportations and from the development of free competition would be small. They would also be limited mainly to the small freight charges such competition would provide for those using the sea transportations. But for this small benefit many individuals would lose their jobs and the public revenue would suffer losses. It was generally made clear that the member-countries which do not maintain the exclusive exploitation of their domestic sea traffic do not mind so much its lifting by the rest of the members. In contrast, the member-countries which maintain this privilege wish very much to keep it. Italy is the country which more than any other wants to maintain it. It seems that both the Italian shipowners and the Italian government believe that their domestic sea transportations are vulnerable to competition, especially that of Greece and Spain.



EEC reservations. The fact, however, is that the code, if implemented by Greece even with the EEC reservations, recognizes the right of Greek companies of regular lines to enter the conferences serving our national trade or the trade of a Community country provided that in the latter case the Greek company has its quarters in that Community country on the basis of the principle of free establishment.

In general, it is difficult for one to say whether the ratification of the code will prove beneficial or not to the Greek regular lines. But it can be said with sufficient assurance that ratification of the code, albeit with the EEC changes, cannot create for our regular lines a situation more unfavorable than the one presently existing. Whether Greece will be benefited by ratifying the code with the EEC reservations or will be prevented from doing so by joining the Community is an issue now being studied carefully by the Ministry of Merchant Marine.

The Community merchant marines are particularly sensitive to the subject of the code and particularly its provisions on the operation of the regular lines. The concern of various European maritime circles about Greece's accession to EEC springs from fear that the induction will allow Greek companies to participate in transportation presently carried out by the European regular lines thus worsening the existing acute competition in this sector. It is not known if and to what extent a trend toward such a direction will come about considering that the Greek Merchant Marine is traditionally dealing with loose cargoes. In any case, it is certain that the Community's attention will be particularly focused on the problems of the regular lines when formulating its maritime policy.

What I have said above constitutes a broad description of the present Community vested rights which, as is evident, do not immediately affect the Greek Merchant Marine.

#### New Arrangements

The Community, however, continues the study of new common maritime arrangements. At present it is preparing rules on merchant marine competition. These rules derive from the treaty's antimonopoly provisions and define the conditions under which the maritime cartels--that is, the present conference of regular lines--will be allowed to operate. Basically, they concern the shipping companies which are members or are about to become members of the conference and are committed to implement the UNCTAD code. From the Greek point of view, however, these rules are of interest not only as they concern our regular lines but also with regard to the large section of our merchant marine, or, that is, the tramps (ships) which go where the cargoes are since they are guided by regulations which include such ships for the transportation of loose cargoes. More specifically, these rules aim at eliminating the various agreements which are believed to destroy free competition. But we believe that as far as the transportation of loose cargoes is concerned no such agreements exist and therefore the Community's regulatory intervention is unnecessary. However, there are other countries who also have objections concerning this matter of rules. For this reason it is anticipated that any Community decision will be delayed if it is ever reached at all. In any case, Greece will be a member of the Community by the time any decision is taken.



first from the point of view of the shippers' interests and second from that of the shipowners' interests. Thus, the Greek participation is for many countries a guarantee that the Community will be more conservative and more realistic in its maritime policy, taking into consideration the interests of all of its members.

On the other hand, the Community policy cannot be unilateral and independent. It must take into consideration the interests of the other big maritime powers which do not belong to the Community, the ambitions of the developing countries, the commercial and political danger springing from the methods of the merchant marines of the eastern countries, and so on. It is evident that in such a circuit of conflicting international maritime interests Greece could not by itself take effective measures for protecting its merchant marine.

Many have expressed the fear that implementation of the principle of the free movement of working people will lead to loss of our [ships'] crews. But this problem has been overcome. Fears of such nature are improbable for many reasons while the transition period eliminates even the least possible fear from the free movement of the working people.

The Greek Merchant Marine will continue to give services internationally "in free competition" while also transporting loose cargo. This competition is today being attacked not because of Community initiatives but by Third World countries. The Community members have given us in Manila, in ONCED, and recently in Geneva, sound proof that in the case of loose cargo they are unshakably devoted to the principle of free competition. This for Greece is the most encouraging indication of the future intentions of the Community members in a sector of sea transportation which is very vital. It is difficult, of course, for one to foresee the EEC maritime policy in the future. This, moreover, depends on other, more general developments.

I think that we should be optimistic about the future of our merchant marine in the Community framework. I do not exclude the possibility of facing various unexpected difficulties from time to time. During the period the Community maritime policy is formulated, Community actions will be undoubtedly discussed and will provoke conflicting views of its members. In such cases, the conventional solutions are a natural result and is the price to be paid for the joint collaboration of a group of countries for the sake of protecting common vital interests. At the same time, however, there is the safety valve of unanimity which safeguards us from unacceptable compromises. Moreover, our merchant marine has had difficulties in the past which were solved more or less in a satisfactory way within the Greek possibilities. The same thing will happen in the future and I believe that it will be met successfully thanks to the good cooperation between the state, the shipowners, and the seamen.

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## FIRST, SECOND CHAMBER MEMBERS' PERFORMANCES SCRUTINIZED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 1 Nov 80 p 3

[Report by Editor B. C. L. Waanders: "De Geus, a Hefty Gentleman Who Knows What He's Talking About"]

[Text] Every budget discussion has its own style and atmosphere. One can't argue too much with this finding of Secretary of State [for Public Health] Mrs Veder-Smit in the second chamber during the discussion of the public health policy. Every female- and male member of government also has her or his own style, of course. For example, the attitude of the friendly and somewhat shy secretary of state for public health differs completely from that of a hefty gentleman such as the new minister of defense, De Geus, who left no doubt whatsoever in the past week that he knew what he was talking about.

Someone else in top form was Minister of Housing and Physical Planning Beelaerts van Blokland in a discussion on the town planning basis of the preferential right of municipalities in acquiring real estate. The minister of internal affairs, Wiegel, was fairly well able to hold his own against a storm of criticism to his remarks on the Amsterdam matter; on the other hand, Secretary of State Koning (internal affairs) had a little more trouble warding off an attack on his policy in the Emmen question.

The abbreviation disease also has struck the realm of public health; the second chamber debate on the latter teemed with cries such as GW (Health counseling and education), LGV (Living- and family problems), MOB (Medical-educational bureau), FO (Financial survey) and PI (Private initiative). He who becomes insane from all this can go to the SPD (Social-psychiatric service).

The secretary of state for public health spoke about the great rush of priorities and also referred frequently to notes and notices; thus her colleague members of government received a notice on alcohol counseling. The Christian democrat Borgman requested attention for the protection of non-smokers, the liberal Dees for further price curbing and the energetic Mrs Muller van Ast (PvdA [Labor Party]) wanted to know exactly what was delaying the solving of the problem of assistant physicians. We simply took comfort in the thought that accelerated evaluations are not always possible.

Encouraging words were spoken in the second chamber this week on municipal autonomy. Several parliamentary meeting hours were taken up this week by an interpellation

directed at Minister Wiegels by Members of the Chamber Walmans (PPR [Political Party of Radicals]) and Kosto (PvdA) on public order in Amsterdam and one directed at Secretary of State Koning by members Knol (PvdA) and Brinkhorst (D'66 [Democrats '66]) on jobs in Emmen.

#### Blurred

Local autonomy has been literally and figuratively ingrained, but it is also rather blurred. If the minister and secretary of state of internal affairs have encroached upon this, they are not the first to have done so. The minister was clever enough to appeal to his ministerial responsibility for granting assistance according to the Police Law, although it is a matter of derived responsibility here. Nor did he fail to point to cases of parliamentary intervention in other local matters. A former minister for internal affairs, Tak van Poortvliet (1891-1894), once said: "As long as they're calling you names, you're not through yet." The current minister probably thinks the same.

Three members of the chamber living in Drenthe -- Knol (PvdA), Evenhuis (VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]) and Hermesen (CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal]) -- this week participated in the juggling of numbers on jobs the municipality of Emmen would lose in refusing a NATO depot; ultimately 150 additional jobs were at stake, exactly as many as the number of members in the second chamber.

#### Lewd

SGP [Political Reformed Party] Member Van Dis objected in the chamber debate on the defense budget this week to "lewd illustrations" with which many rooms in military buildings apparently are being defaced. According to Secretary of State Van Lent, who was participating in a budget discussion for the last time, the concern for military well-being should not include wall decorations. The problems of the limited growth of the defense budget of course pale into insignificance beside this. Secretary of State (for Defense) Van Eekelen, concerned about military power relationships in the world, launched the concept "electorama of knick-knacks" as a small consideration for socialist Stemerink. In order to -- possibly -- find a way out for the bill on municipal preferential right (perhaps a special regulation against the sale of rented houses) the debate on that was temporarily interrupted.

In the first chamber Mr J. Vis (D'66) gave his maiden speech during the discussion of a number of bills for revision of the constitution. Contrary to him, Mr W. F. de Gaay Fortman (CDA) did not want to regulate cabinet formations in the constitution. VVD Member Wiebenga spoke at length about the parliamentary right of inquiry, the right to hold an inquiry with coercive powers, in which a minority of one fifth (20 percent) would not be allowed to commit the chamber majority, according to this senator.

Minister Wiegels became ill in the first chamber this week, or at least dizzy, and won't answer until 11 November.

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## D'66 TERLOUW AGAINST COOPERATION WITH VVD, CDA

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Nov 80 p 3

[Report by Political Editorial Staff: "Cooperation of D'66 (Democrats '66) with VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) and CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) Not to Be Expected]

[Text] Utrecht, 3 Nov--In his speech at the end of the 2-day congress of D'66 in the Utrecht Veemarkt Halls [D'66 Chairman] Terlouw received much applause for his assumption that D'66 will decide against government cooperation with the CDA and the VVD in February.

Just as in the general political debate in the second chamber, the political leader of D'66 again discussed at length the reproaches about vagueness often directed at the democrats. He declared that socialism wasn't designed for the crisis of democracy in the welfare state nor was liberalism designed for the problem of domination of technology in the welfare state. He said it was not a disgrace that the VVD and the PvdA [Labor Party] are feverishly searching for "new roads which don't seem to sprout forth from their principles."

Terlouw was brief about the CDA. "Christian inspiration can lead to violence and lack of violence, property and distribution, enslavement and freedom."

According to Terlouw, D'66 drew up a realistic, concrete and progressive socio-economic program on Friday and Saturday. The line of restructuring Dutch industry which has been followed for a number of years is now also being taken up by others. Industry must first become healthy without too drastic consequences for the incomes of the lowest-paid; only then can expansion of work opportunity in the fourth sector (subsidized service) be afforded, thus Terlouw summarized the policy of D'66.

The party is going into the elections not only with a coherent socio-economic policy, thus argued Terlouw, but also will have to make it clear "that there is a future, that there is hope, that it is worthwhile to cooperate for a society in which everyone has the opportunity to really be part." Terlouw expected an increase in attacks by others who feel threatened by D'66, but "they will run aground on our enthusiasm."

Earlier in the day the congress spoke in favor of police officials and military making moral or political views known.



For the democrats, threatening with dismissal is inadmissible in those cases. According to them, municipalities must get the right to refuse storage of new arms within their borders.

Against the advice of the executive committee, the congress decided that in test conferences of the Final Act of the Helsinki Accord human rights should weigh "at least" as much as a hundred other parts of the accord.

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## AANTJES SEEKS REHABILITATION, RETURN TO POLITICAL LIFE

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 11 Oct 80 pp 14-17

[Article by René de Bok: "Aantjes' Return: Timebomb in the Second Term"]

[Text] Reviled and praised to the heavens, Willem Aantjes keeps his eyes fixed on the final goal: Rehabilitation. He left the political stage through a side door and covered with shame. He is trying to force his reentry to the Inner Court by means of the electorate. ELSEVIERS gauges the forces that are at work to put Aantjes where he very much wants to carry his politics: Into the Second Chamber.

The grimacing face is etched sharply in the nation's memory: The distorted mouth and the fixed, wrathful look that countless dailies and weeklies presented disconcertingly large. That photograph illustrated the downfall of a politician who had remained at the burning point of interest for years better than any destructive commentary or deadly insult. Not 2 years later, Aantjes is again turning his eyes to the Inner Court. In the meantime, his election campaign has begun with a signal of opposition to the Van Agt cabinet and forceful support for the group of CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] dissidents.

But Aantjes does not stand alone. Forces are active behind the scenes to grant Aantjes' vengeance against those who toppled him full freedom. The pro-Aantjes movement in the grass roots, in the AR [Anti-Revolutionary] voters' associations in Utrecht, the Gooi, Eindhoven and Zeeland, is marked.

Aantjes' comeback is no longer a foolish proposition. A year ago practically everyone agreed that an important political function for Aantjes could be brushed aside as a perverse idea, but for a year Aantjes has been performing several weighty political functions: He was a member of the CDA program committee, a member of the study group "Not by Bread Alone," he is now a member of the CDA committee on foreign affairs, and he was described by the AR paper NEDERLANDSE GEDACHTEN this month as a member of the CDA leadership. That is a remarkable comeback for a man who seemed to have been washed away into the bottomless pit after a strikingly controversial career in Christian Democratic politics.

Aantjes was praised for his sharpness, his emotion and his sensitive feel for politics. His enemies watched Argus-eyed the smoothness, the flexibility with which

Aantjes pushed his positions forward like pawns across a political chessboard hidden by tatters of fog. Aantjes was slippery, Aantjes was smooth, but he was not to be dismissed from Dutch politics. And suddenly he was gone, cut down by a lightning study by the self-proclaimed grand inquisitor of the National Institute for War Documentation, Prof Lou de Jong.

There was nothing left of Aantjes that 6 November 1978. His volunteering for the German SS in the war years completely closed the doors to the Inner Court. Two commissions traced the political death certificate by de Jong and his zealous assistant, de Leeuw, once again, and although a few of the crass details were excised from the patriotic historian's report as unjust, the indictment against Aantjes was largely supported.

A year later several spokesmen from the Second Chamber said it bluntly once again. Socialist Joop Voogd: "Aantjes built a political career on hiding his wartime past." The VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] delegation had a short answer to the question whether there existed a way back for Aantjes: "Under certain circumstances, a period ought to be placed behind a political career." The CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] displayed the least toleration: Like the other parties, the communists declared that the responsibility for any political comeback lay with Aantjes himself, his party and the voters, "but," said Martin Bakkers, "in the event of any future appearance, the SS insignia are never again to be forgotten." Mrs Wessel-Tuinstra of D'66 [Democrats of 1966] illustrated the man's political future with a quote from Aantjes himself, from an as yet "untarnished" past: Speaking on the ethics of political activity in the case of purchase price policies, Aantjes said, "I see the lesson for politicians: Keep in mind that a good example says more than a good word. Actions speak louder than words."

In the CDA, the pivotal figures carried out the necessary slaps on the wrist: Aantjes' successor as CDA delegation chairman, Ruud Lubbers, criticized Aantjes' activities, but said too that "he had paid too high a price," and for the remainder Lubbers declared that "Aantjes has a duty to serve society, a duty from which he should not be excused."

Prime Minister Van Agt deployed the old reliable smokescreen: "In an evaluation of the question, 'Where do we go from here?' we must take into account not only the commotion which took place last November [1978], and which is still evident now after a review of the picture, but also the fact that we are dealing with a man and a fellow citizen who possesses great qualities of the head and the heart, who has rendered important services in the guidance of the country."

A year later, the candidacy of Aantjes for a seat in the parliament is a concrete reality. Aantjes appears on two CDA lists in 4 provinces: North and South Holland, Zealand and Utrecht. With a mere 28,000 preference votes, he will have enough to force open again the doors to the Second Chamber meeting hall, which he now still has to watch enviously from the public galleries.

Within the CDA, and particularly within the bloodgroups of the former KVP [Catholic People's Party] and CHU [Christian Historical Union], unrest is growing over an Aantjes comeback. The man of the hour, Steenkamp, swore again this week that any attempt to carry out a preference action in Aantjes' favor will be brought resolutely to a halt.

After the turbulent chamber debate on the Aantjes affair, the leading actor in this tragedy was far from setting his political aspirations aside. He declared that he had little desire to return, but he made it clear that he would not refuse a call from his party. In the meantime, he has reduced his past transgressions to: "I was not wrong, but I made a mistake." He found nothing good to say about his silence about several less attractive details, but "one of my biggest mistakes was certainly that I did not recognize the satanic nature of national socialism in time."

In the fall of last year [1979] there was a turn in the reserve with which Aantjes had contented himself the first year after his being unmasked. The most prominent factor was the support he encountered in increasing measure with antirevolutionary circles in his cautious political lobbying, support on various fronts. His political support in the Second Chamber delegation was to be found for the most part among the loyalists, among whose number he had counted himself as early as the formation of the Van Agt cabinet. Jan Van Houwelingen, Sytze Faber, and especially the then ARP chairman, Hans de Boer. De Boer maneuvered cautiously at first: "I see a more indirect political function for Aantjes." But after the debate, his position became clearer. After the VVD leadership had turned sharply against an Aantjes comeback ("In public opinion there is a lessening of respect for politics"), de Boer responded: "We have no need of the VVD's opinion. It is a matter for the AR, the CDA and Aantjes himself." He said Aantjes' great silence about his wartime past was not an incomprehensible phenomenon, "certainly not in that it has to do with matters of war." Hans de Boer did not see any hindrance in it to an eventual return to the chamber.

But the loyalist politicians are not alone in their missionary urge with respect to Aantjes. The daily, TROUW, the weekly, DE TIJD and the NCRV [Netherlands Christian Broadcasting Association] news program "Here and Now" are competing in their rehabilitation attempts, followed at a distance by DE VOLKSKRANT. TROUW is undeniably in the lead. Aantjes is regularly given the opportunity to spew out his gall on all of those who have denied him a political matter. "Aantjes Able To Fight Back." DE TIJD interviewer Rob Vermaas--author of a biography of Aantjes--judges the Enschede Committee's report to be a partial rehabilitation: "Gratifying Turn for Aantjes," on the cover: "Aantjes Strikes Back."

Aantjes gained courage again. His election as politician of the year 1978 has not given him to think but seduced him to new political activities. His selection to the CDA program committee (which has the job of putting the new party program on paper) was a first try-out in October 1979. The grumbling Aantjes' selection aroused in the KVP and CHU as well as in the more reasoned circles within the ARP was reason for the AR top leadership to tell Aantjes he might just as well save his attempts to smooth his path towards the Inner Court.

Aantjes did not worry about it, but began to project himself outwards. In a speech to VU [Free University] students and a lecture for the ARJOS [Anti-Revolutionary Youth Study Club] he carried on in the old teaching style. In the presence of ministers, secretaries of state and chamber members, he was at his best again with an evangelically emotional speech, in which the required sacrificial offerings were made: Aantjes attacked the Van Agt cabinet, Mrs. Haars, AR chamber member Van Dam and tickled the CDA dissidents with a burning protest against the nuclear weapons policy in the Netherlands. The Christian Democratic partners [KVP and CHU] were moved to express their irritation. And counterforces were set in motion to disarm the explosive danger of Aantjes in time.



The solution was naturally the creation of a little career in which Aantjes could cut little ice but in which his desire for status would be satisfied, a little career which would resemble rehabilitation and at the same time would render Aantjes politically harmless. In a few months time the following suggestions were made: the chairmanship of the Council for the Waterways, the leadership of the new scientific institute of the CDA, the Broadcast Council, the Council of State. This last advisory council to the crown remained an idle wish for Aantjes, because the old guard of the AR, former minister of domestic affairs, De Gaay Fortman Sr, and Senator Diepenhorst found Aantjes' image to be less than appropriate in view of his past.

After Aantjes' candidacy became a real threat, the Broadcast Council raised so much outcry about the affair that Aantjes withdrew insulted. Aantjes rejected another function such as the advisory counsellorship to the minister of Housing and Physical Planning in disgust. In fact, it was made clear to him in a discussion with Minister Beelaerts Van Blokland that the function is not political but purely administrative.

Aantjes let it be known that he did not wish to be considered for a full-time job. The expansion of this is that in that case Aantjes has the freedom of action required in order to opt for chamber membership at a given moment. Last November Aantjes made it onto the big ARP list, from which the eventual CDA list for the 1981 elections will be made up, 180 voting circles put forward his name. Secretary Boersma of the AR voters association in Eindhoven expressed the sentiments which still form the fertile bed at the grass roots of the Anti-Revolutionary Party in which the Aantjes effect takes shape: "As the Lord Jesus forgave Peter his transgressions, so we, too, feel that we must forgive Aantjes."

Because Aantjes knows himself to be supported by a well-wishing following, chamber members and a not unimpressive share of the media, he has little difficulty with the functions which are being pushed towards him, even though they are attractive in themselves. He refuses, because it is not his intention to seek his rehabilitation by way of a present from the Van Agt cabinet. For then he would disappear from the spotlight of public interest, in which he has basked for so long, and sink into a tacky anonymity. A less accommodating attitude with respect to the rumor mongering surrounding his political comeback befits his tactical concept. He has declared several times that he is renouncing a candidacy on the CDA list, and just as often he has followed that by saying that he morally could not refuse if the party were to make an urgent appeal to him.

After the loss of face that AR politicians of note, from Biesheuvel to Berghuis, suffered after the wartime past was brought to light, the ARP summit is still a bit wary of the Aantjes phenomenon. That wariness caused the party leadership just to remove Aantjes from the list of potential candidates for the Second Chamber. They were not sufficiently convinced that "Aantjes would be able to function in practical politics."

According to the rules of the democratic game, the final decision was left to the voters' associations. And then what everyone could have expected took place: the little people at the grass roots spoke out in favor of Aantjes. In September the party leadership went about: Aantjes landed on two CDA lists. Formally Minister President Van Agt unlocked the door to the Inner Court in that aside from saying an unctious word about a man with "great gifts of head and heart" he emphasized

that the passive right to vote did actually stand open to the man with the wartime past. The great reservations which chamber members of various political affiliations cherished during the Aantjes debates last year against a political reincarnation of Aantjes still exist today in undiminished measure. Both within the CDA and in the PvdA, D'66, PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] and CPN, the doubts surrounding Aantjes' reprise are sharp, and several chamber members bluntly state that they will not congratulate him if he is again elevated to the Second Chamber. Aantjes has the advantage that several chamber members who were vigorously opposed to his comeback, like PvdA member Voogd and Aantjes' own fellow party member, Schakel, will no longer be there. Aantjes himself is still wrestling contortedly with his damaged image. The man who, as delegation chairman of the CDA, monopolised the conscience of Christian Democratic politics, who spoke about the ethics of political activity, who gave lectures entitled "On a Clear Conscience," that man was able to withstand saying, when the circumstances were a bit less favorable to him, "There's not a single preacher whose private life you can judge entirely by his sermons." That is Aantjes' pragmatic morality: an acquittal for political hypocrisy. In a supplement to the brochure from the CDA study group "Not by Bread Alone," he launched stern criticism against the CDA delegation: trustworthy dealing, insufficient respect for the rules of democracy, the squandering of outsiders' confidence. As mournful destiny will have it, those to whom this criticism is addressed will be able to return the ball handily, for Aantjes' position is indissolubly tied to concepts like "untrustworthiness," "insufficient respect for the rules of democracy," and "the squandering of outsiders' confidence."

For 20 years, Aantjes has cloaked his political burden under false colors. Historian De Jong characterized Aantjes as possibly the subject of blackmail, but even if De Jong's extreme insinuations are not accepted, it is perfectly clear that during his entire political career Aantjes has been extremely vulnerable. His smooth, slippery political course carried the leaden ballast of a kind of self-blackmail. This was a posture that led to schizophrenic positions; earlier political acts leant more contrast--against the background of his grand silence.

If Willem Aantjes enters the Second Chamber again with preference votes, his course will be marked out for him by his sins from the past. He will not have much room to maneuver politically. Neither in high-flown evangelical sermons on the mount or in the sharp debate in the Second Chamber will he be able to appeal to honor, integrity or a full-steam-ahead course in politics; he will not be able to criticize anyone for keeping quiet about certain details. Aantjes is becoming the perpetrator of his own sorry attempt at rehabilitation.

Nonetheless, his candidacy is supported by a not unappreciable portion of the electorate. His confidence rating jumped up: in November 1978, Aantjes enjoyed the confidence of 41 percent of the public, in April 1979 that had already risen to 46 percent, and in June 1979, 50 percent believed that Aantjes could return to the Second Chamber. Aantjes is coining money from the underdog effect. The question is whether the effect of this political counterfeit is an indication of increasing toleration or of a blurring of standards in public opinion. If Aantjes reaches the Inner Court, he will be jumping from a wartime past into a wartime future: Aantjes as the leader of the CDA dissidents will be a time bomb for the second term.

## STORTING DEBATE OF STOCKPILING REVEALS UNITED OPPOSITION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Nonsocialist Front"]

[Text] It is not only impudent, but a gross underestimation of people's general judgment when the Labor Party's vice chairman and coming star, Gro Harlem Brundtland, makes a tiny difference of opinion of the nonsocialist side and her propagandistic main point during the State of the Nation speech debate in the Storting. For if there is anything that characterizes the present situation, it is not the nonsocialist split, but a government party that is coming apart at the seams--a party that is characterized by internal dissolution and greater disparity than there has been for a long time. When strong powers in the Labor Party are well on the way in creating doubts about the government's security policy, and when one case after another is documented that the party is operating without leadership and management--one tends to think that they have enough on their hands just straightening out their own internal problems. It must be a bitter pill to swallow for the government party's spokesmen in the Storting that the old and well tested split-and-rule tactic is ineffective against the nonsocialist parties.

One of the most important conclusions of the State of the Nation speech debate is that the three nonsocialist coalition parties--the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party--are united about joint goals at the beginning of the election year 1981. One by one the parliamentary leaders of the three parties, Kare Willoch, Lars Korvald and Johan J. Jakobsen, declared that they will work consciously for a nonsocialist majority in the Storting and an administration consistent with that majority. With particular pleasure we notice Korvald's strong emphasis on the fact that a systematically planned policy work will be necessary in view of the election and that he also emphasized the aim to work on electoral pact in some districts. If we should experience a new balance situation similar to the 1977 election, the right joint party lists on the nonsocialist side could be the determining factor in the election outcome.

What then are the nonsocialist parties' political goals if they get the mandate to form a government together? The answer from the nonsocialist party leaders was unambiguous with regard to the defense and security policy. After many

years of unsuccessful economic policy, the main task will be to restore the balance in Norwegian economy, strengthen the competitive capability, and secure employment. The fight against inflation must, therefore, be put in the forefront. The educational system will be strengthened primarily with heavier emphasis on factual knowledge and by stimulating self-initiative and purposefulness. The three parties can also be expected to be united in matters relating to the state church.

In the period until the Storting election, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party will try to obtain the greatest possible support for their programs and leading issues.

This is both their statement and justification. And the very fact that this evolves around three independent parties, will there be a difference of opinion--especially in the opposition--in other matters. But at the same time let us emphasize that a highly understandable party shaping must not take place at the cost of the joint party definition that gives a nonsocialist alternative credibility. Disagreement over single issues must not overshadow the big and collective tasks the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party face.

The conduct of the three parties in the State of the Nation speech debate is a good basis for future cooperation. The Labor Party will not succeed in torpedoing this.

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CSO: 3108



## GROUP FORMS TO STIMULATE DEBATE ON NATO, STOCKPILING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Oct 80 p 3

[Article: "Extensive Defense Policy Debate Supported by 115: Fear War, Disagree on NATO"]

[Excerpt] Norway must put in a greater effort to preserve the peace in the world; take better care of the national independence and prevent our country from being among the first targets in a coming war. Such are the main demands issued by the committee on information on security and defense policies and presented yesterday in Oslo. The committee, which consists of people for and against NATO, presented an appeal signed by approximately 115 persons. It was said that the appeal could be interpreted in many ways. The committee did not give a concrete answer to whether they wanted complete disarmaments in the West alone: We will have a debate about that, said Johan Galtung and Aron Haugstad.

The aim of the information committee is to contribute to a "fundamental and open reviewing of our defense and security policy." In the appeal presented yesterday, it says, among other things, "Atomic war is not only a frightening thought, but a likely possibility. With the increased atomic armament in Europe and plans about stockpiling American military materiel in Norway, many of us feel that now much more than before we can share the responsibility for the catastrophe that must not happen."

Galtung announced that the committee will translate and distribute a series of documents, speeches by the U.S. Defense Minister Harold Brown, among other things, as well as Norwegian materials. They want to station a representative in the United States in order to be more up to date on what the thinking is there. Further plans are to establish an international information network--from Canada to Finland, Galtung added. He said about the main purpose of the committee: We need a debate about /all/ sides of the defense and security policy.

When asked how the operation would be financed, he said that, among other things, the committee would sell information material. It has no economic basis beyond what the participants themselves contribute.

Haugstad emphasized, among other things, that there are international undercurrents in our defense policy debate--and that many feel that "Norway is running errands for the United States." The information committee's working committee consists of Eva Nordland, Helga Hernes, Hans Jacob Utvedt, Birgit Brock Utne, Odd Andreassen, Johan Christie, Asbjorn Eide and Jens Gustav Ivarsen who is their coordinator. The hope is to establish a permanent secretariat in Oslo.

The persons who signed the appeal are: Eva Nordland, research assistant; Gunnar Tonder, union chairman; Helga Hernes, research director; Randi Moe, union vice chairman; Gaute Gunleikarud, college president; Dr Hans Jacob Utvedt, former broadcasting director; Professor Ragnhild Sundby; Arvid Gravklev, cooperative chairman; Birgit Brock Utne, research assistant; Odd Andreassen, union adviser; Johan Christie, major-general; Finn Erik Thoresen, labor union leader; Kaare Soby, college president; Harald Overas, federation vice chairman; Olav Ljosne, former Young Liberal Party leader; Professor Johan Galtung, Gunnar Gargo, former member of parliament; Brynjulf Bull, former mayor of Oslo, and Havard Alstadheim, mayor.

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CSO: 3108

## MANY IN CENTER, CHRISTIAN PARTIES DEFY LEADERS ON DEFENSE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Kristin Moksnes: "In Search of Nonsocialist Defense Debate"; passages within elantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Have the top politicians in the Center Party and the Christian People's Party lost touch? Many have reacted strongly to the party leaders use of the defense debate in the Labor Party for election purposes, and they look for comparable debate in the center parties.

The Center Party's chairman, Johan J. Jacobsen, recently claimed the security policy as the argument for government change. The chairman of the Christian People's Party, Kare Kristiansen, followed up by saying that the "dissolution tendencies in the Labor Party can have influence on national interests." And the Conservatives have expressed unveiled enthusiasm over this unification in the nonsocialist quarters before the election campaign.

/The enthusiasm is not as great in the ranks of the Center Party and the Christian People's Party. The party leaders have indirectly and categorically rejected open change of views in defense policy and disarmament, despite the fact that there indisputably are different opinions among the members./

Tobe Bye, deputy representative to the Storting for the Center Party, has reacted strongly to the statements from the nonsocialist party leaders and groups of the Labor Party leadership after Jens Evansen's address. Something like this might be expected in some Eastern Bloc country, but in a democratic country it should be in good form to discuss the defense and security policy openly, said Bye to VART LAND yesterday.

To the ARBEIDERBLADET she appears sceptical about the Conservative's attempt to gather the nonsocialists to the election campaign on this deliberation.

--It is reassuring for the country's population that a large party, as the Labor Party, is carrying on a defense debate, thinks Bye, who looks for interest for debate among the other parties.

/--Many of us nonsocialists feel the need for information and frankness. The reaction of Evansen's address is frightening. Is it the lack of information that lies behind such an overreaction? Have the top politicians not realized the dangers that the atomic nuclear rearmament implies, wonders Bye, and adds that she, of course, wants good defense, but not that the earth be obliterated./

--There is a debate going on among the party members. Everywhere among the people I observe the pleasure over someone having put a question mark to the rearmament. That the leadership in the nonsocialist parties has not yet picked up the debate, is an indication that the contact with the grassroots is poor. When our political leaders do not dare talk, we, the others, must do it. We cannot turn such a serious issue as rearmament and disarmament over to a handful of mocking generals and politicians.

Bye thinks that in his address Evansen followed up on an official Norwegian speech in the United Nations. During the UN special tenth session about disarmament, Norway obligated itself to keep the population informed about the dangers regarding nuclear rearmament in the world and the necessity of disarmament. Evansen has only reported what he knows and sees, says Bye; and she thinks the Labor Party should be proud of Evansen.

Bye is supported by fellow party member, Marie Larson from Baerum, who was a candidate in the last Storting election:

--The Center Party is known for its defense interest, but there is a limit. Many intelligent people think that now it is serious. We are faced with threat of atomic war which demands that all get involved in disarmament. But we must be informed. I miss a reasonable discussion, and I think it is terrible that the other parties do not pick up the ball from the Labor Party. It is possible that the top politicians make their decision about modernization of atomic weapons, prepositioning, etc., based on solid knowledge, but that cannot dismiss a debate about the decisions based on knowledge the rest of us do not share.

Larson warns against a resolution that in general is not considered by most people to create fertile ground for confidence.

In the Christian People's Party it is Bergfrid Fjose, former cabinet minister and present member of the administration's disarmament committee, who has been the first to come out with it. Fjose, who is active in the action "No To New Atomic Weapons," thinks that critical viewpoints against parts of the defense policy must be tolerated without being characterized "left-wing." She says about the nonsocialist party leaders' criticism of the defense debate in the Labor Party:

/I think the top level politicians should cool it a little. Maybe they are running scared. Seen from outside international politics, the reactions to the defense debate seem overdramatized, says Fjose, who asks for more open debate in the Christian People's Party./

--We must not use such a serious issue as the security policy in political campaigns for the party. This is more important than a victory for the political party, says Fjose. This is an issue about the chances of our children and grandchildren's survival.



## ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL DISCUSSES WEAPONS SHORTAGE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "Training Units a Drain on Weapons Supplies: Can Threaten Readiness in Wartime"]

[Text] In case of mobilization in Norway, training units, consisting of thousands of soldiers, must on moment's notice be partially disarmed because of a shortage of heavy weapons and other equipment in the army. In case of war, the materiel must be returned. This drains the ammunition stored in the war depots. If the army had received more funds, 50,000 more soldiers could have been drafted.

Even though Norway has a small population, there is no shortage of personnel that restricts the country's capability to defend itself militarily. The restrictions today is money.

According to today's plan, Norway can, during mobilization, draft approximately 50,000 men for combat duty. The army inspector general, Rolv Eios, tells AFTENPOSTEN that it would be possible to mobilize further 50,000 men, provided that the political authorities would provide higher wages, materiel and training.

According to today's plans regarding troops in wartime, Norwegian mobilized units have on the average 25 percent of the force in reserve. The percentage is higher in some places. These are men who have served their duty, but have not been earmarked for any particular unit. The reserve can fill the gap that occurs as a result of sickness, absence and the like.

--By cutting down on this reserve somewhat and at the same time preventing great defection from the defense, enough personnel resources should in the long run be established for a combat unit of 200,000 men, says Eios.

To AFTENPOSTEN it is emphasized from various quarters that although it is both feasible and theoretically possible to increase the army's effectiveness with more soldiers, receiving allied reinforcements is not an alternative. The ability to receive NATO-reinforcements from outside has a very special meaning, among other things, because of its discouraging effect on the opponent. Besides, the army works hard enough to get money to further develop the units it has today. Shortage of officers is a motto, the need for materiel is something else.

## Borrowed Weapons

The situation today is that the army's schools and training units do not have their own weaponry, that is to say heavy weapons such as machine guns, anti-tank missiles and such weapons that are necessary for them in order to operate as a fighting unit. There is also a lack of vehicles, communication equipment and other special materiel.

In order to train soldiers and officers in the training units, equipment must be borrowed from the mobilization depots. In case of mobilization, there are distinctive plans regarding prompt return of this equipment.

## The Oslo Defense in Danger?

According to AFTENPOSTEN's information from other sources, the defense of the capital area will, for example, depend on school units at Trandum returning heavy equipment in time, and that these weapons are intact and well maintained. Should the return, for one reason or another, not be in time, two battalions, consisting of approximately 800 men each, would report without finding their heavy weapons in the war depots. The two battalions would, among others, be short of 30 recoilless cannons of the Carl Gustav type, in order to be able to fight tanks in the district near Oslo.

The planned return of these weapons means that hundreds of soldiers in the Trandum area will be so ineffective during mobilization that they might just as well be given leave.

In a commentary to this information, Major General Eios says that it would have been extremely desirable that the training units in the army also have their own weapons. For the country as a whole it can mean that weapons for a whole brigade of 5,000 men can be on loan at a time.

--But one must keep in mind that the training units have soldiers with varied experience, depending on the time of year. Some can be almost ready to graduate, while other units may have soldiers with only 1 week's military training behind them, says Eios.

Another weakness in the mobilization presentation has to do with ammunition. More ammunition is used during training than can be replaced. In the proposal for next year's budget, the department writes that "When it comes to replacing ammunition used in training, it is continually expected to strain the existing stock somewhat as this practice is justifiably applicable to preparedness."

## Rearmament Plans

The army leadership now has ready plans for a rearmament of the striking power, and at the same time taking measures for more effectiveness wherever possible. Now the army leadership is looking for an opening in the budget in order to execute the plans.

With around 5 kilometer range for all the national brigades air defense missiles are the first priority. The Swedish missile RB 70 is already being tested, and the American "Stinger" is also a possible candidate. The cost of air defense is around 1.5 billion kroner.

#### New Data System

The army has developed a new control and warning system model, which will, with the help of radar and data technique, prevent flustered army soldiers from shooting down their own planes with their new air defense missiles. The system is able to give "target directions" on moment's notice--that is to say exact information about which target to fire at. According to the plans, the system can be used internally by one brigade, as well as by many brigades working together. Estimated cost: hundreds of million kroner.

Inspector General for the Army Rolv Eios has suggested that such air defense for the army should perhaps receive higher priority than the air defense's need for new air defense around the airports. Eios has suggested that the plans to buy Roland II missiles for the air defense be reevaluated. Eios tells AFTENPOSTEN that he draws no conclusions in advance, but that the situation might have changed in the years since the Roland II was decided on for the air defense.

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## NEW LABOR PARTY PROGRAM STRESSES ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Erling Koldaas: "Labor Party: Increased Economic Democracy--Property Right Matters Regulated"]

[Text] The proposal for a new program of principles for the Labor Party has no revolutionary changes. The main line is the same as in the old "Principles and Perspectives," but now the choice was made to go all out and look at socialism as a procedure rather than a firmly constructed objective. Increased community control and further development of the economic democracy are the main objectives, and no doubt remains that the property rights matters will be regulated.

--We have chosen to go all out in this program and describe socialism as a method of work, a procedure, and not a goal in itself, said the chairman of the program committee, Church and Education Minister Einar Forde, in his introduction to the presentation of the proposal for a new program of principles for the Labor Party. Formerly we have viewed socialism as the ultimate goal, but in reality this is a program the policy the Labor Party has followed the last 50 years.

The greatest changes, in reaction to the former outlook, have taken place in the program committee's treatment of the party's basic viewpoint. The basis was originally to revise the part of the program that was situation descriptive, but in the process it became clear that the basic viewpoint had to be adapted to become more attractive to the groups where the party is on the point of losing hold, and then perhaps especially among the young. Forde pointed out that the so-called "right-wave" had demonstrated a challenge of that fact, but he emphasized that there had never been any discussion of revising the Labor Party's basic viewpoint, only to define it.

--To us the labor movement is a freedom movement, said Forde, which means that we see the growth game between life and the community as extremely important. But at the same time we admit that no meaningful freedom concept can be given without declaring that it has its limitations. In this regard the new proposal for program principles says:

In order to obtain what we want, we cannot do as we please.

Nature provides barriers we cannot break.



Through joint efforts we can obtain benefits we cannot obtain by ourselves. Many of our goals can only be reached through cooperation.

Freedom requires social organization.

"Solidarity will in the present society speak out to bring forth ways of managing, that give joint solutions when everyone does whatever is sensible." This quotation is from the section on solidarity and Forde pointed out that according to his understanding, the hackneyed honor systems that have always characterized the Labor Party, had been consciously retained. Hackneyed in the sense of being well used, said Forde, who meant that these concepts had now been successfully used in a different manner.

The program committee's chairman was convinced that the regular party members would find what they need for the daily political debate in the presentation of the basic viewpoints. He further pointed out that much pioneering work had been brought forth in this part of the program.

--For us the economy is an aid to obtain human goals, said committee member Per Kleppe, minister of planning. He emphasized that the Labor Party is not Marxist, nor does it build on ideology. He, however, admitted that the part of the program that deals with "Development directives and challenges" has ideas that are a part of the socialistic inheritance. The party leader, Reulf Steen, pointed out in this connection that no socialistic philosophy get around Marxists ideas, but he stressed that the proposal for the program of principles clearly disassociates itself from Leninism.

Norway's close association with the international economy characterizes the proposal; and the same applies to certain conceptions the Labor Party has regarding the economic development in the country. Increased community control echoes all the way through regarding both an important factor such as the oil and gas production and the more worrisome inflation. The program anticipates talks about adjusting the substance of the property rights by expanding the industrial democracy, and it is emphasized that municipal and state property rights seem the most adequate in some areas.

Solidarity will greatly influence the economic life, says the program proposal, and this can in most cases be obtained if the community puts frame conditions on the companies. This was emphasized as a significant principle by Cabinet Minister Kleppe, who sees this as progress development for the democracy. The program also aims for the income from oil to be primarily used to increase collective community saving, and, perhaps just as important, to be used to secure increased influence of the community in the business economy.

The Program Committee suggests for the first time in the party's history to give the program of principles its own viewpoint of life and beliefs. It is maintained that the Labor Party will unite everybody around their basic viewpoint, across differences in belief and outlook, and the state's responsibility to secure the church's working room and living conditions as long as the state church system remains.

The proposal for program principles further inaugurates the practice of sex quota and other special handling equal opportunity employment; maintains that all persons shall have the right for education all through life; that leisure time policy and sports must be expanded as a protection against commercialization; and that the health policy must in ever-increasing degree, get a non-medicinal character, only to name a few main points.

The new program of principles is now being sent out to the Labor Party's locals. Eventual commentaries and change proposals will be presented in toto at the party's national congress in 1981. The new program of principles, along with a new action program, will form the basis of the Labor Party's work during the 4 year period 1981-1985. The Program Committee chairman, Cabinet Minister Forde, emphasized that the party's organs will attach great importance to the treatment and presentation of the principles program.

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CSO: 3108

## PAPER URGES ADOPTION OF NEW INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY PLAN

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 10 Oct 80 p 10

[Editorial: "Democracy in Development"]

[Text] The labor movement in Norway has never wanted to look at democracy as a fully developed social model. There is always the question of bringing the democracy further; to develop new forms that pull the people into the decision making process; and gives them influence over their own society; their place of work and their life.

The development of industrial democracy in Norway began with the appointment of the so-called Aspengren-committee in 1961. This was a committee established in cooperation with the Norwegian Federation of Labor and the Labor Party. The committee finished its work in 1965, at the time the Borten-government came to power. During the 5 years of nonsocialist government, it was impossible to get anywhere in the Storting with the industrial democracy proposals. When the Bratteli-government had taken over in 1972, a majority was reached in favor of a plan to have company and employee representatives on the executive committee of corporations over a certain size.

Eight years have passed since the industrial democracy was established by law. The Norwegian Federation of Labor and the Labor Party think the time has come to go further. Presently, the so-called Skytoen-committee has put forth its proposal for further development of the industrial democracy. The proposal will now be presented for debate both in the trade union movement and in the Labor Party, where it be taken up in connection with program plans in both places.

The industrial democracy has up to now only applied to the corporations. It is an important principle for the Skytoen-committee that the employees have influence in the executive committee of every concern, as well as private enterprises. Earlier, limits were set on industrial democracy, based on the size of the concerns. The new proposal goes further. The employees will have the right to participate in company meetings, board of directors or other decisive and planning bodies in all the companies concerned. With regard to companies that have more than 25 employees, it is not only a

question of rights but duty. We look at this as an important point because it emphasizes that the employees should not only demand their rights, but also want to accept duties and responsibilities.

According to the Skytoen-committee's understanding, the employees should be able to, if the majority so wishes, demand up to half of the membership in the companies' administrative body and executive committees. This does not go against the Constitution and does not shake the property right, because the president of the board of directors or the executive committee will represent the owner and have the final word by his double vote in a tie vote.

The experience with industrial democracy has been good up to now. This is admitted by the employers' standpoint as well. We do not think there are many modern company executives that want to be back "in the old days." The employees have shown that they can bring the companies' executive bodies valuable incentives.

Through the underlying ideas of the Skytoen-committee's proposal, further alternatives of the employees' views and experience can be outlined, and their interest in maintaining the company as a good work place.

The first reaction to the new proposal of extended industrial democracy shows once again the nonsocialist reservations when such things come up. We do not think this is in accordance with people's general understanding of the democratic system. The paper OKONOMISK RAPPORT recently conducted a survey that showed that 61 percent of the Norwegian people agree that employees should have just as many representatives on the executive boards of the companies as do the shareholders, however, in a way that the president's double vote keeps the shareholders majority. Even among the Conservatives there are 44 percent of the voters who share this view. We have not observed any better proof of how strongly the industrial democracy idea function among the Norwegian people. Nevertheless, we have no illusions about the fact that the Conservatives will go along in extending the industrial democracy in this way. We are, on the other hand, eager to know if the center parties want to follow the times.

We are glad that the Skytoen-committee has also taken up some of the ideas from the so-called Laake-committee, which during its time evaluated public representation in the companies' governing bodies. The Skytoen-committee wants to open up access to the municipalities, in case the municipalities themselves or the employees can be represented on the executive boards of the companies if they so desire. Contact organs can also be established between the municipality and companies. It is obvious that it is primarily in places where the whole community is dependent on one or two companies, that such a representation is of interest. In such places the possibility should, however, exist for the officials elected by popular vote to follow the development of the companies. If something goes wrong in one company, the whole community will be hard hit. The community should have the possibilities both to act and to prepare. A representation system offers such possibilities.



## BRUNDTLAND DISCUSSES RECENT LABOR PARTY INFIGHTING

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 10 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Per-Arne Bjerke: "Labor Party Having Rough Times--No Reason for Pessimism, Says Brundtland"; passages within slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] We start the fall session with total attention of the press directed towards us. There is no shortage of attacks and critical commentaries. This may look like a poor beginning of an important work year. But actually what is of any importance is, that the Labor Party can go to the election with a convincing and united political platform. I see no reason for pessimism to gain foothold in the party.

This statement comes from the newly elected vice chairman of the Labor Party's parliamentary group, Gro Harlem Brundtland. She is also a candidate for the chairmanship in the Foreign Relations Committee. Brundtland is the first woman to hold these two important political positions in Lovebakken.

Gro Harlem Brundtland takes over as vice chairman of the parliamentary group at a time when changes in the administration, debates about prepositioning, and especially the state budget cause unusual vibrations around the Labor Party.

/--Do you see it as a political burden that it is primarily with the Conservative support that the Labor Party can push this budget through?/

--It will of course have great significance that we can get the broadest possible support for the budget. From the commentaries that have already emerged, it has been established that it [is] no particular party that will attempt to get the budget adopted. This year, just like last year, the budget will be passed in the Storting with an extremely varied majority.

It will not be easy for the nonsocialists to unite around joint statements for the administration's economic presentation. Rarely have I seen such conspicuous commentaries from the nonsocialists this year. It will, therefore, be interesting to compare the nonsocialist remarks regarding the budget. Anyway, what has emerged from the three nonsocialist parties so far, does not hold together. And these parties claim that they are going to form a government together.

/--Now you say that the nonsocialist parties are distended. But is there not also a great discord within the Labor Party, both about the budget and other matters?/

--I see that from the nonsocialist side, there are constant references made to the so-called infighting in the Labor Party. This gives reason to state the following: The Labor Party's program is the subject for a wide organizational effort. The day the program will be adopted by the national congress, there will be no doubt about the Labor Party's intentions.

#### Clarification

We have forums where we can clear up internal disagreement and emerge with a common view. Internal discussions in any party are not anything unusual. That also takes place to a high degree within the nonsocialist parties. But these parties do not have a common organ that can clarify what the parties really mean.

The Center Party, the Christian People's Party and the Conservative Party enter the election with three different platforms. I doubt strongly that it will be possible to bridge all the political main areas, economy, oil, environment and abortion, where they have different viewpoints.

The Labor Party enters the election with one program and that is where the big and deciding difference lies.

/--The National Congress in Kjemisk has brought forth a strong criticism over the state budget. Is Arthur Svensson right when he maintains that this budget will lead to a more strained relationship between LO and DNA?/

--I definitely hope that is not so. The Trade Union Movement and the Labor Party must stand together if we are to win the election. I do not think it is so strange that there are many and partially strong reactions to the budget. Many interests are involved. A budget also contains so many elements that it must take some time to become absorbed in it. I think that a part of the criticism will subside when the entirety of the economic presentation is better known to people.

#### High Public Consumption

We concentrate on full employment. We do not want any brutal restrictions levied on the public statements. This is the basis of the budget. High public consumption is important for the social profile. Now Presthus says that the administration has not gone far enough in order to curb the progression. The question then is where the state will get the money from, if the progression is to be curbed further. It will be interesting to see if the Conservatives will suggest real cuts in the budget. They have not been too eager for that in recent years. The tax reduction the party plans to make, must either extend to the foreign debts or public consumption. In his commentaries Kjell Magne Bondevik has also concentrated on changes that would make the budget more expansive.

/--One matter that will come up soon in the Storting is the American prestockage issue. The people in the party opposed to the prestockage criticize the way it is treated. What are your comments on that?/

--The administration is treading a delicate balance here. The prestockage itself is in accordance with our base-and-security policy such as it has been conducted up to now.

#### Open Debate

The administration had been criticized by the nonsocialist as it had not come forth with a viewpoint. Now the administration is being criticized by fellow party members instead. But I do not think it is a bad sign that there is room for a debate on such an issue within one party. On the whole, I think there is need for much more open discussion about defense-and-security affairs.

/--As a result of the administration changes, there have been new speculations about the leadership in the party. Now both Odvar Nordli and Reulf Steen have clarified their position and said that they will continue in their posts. Do you feel the need to do the same?

--No, I do not. It is the task of the National Congress to decide the composition of the party's central organs. Just as it is the National Congress' responsibility to adopt the party's program and political platform.

With regard to Nordli's position, we wanted to emphasize from the side of the party leadership that this is our administration we enter the elections with. Now we hope that the nonsocialists can also present a candidate prime minister. Regardless of the fact that they never express much desire for cooperation, it is decisive what they vote for, and who they vote with, says Brundtland.

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CSO: 3108

## PAPER DIFFERS WITH EVENSEN ON SOCIETY POLICY VIEWS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 10 Oct 80 p 10

[Editorial: "Evensen"]

[Text] Ambassador Jens Evensen has thrown himself into the fiery debate about the prestockage and important aspects of Norwegian security policy; the issue of establishing atomic free zones in the North, among other things. The last one is not a new concept. Every time it has been aired, it has been rejected by the Norwegian authorities with reference to the fact that the North is an atomic free area. To expand this to also include the obligation not to use atomic weapons in war, has always been considered of little interest and such an issue will hardly ever be decided, neither in Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen nor Helsinki.

We do not agree with Evensen's viewpoints, but accept that his arguments are an important part of the debate about these issues. On the other hand, we are seriously skeptical about these arguments being brought forth by such a high level official in the Foreign Ministry, and the special duties that are ascribed to Ambassador Evensen. We also refer to the fact that such an eminent attorney in this field as Arvid Frihagen concludes his evaluations that Evensen has clearly broken the obligations he accepted as an official.

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## BRIEFS

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY PLAN OPPOSITION--The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions and the Labor Party's joint proposal about the extension of industrial democracy, in such a way that it will extend to companies with 25 employees and more, has caused violent reactions among several spokesmen for the smaller companies. The extreme consequence of this would be a lock-out to prevent the adoption of the proposal. That will scarcely be the proposal much longer. The Aspengren-proposal took 5 years. Of course, much depends on the Labor Party winning in the next elections. The proposal of 50 percent representation in the governing bodies of the companies can, hypothetically, hit as many as 113,000 companies. From the judicial aspect it is scarcely against the constitution, as the side of the ownership continues to hold the real control. It will not be necessary to change the Constitution until the proposal develops such that the employees get more than 50 percent of the votes in the governing bodies. In recent years statements from leading people within the trade union movement and party, can without any doubt be interpreted such, that the proposal is one more step on the road to total nationalization. [Excerpts] [Oslo NORGES HANDELS OG SJOFARTSDIDENDE in Norwegian 10 Oct 80 p 4] 9583

CSO: 3108

## PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE OF LEFT IN RIGHTIST POLITICAL CLIMATE

## Postelectoral Political Realignments

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 5 Nov 80 pp 2, 3

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Leftist Gaullism in Portugal at the End of 1980"]

[Text] The Move of the Evidence From Right to Left

The Portuguese right is traditionally conservative, patriarchal, paternalistic and presidentialist or presidentializing, seeking in political power, specifically in its maximum embodiment, the fulfillment of all the needs, aspirations and dreams that it cannot achieve or pursue through the dynamism of the civil society.

The Portuguese left is traditionally averse to presidentialism, which it associates with the dictatorship or with incipient forms of authoritarianism, preferring more or less mitigated types of parliamentarism.

Now what is happening in Portugal on the eve of the election campaign for the presidency of the republic is an extremely interesting phenomenon, which has broken off from the positions assumed by the various Portuguese political sectors for over a century.

In fact, the Portuguese right is tending to try out a certain parliamentarization in the present government system, as part of the goal to approach formulas associated with the current center-right in Europe, to consolidate and reinforce the majority acquired in the Assembly of the Republic and also to limit the dangers of an overly prominent role for the president of the republic during the next 4-year term.

Experience will show the extent to which this attempt to stress the parliamentary bent in our semipresidential system of government is practicable and can be achieved by the Portuguese right.

But the unique feature is what is happening among a portion of the Portuguese left which has deliberately launched into presidentialism, even though it is not fully aware of all the consequences of the course of action on which it is embarking.

Thus, at present, among the Portuguese right the winners are the anti-Gaullists, and the losers are many of the former Gaullists whose plans to stress the presidential bent in the system of government have been thwarted. The winners are individuals

such as Sa Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral, who have been quicker to count on a certain amount of parliamentarization in the system. For the present, the losers are individuals such as Lucas Pires, who would be inclined toward a presidentializing line more integrated into the traditional behavior of the Portuguese right.

Meanwhile, among the left, Gaullism is on the rise as the only alternative to a right wing parliamentary majority, and Eanes' candidacy, to a substantial number of its backers, is nothing more than a form of leftist Gaullism, and in certain instances they are not fully aware of its present effects or those in the near future.

## 2. The Genesis of Leftist Gaullism

How did this situation, to a large extent unprecedented among the Portuguese left, occur?

It may be said that the major driving force in that process was President Eanes himself.

Little by little, throughout 1977 and later, overtly, during 1978 and 1979, the president of the republic acquired decisive weight in the operation of the Portuguese government system.

The crisis in the leading Portuguese political parties and the impossibility of forming enduring, stable, majority governments, as well as the president's action itself, caused Portugal, from the middle of 1978 until the end of 1979, to be governed by executive bodies of presidential responsibility and inspiration, yet tolerated by Parliament and by the parties.

On that occasion, there arose in our country a strong trend of opinion favoring a more clearcut presidentialization of the government system.

The uniqueness of the trend lay in the fact that there converged in it the presidentialists of the right as well as the presidentialists of the left.

Presidentialists of the right were individuals dissatisfied with the party situation, or cut off from the parties' top ranks, who saw in the presidential formula a means of constructing, at Belem, what they failed to achieve through the current political parties.

There were some centrists; there were dissidents from PSD [Social Democratic Party] who, rather than opt for rapprochement with PS [Socialist Party], chose to go along with any movement or party of a presidential type sponsored by Eanes; and there were activists from certain social organizations, without any direct partisan persuasion.

In short, they were individuals such as Sousa Franco, Mota Pinto and Jose Manuel Casqueiro. They were the great backers of the Mota Pinto government for which they fought the present ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association], alienated sectors of PSD and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], and independents from the center and right, opposing the political leaderships of the main parties, including PSD itself.

But, at the same time, the presidentialist line of the left was coming into existence.

It was Eduardo Lourenco, Eduardo Prado Coelho, and Vasco Graça Moura who criticized the party's action in recent years, and who explained that the Portuguese left had only one possibility for the future, namely, to stake everything on Eanes and on the reinforcement of his political position.

To these and to sectors of the partisan left which nurtured the same goal (the most typical example of which was the former IS [Socialist International]) the governments of Nobre da Costa and particularly Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo were the best proof that such presidential reinforcement was both possible and desirable in our country.

In brief, for a year and a half, President Eanes has had a combination of support to reinforce his political intervention, which began in the traditional right and ended in the socialist left.

Each saw in Eanes the suitable instrument for implementing its politicoideological plan.

For Mota Pinto, it was the presidentialist party which he went so far as to mention in an interview on radio during 1979. For Casqueiro, it was the presidentialist movement, the preparatory meetings for which he participated in actively. For many of the present ASDI members, it was the one and the other, as in the case of Medeiros Ferreira, who was consecutively involved in all the phases of that long series of attempts to presidentialize the government system. For the former IS, the entry into PS did not allow its members to make the connection with Eanes, with the advantage that they could count on the tactical alliance of the so-called "technocrats". For certain leftist theoreticians, who are moreover among the best analysts of the national situation in essential sociopolitical areas, what was involved was convincing the Portuguese left that it was viable only if it learned three things from the right: not to be afraid of presidentialism, to substitute the verbalism of the opposition with the technocratic competence of the government and to overcome certain complexes about party liberalism with respect to the role and mission of the political parties in a contemporary democracy.

### 3. The Aspirations of the Leftist Gaullists

There they are, the proponents of leftist Gaullism, again and more forcefully backing Eanes' second candidacy and explaining why PS and Mario Soares in particular should give in to the president-candidate.

The conjectures are as noted:

1. PS in general and Mario Soares in particular have not managed to be a government, and lacked competence to run the country technocratically; and hence AD [Democratic Alliance], which has been more intelligent and more subtle in power, won the elections of 5 October and deserved to win them;

2. PS in general and Mario Soares in particular exaggerated their role on the Portuguese political scene, placing it ahead of far more important national interests; and this is because, although having a militant, courageous view of the parties and of PS per se, they lack a genuine view of the state;



3. PS in general and Mario Soares in particular have too many parliamentary and anti-presidential complexes inherited from the liberal, antimilitarist republicanism of decades past, and do not understand that the left of the present and future cannot be formed nor exercise power apart from that national sociological reality which is a certain patriarchal quality in the authorities, an obvious weakness in the civil society and an unequivocally leading role for the Armed Forces.

If the left wants to continue ignoring the real country in which it is living (as claimed), then it will have to wait many, many years before it comes to power again.

If the left, specifically PS, wants to be an alternative in power within the not too distant future, then it must lose its complexes and learn many things from the right.

It must learn that the country is above the party, that the head of state, with everything that he represents, carries a political weight among us which cannot be minimized nor dissipated by the parties or by Parliament, that to govern Portugal today means also, if not primarily, to sacrifice the rhetorical style of the verbal opposition in Parliament to technocratic competence in office.

In short, what an Eduardo Lourenco and an Eduardo Prado Coelho maintain is that PS has no alternative other than to stake everything on Eanes, particularly since the time when AD reinforced its parliamentary majority; to wager on the reinforcement of the political position of a reelected Eanes; to wager on the promotion of new party values that will replace the "historical" ones; and, why not say so, to wager on the inevitability of the replacement of Mario Soares himself, sooner or later.

It is obvious that this proposition has a risk, namely, the risk of reinforcing the presidential powers.

But since, to those who uphold it, it is not only desirable but no possible alternative is known, there is nothing left to do but run that risk (see Eduardo Prado Coelho's important article in this EXPRESSO, on pages 6-R-8-R).

#### 4. The Reaction of the Historicals and the Imponderables of the Future

As might be expected, this proposition cannot fail to be opposed by the "historicals" and by Mario Soares himself.

In the first place, because, to them, what is more important than a president of the republic and presidential elections is the role of the political parties in democracy and the role of the PS in particular.

Secondly, because they disagree, on principle, with any presidential reinforcement in the government system with a greater or lesser military component.

Thirdly, because they think that the battle against the right should not take place in the field and with the right's own weapons; otherwise, one of these days, the Portuguese left will be nothing: not what it was, nor what it is trying to be, imitating orientation that traditionally typifies the Portuguese right.

Added to these general arguments is a reason based on convenience.

The fact is that the leftist Gaullists are attempting to come to power: to power in the country and, of course, to power in the party.

Mario Soares and the "historicals" are obviously attempting not to lose the positions that they have acquired in the party machine.

Hence this struggle, in addition to being a struggle of principles, is also and very intensely a struggle for power within PS (see Jose Antonio Saraiva's remarkable article in this EXPRESSO, on pages 4-R and 5-R).

### 3. The Reasons of Both

In our opinion, the oddest thing is that both are right and, with respect to principles, both are wrong.

The leftist Gaullists or, if you will, the socialist backers of Eanes' second candidacy, are completely right theoretically. And Mario Soares and the "historicals" are wrong in the realm of principles.

Because the fact is that PS and Mario Soares were a government, and did not know how to govern. PS and Mario Soares were an authority, and did not know how to acquire a sense of the state. PS and Mario Soares still have parliamentarist, liberal, republican complexes germane to another time and an opposition stance which has not attracted anyone nor convinced anyone as an alternative in government.

The left which they are and represent, from what they have said and done in recent years, is old and exhausted, like a squeezed lemon which does not give any juice.

There is probably not a single Portuguese business owner, or a single qualified manager, who expected from a Tito de Morais, a Manuel Alegre or an Edmundo Pedro a new, competent and galvanizing idea for the Portuguese economy.

As for Mario Soares, he still continues to confuse the standard of living with the cost of living, the balance of payments with the balance of current transactions and the information boards with the editorial boards.

Then in theory, Eduardo Lourenco and Eduardo Prado Coelho are right.

However, there is an enormous difference between theory and practice, especially in this country of Portugal.

And the difference consists of this: There is no evidence that wagering on Eanes will lead to the objectives which those theoreticians are attempting to safeguard.

It is in this respect that Mario Soares is right; and they probably are not.

Because the fact is that Eanes was president and his term does not represent the implementation of a program, but rather a cyclical fluctuation between programs, to seek the broadest possible span of support from the right and the left, even at

the cost of ambiguities and contradictions in the course taken. This December, Eanes might win with the votes of the Portuguese left and subsequently decapitate part of that left, depriving it of "elan" and limiting its maneuvering room as opposition to AD.

A reelected Eanes would more readily be the president who negotiated from the right with the protection of the left than the president who guaranteed the left its revamping and its transformation in order to be a political alternative in 1984.

PS and Mario Soares will inevitably be a doormat, necessary for winning elections but dispensable whenever the presidential action required their silence, their toning down or their exclusion from power.

Hence, in theory Eanes could be the essential driving force for the reconversion and rediscovery of the Portuguese left.

In practice, he would tend to be one of the gravediggers of part of the Portuguese left: more specifically, the Socialist Party and its present historical leadership.

Such is the drama of the Socialists a month and a half before the presidential elections.

Soares and the "historicals," without Eanes or against Eanes, with the weight of party identity still valid, are the guarantee of a potential leftist opposition leadership, but they are not a government alternative on which it would be worthwhile wagering. They are the Portuguese Mitterrand and his followers, great lords of the socialist opposition in France, but whose chances of returning are extremely slight.

On the other hand, the leftist Gaullists, with Eanes, and without or against Soares, are nothing.

They are not the PS in its historical version, because they have assumed the original destiny of the party only very partially. They are not the Portuguese Rocard, because there is not thus far any indication that any of them have a political profile, national charisma and a capacity for institutional affirmation for this purpose.

And, in particular, they will always meet with that critical obstacle that exists in Portugal and not in France, namely, Ramalho Eanes.

In France, Rocard is an alternative to Giscard, a leftist alternative to a right-wing president.

In the Portugal of 1981, Constancio, Gama or Sampaio would never and could never be leftist alternatives with national representative status and a galvanizing profile, as Sa Carneiro has in AD.

Most of them, even though they are claimed to be technically competent, are still in the 1960's politically speaking, and still need to travel widely to become familiar with the real country.

Theoretically, the leftist alternative would be Gen Ramalho Eanes.

From a practical standpoint, the leftist alternative would be the PCP, particularly after Eanes, with the legitimacy of the Socialist votes, decided to bend strategically and throw himself into the arms of the right, from which he comes by training, which elected him in 1976, with which he is identified in essential aspects and with which he will have to coexist in power for 4 years. Then PS would be inevitably and tragically betrayed.

In the newspaper columns, an Eduardo Lourenco or an Eduardo Prado Coelho explain, intelligently and brilliantly, why a consistent Socialist must prefer Eanes over Soares. In everyday political activity, Mario Soares, with his gesture of real political insight, explains why the electoral wager on Eanes is the greatest mistake a Socialist voter could make.

P.S. Let the anti-Soarists of today (even after having needed Mario Soares--like bread in their mouths--to rise to where they have risen) not claim that we are backing Soares out of circumstantial convenience; they whodare to say about Soares what we have written here.

Let the perpetual Soarists not claim that we were unfair to Mario Soares. The obvious political amorality of Eanes is one thing; to conceal the fact that Mario Soares is in present-day Portugal more a great political leader of the past than a strong hope for the future is something else.

#### Eanes-Soares Leadership Struggle

Lisbon EXPRESSO-REVISTA in Portuguese 5 Nov 80 pp 4-R, 5-R

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "From Eanes' 'Treason' to Soares' 'Vengeance'"]

[Text] If Mario Soares' decision to withdraw his support from the candidate Ramalho Eanes has no other merits, it has at least one: that of evoking extremely revealing reactions from all the political agents and organizations.

It might even be said that no political gesture has ever had the power to divide the Portuguese people so clearly as this one has. The option was simple: it was summarized by backing Soares against Eanes, or backing Eanes against Soares. And it is certain that there was no one, from the far left to the right, who did not assume one of these two positions.

The extreme left, of course, backed Soares. And it backed Soares for two different types of reasons.

To certain extreme leftist sectors, Mario Soares' break with Eanes, producing bewilderment among the left in general and the Socialists in particular, naturally enhanced the chances of the candidate Otelo. Maj Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who was doomed at the outset to receiving no votes except from the revolutionary left area, could, after Soares' decision, start harboring hopes of seeing his electorate extend to other areas of the left, specifically, in the Socialist camp. It cannot be claimed that the reasoning was devoid of logic. Soares' gesture, in fact, will



inevitably cause a certain amount of splitting of the party's votes; and some of them will certainly fall into the beret of the April captain.

To other extreme left sectors, the backing for Mario Soares was based on a different kind of reason. Doomed, as a result of the conditions that have been created, to have to choose in December between two "rightwing candidates," certain leftist sectors have, with Soares' decision, observed the opening of new prospects for a "truly leftist candidacy." And this, if it were to be confirmed, would at least spare them the sacrifice of having to vote for Eanes in the forthcoming elections.

The right, of course, also backed Soares.

However, although the attitude of the extreme left, or at least part of it, was considered, though naive, the attitude of the right was neither naive nor considered: it was hypocritical. The right backed Soares like one who consoles a woman who has been deceived by her husband. "Didn't we tell you that he was a scoundrel, and an unscrupulous adventurer!" To be sure, for the right, the fate of the betrayed woman mattered little. What prompted it to run was the opportunity to attack the husband. At the present time, for better or for worse, the number one danger for the right is named Eanes. To combat him it will offer its hand to whomever it needs to, even if it is Dr Mario Soares, the "bungler" and the one "mainly responsible for the catastrophe of decolonization."

The PCP, of course, condemned Soares.

In this respect, the question is posed more subtly, and thus deserves special treatment.

#### Soares' Attitude: an Unexpected Setback for the PCP

It seems to me that the presidential issue is quite a secondary issue for the PCP. Moreover, I am even convinced that the election of Gen Soares Carneiro would better serve the interests of the Communists than would the election of Gen Ramalho Eanes. This is for a simple reason: because with the election of Soares Carneiro the PCP could speak, in forums with greater credibility, about the danger of a "return to fascism"; and, under those conditions, it might be accepted entirely as a "resistance party". It is in this guise that the Communist Party unquestionably feels more at ease.

Only it is very difficult to explain this to the members, and especially to the Communist sympathizers. Therefore, the PCP must act in such a way as not to be able to be accused of having contributed to the election of the "candidate of reaction," namely, Gen Soares Carneiro. But it must do so never losing sight of its main long-term objective, which is that of heading the Portuguese left. And in the pursuit of that objective, the PS' association with General Eanes' candidacy was useful, if not essential.

But let us observe. By adhering to Eanes, the Socialist Party would lose part of its identity. Upon agreeing that Eanes' reelection is the key political issue at present, upon peacefully agreeing that the future of Portuguese democracy depends on whether or not the current president is elected, PS would implicitly agree on

the subordination of its own role in the defense of the institutions. Now the Socialist Party, as a leading leftist party, cannot fail to say, under all circumstances and whatever the limitations of the time may be, that the continuity of the democratic regime depends on it and not on any other political agent. To do the contrary would be political suicide.

In addition, in risking its apparatus on the candidate Eanes' campaign, PS would suffer another defeat if Eanes were to lose. And, if Eanes were to win, the winner would not be PS, but rather General Eanes; because it would be he, not PS, that would be converted into the leading bulwark of democracy, and the symbol of resistance to AD.

PCP could witness all this on the sidelines, with a smile between its teeth. Everything would be going in its favor. By running a candidate of its own for the presidency, and not campaigning for Eanes, it would never turn out to be defeated; by letting its candidate fall into the orifice of the polls, it would not suffer the humiliation of the counting of solely Communist votes, and it could not be accused of having contributed to the defeat of Eanes. On the contrary, if Eanes were elected, PCP could participate in the victory celebration, because it would have contributed with its votes to the president's reelection.

However, Soares' decision has confused the Communists' ploy.

Having withdrawn his support from Ramalho Eanes, Mario Soares, even if Eanes wins, will at least not be able to be accused of being a hanger-on insofar as the president's entourage is concerned; and therefore, he will not be put in a subordinate position with respect to the winner. And, in the event that Eanes were to lose, Soares could then proclaim quite loudly that he was the only spokesman of the left who did not bend under the weight of a military candidacy, who reacted and who called for running the left's own candidate.

Whatever happens, Mario Soares, with his attitude, has become available to contest the PCP for the leadership of the Portuguese left. To be sure, Soares' move is not devoid of risks. But that is exactly the main difference between a politician like Mario Soares and an apparatus like the PCP. Under all circumstances, the Communist Party's tactic is to accrue the maximum benefits without risking anything. The life of a politician like Mario Soares, who does not have behind him a wellnigh perfect, well-oiled, disciplined machine, cannot avoid risky moves at times.

#### The Agreement With Eanes: the Opportunity for Soares' Revenge

Having reached this point, it befits us to ask: Why didn't Soares assume this position sooner; why didn't he realize the advantages of his dissociation from Eanes until now; why did he start out agreeing to back him?

The answers do not seem difficult to me.

Within PS there are essentially two movements: the "Eanists" and the "Socialists." In other words, there are those to whom everything depends on Eanes' reelection, and those for whom everything lies in the defense of the party.

Affiliated with the first group are those who are "least political of the politicians," individuals like Vitor Constancio or Jorge Sampaio, for whom life is not confined to party activity.

Based upon the notion that Soares Carneiro's rise to power could jeopardize the democratic regime, and that the man in the best position to oppose him is General Eanes, this group would advocate backing Eanes unconditionally if it were a matter of doing so. If the issue was to defeat Soares Carneiro, and if it were Eanes who seemed more capable of doing so, then the party should stake everything on Eanes, even if this were to become a sacrifice for the party, its image and its identity.

The other group, composed of personages like Manuel Alegre or Tito de Morais, Joao Gomes or Edmundo Pedro, naturally have a different outlook on the matter. To these individuals, whose lives are limited to party activity, and for whom there is no future outside of the party ranks, the party's survival is a vital issue. Hence, at all times and whatever the conditions are, they have to put the party's interests ahead of any others. And they cannot, for whatever reason, accept situations wherein the party is placed in a subordinate position or trailing behind anyone, whoever it may be.

Understandably, these two movements came into conflict regarding the presidential issue. And from the clash between the extreme positions of support for Eanes without compensation or the running of the party's own candidate, there emerged a solution based on compromise: backing for Eanes, yes, but with conditions. The party gives, but it will also receive something in return.

Mario Soares was the negotiator of the agreement. And the fact is that Soares may have seen an opportunity for revenge there. Insulted by Eanes, ejected from the government as if he were a cleaning woman, Soares, charged by the Socialists to negotiate the terms of a political contract with the president, felt that the time for his revenge had come. In fact, Mario Soares did not go to Belem to offer Eanes the backing of his party. What Soares went there to do was to demand of Eanes a commitment: written, sealed and signed. What Soares went to Belem to do was to force Eanes to abjure.

In fact, after the damage that he had done to the PS, Ramalho Eanes, agreeing to sign a pact for mutual cooperation with the Socialist Party, implicitly admitted the mistakes that he had made. Soares had his revenge. The positions were reversed: now he was the one in the strong position. If the president wanted to run as a candidate again, he would have to give the Socialists formal guarantees. He would have to vow not to be insubordinate as he had been in the past.

During the election campaign for the Legislative Assembly, the tone of the Socialist propaganda still stressed Eanes' dependence on the PS. "To vote for General Eanes is to vote for the FRS [Socialist Republican Front]." PS was actually unconcerned about Eanes' election per se. Eanes' victory only concerned Mario Soares and the "pure" members of PS insofar as it would be possible to establish such an identification between the candidate and the party that General Eanes' victory would appear, not as the victory of an independent candidate, but primarily as the victory of the party which lent him support.

It is from this standpoint that the break-off by Soares and his group from Eanes should be interpreted, after the notorious press conference held by the president of the republic. Eanes, who demarcated himself in a categorical and even aggressive way from the Socialist Party, ceased to hold any interest for the Socialists. From that moment, PS could no longer in any way claim for itself the credit for a possible electoral victory of the candidate Ramalho Eanes. The latter's victory, if it should occur, would belong forever to him.

Eanes' press conference may not have violated the commitment between him and the Socialist Party, but it certainly brought into question the unstable commitment between the two PS factions.

After Ramalho Eanes' statement of independence from Mario Soares' party, the "pure" members no longer had reason to support him: the interest which had prompted them to accept the commitment disappeared. Hence, those who, from the outset, advocated unconditional backing for Eanes remained alone in the arena. Confrontation was inevitable.

#### Eanes and Soares: Each With His Own Reason

The opinions are divided. In this dispute which, bringing Soares and Eanes into confrontation, far transcends them, there are those who heatedly defend the Socialist leader, scoring Eanes' positions, and there are those who back the candidate for the presidency, violently condemning Soares' action.

What I think few people understand is that both Soares and Eanes could not have acted any differently from the way they did act.

In fact, no one would hesitate to agree that the PS' association with Eanes was embarrassing to the party, caused it to lose its identity, obviously benefited the PCP's leadership of the left and weakened the democratic opposition to the AD government. Under these circumstances, PS could only back Eanes under the conditions whereby it did back him: demanding, putting him in a dependent position, and making his election depend largely on Socialist support; so that PS could emerge from it, not in a weak position, but rather in a strong position.

On the other hand, Ramalho Eanes also chose the only possible course of action. Unable to obtain the support of the majority of parties, as he had in 1976, Eanes had no solution other than to run in 1980 as an independent candidate; and for this reason he was unable to allow a party, even though it was a majority within his candidacy, to take possession of his image alone.

Both Eanes and Soares had their reasons; the fact is that the reasons of each one are mutually contradictory. And the argument that Soares, with this attitude of his, has jeopardized democracy is not very convincing. The fact is that both Eanes and Soares can claim for themselves the leading role in the endeavor of "safeguarding the regime." Eanes, because he may argue that the election of Soares Carneiro would be the first step toward subverting the institutions; and Soares, because he may retort that democracy is not contingent on the election of a president, that the essence of democracy lies in the existence of the parties and that any action in defense of party independence and autonomy will always be reflected in time in benefits to the democratic regime.



Both Eanes and Soares have their reasons. Eanes, being a candidate for the presidency, will naturally tend to think that the defense of the institutions, in the last analysis, lies in the presidential institution. Soares, being head of a party, and the largest party of the Portuguese left, will be prompted to say that the defense of democracy depends, not on the presidency of the republic or on any other seat of power, but primarily in its own steadfastness.

#### Future of Democratic Socialism

Lisbon EXPRESSO-REVISTA in Portuguese 5 Nov 80 pp 6-8-8-R

[Article by Eduardo Prado Coelho: "Portrait of the Portuguese Left"]

[Text] 1. While the conflicting uproar of the various committees which have already met, are meeting or are about to meet is under way, it may be useful to take advantage of the quiet from this fracas to reflect a little. What is happening in the Portuguese left? The answer may possibly date far back; perhaps it would be helpful to go back seeking it.

2. There are two traditions, two lines and two perspectives. For one, the political decision results from a discussion in which they all participate: inasmuch as it is discussed, it relates to everyone.

But, if my car is damaged, because of the fact that what relates to my car obviously relates to me, should I, incompetent as I am, decide on the best way to repair it?

If everyone is to participate legitimately in the selection of correct decisions, it must be assumed that they all have a minimal degree of political competence. This is the rational basis of the democratic proposition: it counts on the distribution of a minimal degree of political competence among all the citizens. Whether it be through the benefits of information, or whether it be because specific virtues are ascribed to the people, the people, by the mere fact that they are the people, may appear, to both the left and the right, although for different reasons, to be individuals-presumed-to know.

This is, if you will, selection in the tradition of Protagoras.

But there is another tradition, attributable to Plato, or some of his possible literature, which holds that the political decision must belong to a political elite: the only ones who possess the political competence for this, precisely because they have the technical training for it. This is, if you will, the basis for the technocratic proposition.

3. The two traditions presuppose different values.

The tradition of Protagoras was based essentially on the ability to argue and persuade: it has given rise to the art of rhetoric, the experience of the forum, and a calling to the rostrum and parliament. The entire speech must be enticing.

The tradition of Plato was based essentially on the ability to display technical competence. In this respect, what matters is the credibility.

4. A few days ago, in an issue of LE MATIN in which he upheld the need for a good economic training, Pierre Rosanvallon described the Giscard-Mitterrand confrontation during the course of the last contest for the presidential elections. On a certain occasion, when confronted with a specifically economic question, Giscard hurled at Mitterrand a supercilious "I shall explain to you," and this comment, relentless in its harshness, defeated Mitterrand's comments a thousand times. From then on, Mitterrand's remarks, which were obviously enticing, began to lose credibility.

And that is also why the elections were lost.

5. Alain Touraine wrote: "The public no longer speaks the language of politics today; it is unrest and distrust which govern it, no longer wrath or hope." \*

However, the politicians still speak the language of politics; all politicians, but especially the leftist politicians.

What is happening?

It so happens that those remarks are gradually losing credibility: those remarks of the left.

6. As Michel de Certeau has proven, when the religious person ceases to be an autonomous power, it is the politician who becomes a religious person. Therefore, he can write: "The place occupied at another time by the Church or the churches with respect to the established power can still be recognized, after 2 centuries have elapsed, in the operation of a so-called leftist opposition." \*\* Thus, there is a shift of beliefs based on the same structural pattern. An example of this may be found in Jansenist evolution: it was converted from a prophetic opposition in Port-Royal in the 17th century into a political parliamentary opposition in the 18th century, wherein, "there is actually, with respect to the established order, a relationship between the churches which used to uphold another world and the leftist parties which have promoted a different future since the 19th century." \*\*\*

7. Now, as Krystoff Pomian stated in a colloquium on O TEMPO, which I attended in the small Italian town of Fermo, there is today a crisis of the future. That crisis of the future is obviously linked with the crisis of the societies of the East which is apparent to us.

It is for this reason that one can assert that Marxism did not, like other types of thinking, lose its value as a knowledge and a place of productive conceptualizing; but it did, indeed, lose its imaginary value: it can no longer achieve, nor can it be used as the basis for imagining a different world, a new man, etc....

\* Alain Touraine, "After Socialism," Branset, Paris, 1980, p 13

\*\* Michel de Certeau, "Believe/Make Believe," in Critique of Political Practices, Galilee Publications, Paris, 1978, p 17.

\*\*\* Id. pp 17-18

Hence, we are now politically lacking in the instruments that would enable us to imagine the different society that we may desire.

Hence, the art remains the root of the desire. Whoever has a sense of the art knows that something different is both possible and desirable.

Whoever does not have a sense of the art, remains like Angelo Correia. And this is why we do not think that, in spite of everything, Sousa Tavares will remain like him.

8. That crisis of the future has serious consequences.

Democratic socialism today has an entire political rationality that is more or less convincing. It does lack a political imaginary quality capable of producing the images of another world, which are not the concentration-oriented images of so-called totalitarian communism.

Therefore, socialism considers itself differently, but still allows itself to be inspired by the light of an imaginary quality that is not its own, for lack of a better one. It is the old subject of Marxism as a source of inspiration or a methodology for analysis.

Therefore, the totalitarian imaginary quality has compromised the rational plan of democratic socialism.

Then would it be better to abandon the plan?

I think not, and the best proof of this is Sousa Tavares himself. When the reference to democratic socialism is abandoned, a place of resistance is abandoned, and then one coexists, without apparent aversion, with the most reactionary of the speeches circulating today (that of Soares Carneiro) or the most degraded of policies.

Sousa Tavares is still the best practical example of the fact that there should be no abandonment of the reference to democratic socialism, because the consequences are evident.

9. But it is in the extent to which the hypothesis of a different world is a corrupt image (that of totalitarian communism) or a tarnished image (that of democratic socialism) that, as Touraine says, the unrest and distrust replace wrath and hope.

One starts to think about the room in the same world. The opposition between exploiters and exploited was understandable at other times from the standpoint of a different world that the exploited would impose on the exploiters. Today, there is a tendency to think that the gap will be reduced when, in this same economically threatened world, everyone lives better.

10. Thus, the old metaphors of the Platonic model are restored: the governor is the one who knows how to steer the ship to a good port; he is the helmsman of a people.

Everyone recognizes the good port as being the same: the one in which there is greater abundance and development.

It is now a matter of means: who is the best governor from a technical standpoint?

This is why the speech of persuasion loses points, and the speech of credibility gains ground. The ends are confused with the means: this is the reign of technocracy. \*

11. I could write (without ambiguity) that the truth about the last election campaign for the legislative seats was the debate between Cavaco e Silva and Vitor Constancio. In fact, that assertion was not meant to be either an assessment nor depreciative. Cavaco e Silva and Vitor Constancio were thinking in terms of a society remaining the same (despite the monstrous differences in details). This means that Vitor Constancio does not appear to be harboring the pleasant illusion that, because of the fact that he could establish a more rational policy, he was in a position to be able to promote an image of a different society. He is not, and he realizes it very well.

Comparable to the aforementioned debate was the famous political "gaffe" of General Eanes' press conference. Unqualified from a tactical standpoint, it was symptomatic and profound from a theoretical standpoint. In fact, Eanes, AD and FRS (whatever the illusions that they harbor may be) are thinking inwardly of the same model of society.

They do disagree over the means.

Because the means that AD would be inclined to use would tend to preclude the possibility of creating conditions for imagining a different society.

Because Eanes, Vitor Constancio and the rest of FRS are seeking to create complete conditions for being able to freely imagine a different society.

(Now when, in an undertone, during the third half of every night's insomnia, they try to imagine a different society, they still imagine the communist society; and this worries them, because they are incapable of stating unhesitatingly that there could be a different communism besides that distorted one with which they are familiar.)

Therefore Eanes, somewhat naively in seeking to demarcate himself from the PG, said aloud what the others say in the privacy of their consciences.

12. The Portuguese situation is a strange situation wherein different periods of history are interconnected.

There was a time in history when the exploited still felt rebellious and there was a need to guarantee them a different world: that is the bare foot which lent delight and forcefulness to the FRS rallies.

Only it does not suffice to enable the left to win power democratically.

But there is another time in history: the one reflected in terms of unrest and a desire for a more abundant and more stable society.

While the former accepts the political speech of persuasion, the latter seeks credibility.

\* Antoine Compagnon, "On the Legitimacy of Political Discourse" (The Persuasion of Persuasion), in Critique, No 401, October 1980.



Cavaco e Silva offers credibility: hence, AD wins.

And there is a great likelihood that the second time in history will gain advantages over the first time in history.

13. If this were the case, while credibility would gain ground over persuasion, there is the speech of certain politicians which would be increasingly inappropriate, and there is a different speech of other politicians which would be increasingly effective.

On the other hand, the elections will not be essentially a time for a political discussion of the goals of the society, but rather a privileged occasion for politicians to gain credibility: hence the importance of "marketing" techniques. The politician does not attempt to find out the ideas of the masses. He does attempt to justify his technical decisions among the masses, and to learn whether they still adhere to his orientation.

Therefore, the majorities may be silent, if necessary. \* Therefore, the elections are not aimed at giving the will of the masses representation, but rather at probing the reaction of the masses. Hence, the marketing techniques are related to the proliferation of polls. The election is only a total poll. The representative dimension is lost, while the simulated laboratory dimension is gained. The elections offer a smaller model of the effects of a predominantly technical orientation.

Mario Dionisio was perhaps the only one to note, in a very lovely article,\*\* what these elections were like: "Radio and TV performers, stars or planets of the record market, a great deal of color, many variety shows, heaps of papers and slips of paper flooding the streets in handfuls, and political speeches in between. National and international performances of light music brought many people, especially the youth, to rallies and other propaganda events, who attended only to see and hear them; and later, saying goodbye, there were more equally alluring attractions elsewhere, regardless of the section or area." And what about the political reflection, and the civic debate? They were submerged by those same marketing techniques (even though there was an attempt to deny this fact, claiming that the use made of them was different). And hence Mario Dionisio concludes: "There is something wrong when political camps that are so opposed in all respects resort to similar styles, as was noted during the last election period."

14. There is a delightful irony in the affair: Those who were so indignant when Eanes said that the model of society was the same as a general model are the ones who, during the election campaign, used exactly the same political propaganda techniques.

It is they whom Mario Dionisio clearly condemns in a text which seems to us to be filled with melancholy.

\*Jean Baudrillard, "In the shadow of the Silent Majorities," in *Utopie*, Paris, 1978.

\*\* Mario Dionisio, "Sad Rain in the Puddle," *O JORNAL*, 17 October 1980.

15. Can it be that this phase, during which Plato takes precedence over Protagoras, and credibility is imposed on persuasion, is definitive?

There is every indication that it is not. And the undeniable signs of this are evident from the crisis in models of development.

After that crisis, the alternatives involving the destination of the vessels will be repositioned, the ends will be distinguished from the means; and we can assume that there will be room for a new political debate concerning the ends. Only that time has not yet come for Portugal.

16. That is the tragedy of the Portuguese left.

It is too late to rely on the models of rebellion capable of supporting the communist utopia; industrialization and the facts have changed the landscape.

It is too soon to embark on debates concerning alternative models associated with ends that have not yet appeared clearly (although they are thoroughly modeled) on the horizon which we have; and hence the precarious foundation for a different left.

17. Joaquim Mestre intelligently describes what is occurring in an article in O JORNAL. \*

He thinks that the socialist plan cannot be the discussion of the variants in the present situation, its variants. And he says that that we must raise "the political debate to the realm of the overall plan of society and (establish) the focal point of the discussion on alternative models of society, economy and culture."

But he fears that the previous imaginary quality will return with its overly easy evidence: "Not a millenary, theoretical plan of diffuse features related to idyllic images of an abstract nature."

Antonio Reis says the same thing when he notes that the great confrontation with AD will take place in the realm of a new cultural plan for Portuguese society, \*\* concurrently with the need to impede the internal fascist-oriented tendencies in the AD process: the need for counteracting power.

Touraine corroborates this: "Today it is in the realm of culture that the principal responses are made." \*\*\*

However, democratic socialism is nothing but a reference to this, a bright sign of this, the morning expectation, and the pressing desire for more.

Those who claim to know what democratic socialism is are complete fools.

\* Joaquim Mestre, "What Now, Socialists?", O JORNAL, 17 October 1980.

\*\* Antonio Reis, "FRS: Counterbalancing Force or Timely Alternative," O JORNAL, 17 October 1980

\*\*\* Touraine, id., p 20.

18. It is odd that Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa should also say that the main area of confrontation will be that of the cultural plan of the society.

Because, when confronted with the technocracy of the right or the left, while the left only has the inspiration of the Stalinist model (PCP), the right only has the inspiration of the cultural past of the fascist model (Soares Carneiro). Therefore, Soares Carneiro is the ideological monstrosity of a rightwing Stalinism.

It is because Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa knows this (better than anyone else) that he cites the need of the right for a different cultural plan.

19. The tragedy of the PS is the confrontation between Soarian, as a speech of persuasion without credibility, and the new left technocracy, with a speech of credibility without imagination (without a cultural plan); or, if you will, between Mario Soares and Vitor Constancio.

"Soarian" as a phenomenon of the party apparatus is the reflection of the tumultuous death throes of a rhetorical speech enlightened by a communist unconscious state which feels increasingly maladjusted and empty. Hence the move from the political analysis to antifascist demagogy, and from the latter to poetry which, in politics, is the senile disease of communism.

20. Hence the tragedy of Mario Soares. Mario Soares is a brilliant and courageous politician of persuasion, on the side of Protagoras.

Mario Soares is a very bad politician of credibility: he has not shown any organizational capacity nor technical competence.

Therefore, his speech today, in its tragic inappropriateness, is entirely acceptable to the right. The more violent it is, the more harmless it is. It is the speech of a different time in history which, with respect to the speech of a new left, succeeds only in making nice gestures of courtesy.

With the passage of time, we have observed our country, whose wrath we fear so much, having wrath now which we no longer fear. Its impatience and rebellion have turned inside; and we, outside, smile compassionately at that useless excitement. Little by little, the countenance embellished by distance becomes converted into a portrait, and the portrait becomes faded in the direction of an unknown place.

If it were not something else, this could be the portrait of the Portuguese left; the dead portrait. We hope that it is something else.

21. "Then the eyelids drop and the body is absorbed by the enigma. The walls rise the portrait recedes, my youth is left without weapons, glowing and stupid."

Perhaps wisdom is like that: debased and crushing. The only time that it belongs to you should be in age, but when a youth approaches it, fascinated that he has been given the status of a messenger, as if he wanted to touch the ice, convinced (he!) that the heat of a few years could melt the ice, then the ice sticks to the foolish burning hand, and burns it." ("The Grandfather Died That Same Day," Horberto Helder, "Equation, the Returning Steps").

## Socialist Alternatives, Strategies

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 24-30 Oct 80 p 26

[Article by Socialist Party Steering Committee member Joaquim Mestre: "And What Now, Socialists?"]

[Text] "God is not always in the mood to work miracles." D. Luis da Cunha, Political Testament.

1.

The elections of 5 October constituted a prominent occasion for Socialism in Portugal, as those of 2 December 1979 had, although for different reasons. While those of December were noteworthy because of the difficulties in keeping the left in power, in a situation of economic and social crisis, in those of October the conditions surrounding the viability of its conquest were involved.

Because while the results of 5 October did not actually reflect a defeat for the Socialists, the same cannot be said about the left in general.

In part, it was unquestionably the Communists who paid most dearly for the growth of the right, a fact producing several doubts not only about its obvious ambition for hegemony of the left, but primarily about a political line that has remained relatively constant since 25 November.

What concerns us now is chiefly the Socialist camp confronted, after the last legislative elections, with the stabilization of the right wing electorate and its correlative parliamentary majority.

There will be some who indicate easy solutions for the impasse that has been created. There will appear the usual prescriptions, ranging from an agreement with a PSD with its Social Democratic origins reconverted, to the PS' realignment "more to the right" in order to "win over the middle classes." Once again, there will be an attempt at purely institutional expedients which assume the current correlation of forces to be an ineluctable fact, and which also seek outside of the Socialist camp itself the solutions which can only be found within it and through its reinforcement.

Also without value now are the immediate explanations which seek in the diversion of votes, the vicissitudes of the campaigns and the deception of the electorate regarding its "true" interests anaesthetic ways of evading the questions that these elections have brought up again. The truth of the matter is harsh and raw: the diversion of votes (which unquestionably occurred) does not change the essential picture: the campaign was contested with an undeniable enthusiasm, the electorate is what we have, and it is on the electorate that the parties must count in a democratic regime.

The fact is that the undeniable revival of militancy and dynamics which it produced did not exceed the bounds of the voters already acquired, and was not absorbed by the rest of the electoral body. At best, we shall witness a certain amount of political stratification which certain changes within the left do not belie, and the electorate of the right, whether new or transferred, is what has grown, albeit slightly.



It is a fact that there is still evidence of a certain pendular effect of a shift to the right which, to some extent, compensates for a previous nearly universal shift to the left during the post-25 April period. The stabilization may possibly not yet have reached its final degree, but it is evident that we are approaching it at a fast pace.

This observation should not cause surprise, inasmuch as the weight of a long tradition of domination by the right in Portugal, ideologically among other areas, would sooner or later have to produce some (bitter) fruit. Besides, we are in a situation somewhat similar to the one experienced by a large part of the European left: having reached the level of nearly half the electorate, it can hardly attain the majority that would enable it to govern.

Hence, the question now is no longer that of how to govern and retain power, but rather that of knowing how to shift the direction of the majority and conquer the right. This is a new problem in Portugal, where the left, with the best of consciences, has been accustomed to retaining the illusion that the social body of the country, upon the redeeming clarion call of 25 April, was miraculously transformed into a socialist and "leftist" one. Therefore, the latest results, in their numerical smallness, reflect a 180 degree change in the political viewpoint, which was perceptible before but which has been confirmed now.

The evidence that the results show is that the left is faced with a delayed task of reestablishing its electoral base, and with the fact that (something equally well known) the obvious need and necessity of a society such as ours to decide to incline toward those who could best serve it do not suffice. The irony of history plays mean tricks like these on men who are armed only with their good intentions. So, we revert to the importance of conscience, the famous subjective factor in any process for transforming the social reality or, if you prefer, the cultural issue in its broad sense.

2.

The fact is that the Portuguese elections were contested in 1979 and 1980 in an atmosphere of referendum on the regime, under the guise of a mere electoral battle. And it is this which, in our opinion, caused the individual behavior, the dynamics of the campaigns and the good or bad way in which the governments have governed not to carry any weight or to carry an insignificant weight. The fundamental questions appear to dominate all these things, which thus assume a secondary, ineffective nature.

And the right brought up the questions of the regime as a priority, not because they are in governmental terms, but because that is its most favorable battleground; that is the way to agglutinate its electorate more strongly; and that is the realm in which it is virtually isolated and without challenge. Because, in fact, of the two alternative plans opposing it (the Communist and the Socialist), the first, although it is rather clearcut for reasons that are well known, the use made of it is confined to the intransigent sector of the PCP but does not transcend it, whereas the second is excessively diffused in the consciousness of the Portuguese people, and hence its translation in electoral terms can hardly be made.

It is true that, right now, the right has an enormous advantage in its favor: it proposes only to keep what exists (with the necessary retouching to insure its survival, of course!), and one who keeps what is already known has in his favor at least greater ease in being understood; unlike the left which, transforming by definition, now brings up the question of finding out the "why" and "how" of that transformation.

And the right has still another advantage: All the crudeness and even aggressiveness with which it defends itself or attacks its adversaries appear as a means and a tool for a clearcut political design; and hence the moral judgments on that type of behavior appear irrelevant. The objective in politics seems to be everything, and the means of little importance; because it will always be thought that whoever wants a certain goal will accept the means necessary to attain it. This is certainly a Machiavellian principle, but one which the observation of our political life does not appear to belie.

It is to this degree that the intransigence and the systematic offensive against everything in opposition or putting an obstacle in its path having caused, not its condemnation by well formed consciences, but rather an effect of agglutination, confidence and credibility in the success of a plan that is simple and, for that very reason, catalytic.

Moreover, the concentration of the political discussion on the mere form of current management, the current (economic and political) situation and questions involving the government puts the latter in the center of the initiative wherein all the concerns and attention are concentrated.

In the face of this strategy of radicalization and monopolization of the issues being debated, the left, regardless of how stringent, competent and devastating it is in its criticism of the government's action and of the methods used, upon allowing itself to be confined to this area, has implicitly accepted the battle in the adversary's camp.

In view of the conservatism of the right and its economic, political and cultural restorationism, it was necessary to offer a clearcut, simple and realistic alternative which, in our opinion, can only be Socialist. Now little or nothing has been said about this, other than formulas devoid of significance and meaning to the ordinary citizen.

The difference between the rhetoric of the right and the left is that the former relates to a reality with which everyone is familiar in his daily life, and the latter is contrived in a vacuum.

3.

This brings up a very old problem of the socialist movement everywhere (a reason that no despair of any kind is in order here): in fact, either the political debate is raised to the realm of the overall plan for society and the center of the discussion is established on alternative models of society, economy and culture, or there is a discussion of the current situation, and it is confined, in this case and with some kind of luck, to waiting for the world crisis, "the exterior," the ineptness of the adversary or some fright to restore to it a majority of cyclical dissatisfaction.

A choice must be made between these two strategies.

However, in the first one, a possible access to power for the Socialists would represent a reinforcement of its real base of social and electoral support, the victory of its own concepts in the society and the rebirth of the hope and viability of an alternative model; whereas, in the second, there would be only an arithmetical and precarious addition of votes, with the limitations that experience, both ours and that of others, has proven.

For the Socialists, however, the choice between managing and changing the society does not exist, since Socialism, being different by definition, is necessarily change and transformation.

4.

In 1979, following the well-known circumstances of 1977 and 1978, the electoral debate was focused on the action of the Socialist governments, while the right had already begun a process of overall challenge to the system (Constitution, economic model, style of government, ideology, etc.). In short, AD attacked the nerve and essential points of the model of society, while PS defended itself, and could not even show an increase in social welfare in its behalf.

In 1980, the electoral battle took place in nearly the same terms, with the disadvantage that FRS was not even a government; which directed it toward a predominantly critical attitude.

It should be noted, in this connection, that we are not attempting to say that there were not in the Front's organizations any documents of major interest and quality which were positive contributions giving proper treatment to the essential issues mentioned here. I refer only, and in passing, to the "PS Plan for the 1980's" and the Front's "Government Program," the latter of which was released, unfortunately, not until the final week of the campaign. However, we are only concerned here with the analysis of the electorate, that is, the way in which the ordinary, uninformed citizen learns about the existing political reality, and how he decides on his vote: the one whom we do not think even the echo of those works ever reached.

In short, it seems indisputable to us that, in the context of Portuguese political life, the fact that not even minimal consensus has been established between the leading political forces on the type of society in which we want to live has caused the main area of debate and option to end up inevitably concentrated upon this question. Hence, it is in that area that the Socialists will have to struggle in the near future, if they want to contest the right for the political and cultural hegemony that the latter has acquired in recent years. This means the reformulation of part of its strategy, and the need for an enormous qualitative improvement in the political debate.

The October elections caused Portuguese political life to embark on its adulthood. With the euphoria of 1974 vanished, the crisis of 1975 solved, and the transitional phase of 1976 and 1977 ended, the years 1979 and 1980 represent a period of likely

stabilization of the party forces. It would be a serious mistake not to realize that, from now on, the option of voting will no longer be taken for tactical reasons, but rather for reasons related to profound choices on essential matters associated with the society's organization and way of life.

All the time that the Socialists wasted in understanding the new situation created in this way, and in dispersing their forces for lesser, partial battles, will necessarily be reflected in attrition in their social and electoral base, as has been occurring for the past 2 years.

Hence, the question is to learn how to devise, and make real and possible, a credible alternative that will challenge the right's method of producing, organizing, living and thinking.

This is the nature of the timeliness and viability of the Socialist plan that is on the agenda, without which there will be no Socialists nor party, much less a real prospect of Socialist power.

If the alternative to the existing society (according to the Socialists) can only be Socialism (in its multiple facets and periods), it is Socialism that must be discussed, and it is the Socialist plan that must be reviewed and, in particular, transferred inside the social body. It is not a millenary, theoretical plan of blurred features related to idyllic images of an abstract nature; but rather a very concrete alternative for the various national problems which the citizen can perceive as being possible to achieve, sensing the difference that its implementation would mean to him.

If this were done, its effect on the electoral level would not fail to occur, and the Socialists would be in a position to effectively challenge the government, on a basis that would then be sound and unequivocal.

Otherwise, only a miracle could bring them back to power; and, insofar as miracles are concerned, we have been warned about how they depend on an unstable divine mood...

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## FUTURE DIRECTIONS, STRATEGIES, TRENDS WITHIN COMMUNIST PARTY

## Cunhal's Electoral Tactics, Strategy

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 25 Oct 80 pp 2, 16

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Alvaro Cunhal, the PCP, Mario Soares, the Presidential Elections and Candidate Ramalho Eanes"]

## [Text] 1. The Selection of the Right Time

There are Portuguese politicians who talk so much that their public statements are undervalued and they have to say bombastic things or act with showy gestures to make public opinion, at a peak, realize that we are witnessing a certain shift on the national political scene.

There are other politicians who, on the contrary, never speak freely, and normally do not say anything more or less than what stems from the strategic and tactical options that they are seeking to serve.

Even when they seem repetitive, monotonous, uninteresting and boring, the alert political observer would fare badly if he did not lend their remarks all the attention that they deserve.

Alvaro Cunhal is one of the politicians of this second type.

Although many consider his emerging presence as routine or uninteresting, no one with any sense of responsibility would dare say that it is not important to decipher his public statements line by line, and word for word; because he only speaks when he wishes, every time he speaks he is trying to convey a political message, and that message reflects quite precisely the PCP's [Portuguese Communist Party] strategic and tactical line at the time in question.

This has been the case since 1974 and 1975, to mention only the period of the PCP's recent legal existence; years in which it was almost possible to guess the Communist offensives from Alvaro Cunhal's speeches. Every time Cunhal scored a "reactionary maneuver" in advance, at that point it was known for certain that he was creating maneuvering room for a new tactical step of the PCP.

Now one of the most interesting facets of Alvaro Cunhal's public addresses is precisely that he never speaks fortuitously; he is not like those political leaders who need to speak in order to remember that they exist.

To the latter, appearing in public is a virtually necessary requisite for proving that they are operative and still carry political weight.

To Alvaro Cunhal, the opposite holds true. It is only when there is a pressing need to appear, issuing certain watchwords, that the PCP's secretary general does so, with the utmost possible precision.

In other words, in his public speeches (as in the case of the majority of communist leaders as well), the "timing" is an essential element, at times as important as the content.

This was what happened, once again, in the interview that Alvaro Cunhal granted to DIARIO DE LISBOA last Wednesday.

Less than a week before, the PCP had convened its Central Committee and Alvaro Cunhal held a press conference at its conclusion.

However, since that press conference, on 15 October, the crisis started in the PS [Socialist Party] over the backing for Gen Ramalho Eanes' second candidacy, and the left was shaken by the position of Mario Soares and by vague movements which were produced, indicating the most diverse and even contradictory electoral alternatives.

The crisis, over which the right, more or less discreetly, rejoiced, continued after Sunday, 19 October, and allowed for various kinds of speculation, for example, the possible candidacy of Mario Soares, the possible negotiation of a civilian candidacy between PS and PCP, and the possible receptiveness of PCP to the dissolution of Gen Ramalho Eanes' second candidacy.

When the speculation reached that level and took that tone, Alvaro Cunhal felt that he could no longer remain silent, that it was necessary to give his "watchword" to the Communist voters and also to many independent voters of the left.

That was what he did in his terse interview of 22 October, in which there was not one word more nor one word less, neither in the answers that he gave nor in the questions themselves, which are shown as having been asked by two editors who appear in profile in a photo but who are not identified in the text of the interview.

## 2. PCP: Unity and Cohesion

The first portion of Alvaro Cunhal's interview relates to the party's image, and the way in which it reacted to the criticism aimed at it after the election results of 5 October.

Alvaro Cunhal allowed for this topic one question and one of the longest answers in the interview. The question was: "There are some who think that the PCP leadership is an old entity, not only in age but also in language, for the 1980's. Could you comment on this?"

Let us begin by noting the way in which the question is phrased, alluding only to the age of the leaders and their political language, and not daring to mention either the political orientation or the strategic line, and their possible unsuitability at present and in the future.

Alvaro Cunhal explains that the PCP is in better health than ever; it is "the Portuguese party with greater organization, a larger number of members, deeper roots in the working classes, a greater capacity for implementation and mass movement, and greater consistency between the establishment of the objectives in its program, and political work and everyday activity."

And he also stresses that the party's unity and cohesion and the leadership's bond with the rank and file are still intact, despite the campaigns of the "reactionary forces, abetted by different political forces."

In short, if Alvaro Cunhal feels the need to explain all this, it is because, in fact, this question has been asked and is being asked as a result of the legislative elections of 5 October.

And the PCP secretary general perceived that it was better to intercept the same question immediately, giving it an answer in advance, instead of allowing the effect of doubt which the election results and the inflexibility of the PCP's reaction to them could produce among certain sectors of Portuguese public opinion to increase, even if only slowly.

For great doubts, great remedies. Hence the manner in which Alvaro Cunhal hammered into an interview related to a completely different subject the reaffirmation of the PCP's force, unity and cohesion.

We consider that reaffirmation all the more interesting because, exactly 8 days ago, we raised the same issue in EXPRESSO (pages 1-R and 2-R) with a prominence that no other news organ attached to it any longer.

It is quite often possible to ascertain from interviews with politicians which news media they usually read or watch, and whose journalistic influence they have ended up admitting, albeit implicitly.

### 3. The Presidential Elections and Eanes: Subtle Backing but Strong Backing

However, the longest and most important part of the interview was related to the presidential elections.

In that part, Alvaro Cunhal also made excellent use of a dual political language, specifically when referring to Gen. Amalio Eanes and to his candidacy.

The starting point is well known: The CP still has as an essential objective at the present time the pursuit of the defeat of the AD [Democratic Alliance] candidate, Gen. Soares Carneiro, an idea that has been reiterated several times.

Hence, everything must be done to attain that objective.

It was on the basis of this already known assumption that Alvaro Cunhal applied two different levels of language in his interview.

On the first level, we can place two statements made by the PCP secretary general: "It was not PCP which proposed General Eanes' candidacy; it did not promote it nor support it." And he even expressly declared that he did not support it and that "it is a candidacy which PCP does not support, but which the reactionaries are fighting in a bloc."

In other words, in two brief excerpts and in the most careful possible manner, Alvaro Cunhal gave a reminder that PCP did not back and does not back the Eanes candidacy.

Thus, he was "covered" for the entire remainder of the interview which is, both subjectively and objectively, a backing for Eanes. It was even the greatest backing for Eanes during the agitated week of crisis in the PS started by Mario Soares....

In what is that backing reflected?

1. In the initial criticism of all those who, during the crisis, caused "contradictions, differences, confrontations and discussions on which it would be necessary to concentrate efforts and mutual action"; that is, an indirect criticism of Mario Soares and his supporters;
2. The also critical reference to those who "pulled the rug out from under Eanes' feet" through a "sudden change in position and attitude"; another indirect criticism of Mario Soares and his supporters;
3. The overt attack on a possible Mario Soares candidacy: "it would be not only a candidacy of defeat for Mario Soares, but also a candidacy that could represent the defeat of democracy;"
4. The relative praise for Eanes' candidacy in comparison with a possible Mario Soares candidacy: "Before the recent events, the Eanes candidacy represented the entire PS and something more. And the Mario Soares candidacy would mean only part of PS and something less;"
5. The attack on Mario Soares through the right's reaction to his attitude: "When the reactionaries begin praising democratic leaders, something is amiss in the latter's activities;"
6. The denial of the notion of any PS-PCP understanding with a view toward running a common civilian candidate;
7. The suppression of the notion of a "central bloc," avoiding a direct attack on Eanes or even ascribing to him an explicit reference to that central bloc; but rather trying to explain to the Communist voters that such a "central bloc," of highly questionable feasibility, did not constitute a valid argument that would separate the PCP from Eanes.

In short, during his interview of 22 October Alvaro Cunhal did Eanes an inestimable service.



When the PS was holding an internal discussion of whether it was yes or no for Eanes, Alvaro Cunhal said that they could not count on PCP for a common civilian candidate, that they could not count on PCP to vote for Mario Soares, and that the change in attitude on the part of the Socialist secretary general was incomprehensible.

When several leftist sectors found out that the ones backing Soares were, among others, several PS "historicals," Alvaro Cunhal, to the left of them, said that they were deceived, and that the strongest candidacy for defeating Soares Carneiro was that of Eanes.

When certain areas of the Communist electorate might have been surprised, in Eanes' press conference, at his verbal anticommunism and his reference to the "central bloc," Alvaro Cunhal demonstrated that none of that was important, and none of that could or should interfere with the PCP's great objective, which is that of successfully defeating the Soares Carneiro candidacy through the Eanes candidacy.

All this was stated in a second level of language, after Alvaro Cunhal had formally reaffirmed that the PCP did not back Eanes.

In other words, it does not back him formally; but it does back him substantially.

And because in politics, normally, what matters is the substance and not so much the form, Alvaro Cunhal's interview represented the strongest assistance coming from the left that Eanes could receive so as, also through the left, to begin the counter-offensive to deflate Mario Soares' political position.

A final comment should be made on Alvaro Cunhal's interview: on the caution with which he managed to talk about the presidential elections, PS, Mario Soares and Eanes, without ever referring to the latter's press conference, which was the deciding factor in the crisis that was experienced.

Alvaro Cunhal knew that to mention it would mean reopening the wound, attacking Eanes, and depriving the interview that he wanted to hold on 22 October 1980 of political content.

Therefore, there was not a single answer nor a single question in which mention was made of the Eanes press conference.

Even when it was necessary to ask about matters discussed in it, for example, the reference to the "central bloc," the question was skillfully couched without a concrete reference to that press conference.

#### 4. The PCP Strategy

In short, this terse interview, in which the only element dimming its brilliance was the fact that its preparation was highly visible, in the content of the questions and answers, and in their interconnection (but nothing else would be expected of the PCP or of Alvaro Cunhal, especially during a period of a certain amount of crisis), reflects two complementary strategic lines of the Communists at the present time in Portuguese politics:

The first one is the "sticking" to the candidacy of Gen Ramalho Eanes which, in the event of the latter's victory, will enable them to appear with a large amount of negotiating weight, particularly when compared with the position of PS which, within 2 weeks of the start of the election campaign, will respond to the pros and cons of backing for that candidacy.

The second is the clearcut offensive from the standpoint of leadership of the leftist opposition, in the event of an Eanes defeat, with all that this implies for an attack on Mario Soares and political attrition in the PS.

The major target of Alvaro Cunhal's remarks was, as it could not fail to be, Mario Soares and, intermediately, the PS.

Alvaro Cunhal and the PCP are quite well aware that the essential thing, from their standpoint, is to learn who is going to maintain the political initiative in the left's parliamentary opposition to AD during the next few years.

This is so whether Eanes loses or wins.

This major objective requires a very heated contest between PCP and PS in the near future.

Thus, in his interview, Alvaro Cunhal combined what was useful with what was pleasant.

What was pleasant was his backing for Ramalho Eanes, at a time when only someone to the left of the PS left could reassure any left as to whether it could and should vote for Ramalho Eanes, in conscience.

What was useful was his attack on Mario Soares and, by reflex, on PS, in a preventive fashion, like someone saying that PCP is alert and operational, so as not to leave the leadership of the leftist opposition to the governmental majority to PS.

It remains to be seen what the advantages and costs of this nice gesture by Alvaro Cunhal will be for Ramalho Eanes.

It remains to be seen what the cost will be for the PS of this and other PCP plays involving attrition, aimed at a very obvious objective which, if it were to materialize, would only accentuate the factors for crisis among the Socialists.

#### Central Committee Redefines Strategy

Lisbon EXPRESSO-REVISTA in Portuguese 18 Oct 80 pp 1-R, 2-R

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Self-Defense Analysis Means No Change"]

[Text] To many political observers, the elections of 5 October of this year indicated a resounding defeat for the Portuguese Communist Party, from the decline in voters and the number of offices won by the United People's Alliance [APU].

While the Socialist Party is just now starting to reflect on its no less significant electoral defeat, the Portuguese Communist Party felt that it could not allow much

time to elapse after the election date before it tried to understand and publicly explain the reasons for the results of the 5 October elections.

So, this week, there was a meeting of the Portuguese Communist Party's Central Committee, which held a press conference last Wednesday and released the long, detailed document, containing the results of the assessment made of the elections.

Because of the fact that this was the first Portuguese political force to analyze the situation resulting from the composition of the new Assembly of the Republic (and the voting trend among the Portuguese people); because of the fact that this was a political force which was clearly defeated in the challenge of 5 October; and because of the fact that, to many, that defeat indicated the possible beginning of an historic shift in the Portuguese Communist Movement.

For all these reasons, EXPRESSO decided to devote special attention this week to the current position of the PCP, its background and also its foreseeable future.

Therefore, we shall try to go beyond the "formalities" of the PCP press conference, looking behind the scenes of the situation experienced by that party; and, for this purpose, contacting national leaders, in informal talks, which therefore do not permit specific identification.

Moreover, EXPRESSO is publishing the commentary by Jose Augusto Seabra on the ever current topic "The PCP and the Intellectuals," considering the opportunities that the Portuguese Communist intellectuals have, in his view, wasted to readapt the PCP's image to the course of the national realities.

Finally, Jose Pacheco Pereira, an historian concentrating on the PCP's past, uncovers some major omissions and distortions of the party's historiography, which to some extent are symptomatic of a political practice that has lasted until our time.

The meeting of the PCP Central Committee allowed for a very open debate between various analyses made of the election results and the PCP's position toward them.

For example, to some, no mistakes were made and the election results were merely the result of objective conditions, such as the exercise of power by AD, with "demagogic" socioeconomic measures and a dominant government influence on the nationalized news media, the division of the left as opposed to the unity of the right and the flawed politicoelectoral strategy of the FRS [Socialist Republican Front].

To others, who were, furthermore, few in number, considerable mistakes were noted on the part of APU and PCP, which were, in their overall effect, more serious than the objective conditions surrounding the elections.

The prevailing line, which may be described as intermediate, ended up assuming a position between the two that have been cited, with the view that the election results stemmed mainly from unfavorable political conditions, to which were added, on a lower level, certain mistakes in strategy and tactics on the part of PCP.

As usual, these mistakes were minimized on the outside, except for those relating to "triumphalism" noted at the end of the campaign, which was highly criticized.

Nevertheless, and this is something which is not very customary, the final document from the PCP Central Committee meeting refers to several equivalent problems, in addition to that triumphalism in the campaign, which represent considerable tactical flaws.

It mentions matters such as the type of propaganda used, the nature of the attacks aimed at the government and the heads of AD, and the degree of mobilization of the masses both before and during the campaign, giving the impression that, in all these matters, there were disputable points involving the way in which PCP determined its electoral orientation.

But, despite this hesitant acknowledgment of the existence of electoral mistakes of a strategic and tactical nature, along broad lines the analysis was essentially a self-justification of the PCP's position:

Of the nearly 350,000 extra votes received in December 1979, only a third were lost in the 5 October elections.

Of those losses, numbering slightly over 100,000 votes (which one PCP leader, in a conversation, described as "a general but moderate decline"), a sizable share is considered to be Socialist votes taken from the PS in December and reconsidered now in October, and also useful votes of PCP voters in FRS, as a political force better suited for putting up immediate opposition to AD, in various electoral circles.

The decline that has been noted maintains the PCP at figures exceeding those of 1975 and 1976, and the Communist leaders like to recall what was said about the inexorable decline of their party after the 1976 presidential elections and Octavio Pato's campaign, to prove that the prophecies being made now are even less warranted than those made unsuccessfully at that time.

Thus, although seriously concerned about the "sign of change" indicated by the AD victory and about what they consider (although in a low voice) the inevitable crisis in the PS, the Communist leaders tend to minimize the signs of electoral failure, and hence any need for a change in leadership or even an organizational change.

#### Meeting With MDP: Very Slight Differences

This PCP analysis coincides, in its fundamental lines, with that made by the MDP-CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Electoral Commission], as might perhaps have been expected.

At a meeting not publicly announced which was held last Wednesday, that nearly total agreement was confirmed.

The MDP-CDE combined limited itself to not agreeing with the order in which the objective conditions explaining the election results were listed.

In other words, it did not even question the list of those factors, disputing only their arrangement in order of relative importance. For example, to the MDP-CDE, unlike the PCP, the most important factor in the rise of AD was not the latter's influence on the news media, particularly the nationalized ones.



A corollary to this analysis made by the PCP Central Committee is that it does not foresee any significant organizational changes, much less any changes in personnel.

According to a qualified leader of the Central Committee, Alvaro Cunhal "still displays excellent physical and political form, and will last a long time to come in the post of PCP secretary general."

In fact, despite the superficial impression conveyed by certain news media that the press conference represented a certain amount of "repentance by Cunhal" forced by the PCP Central Committee, the truth requires saying that there is no anticipation of his replacement in the position that he holds, either now or at the PCP's next Congress, which will be the 10th; neither a replacement nor a decline in internal prestige.

#### 10th Congress a Little Ahead of Schedule

The last PCP Congress took place in mid-1979, and their normal interval is 3 years.

On principle, the 10th Congress should be held in the summer of 1982; but, according to a Communist leader, it is often desirable for the dates which have been set to be moved up 4 or 5 months; something which might also occur with the next one. For example, nearly a year and a half intervened between the Eighth and Ninth Congresses.

In any event, the one of late 1981 or early 1982 (most likely in late 1981) will be a congress evaluating the "change" in Portuguese political life; although this is a change which the PCP considers reversible and possible for the leftist forces in our country to curtail.

It will be, in particular, a congress of continuity, wherein the changing of cadres will be done gradually and carefully, without challenging the leadership positions held by various leaders for many decades.

#### Presidential Elections: the Pros and Cons of Their Own Candidate

One question that was not debated until the end of the Central Committee meeting was that of the PCP strategy regarding the forthcoming presidential elections.

The essential objective was approved: to defeat the AD candidate, Gen Soares Carneiro.

Also evident was the PCP's determination to agree on the channeling of Communist votes toward Ramalho Eanes as the strongest candidate to oppose Soares Carneiro, so as to pursue the aforementioned objective.

However, there remained to be decided an entire gamut of tactical options concerning the best way of giving votes to Eanes, without allowing this to constitute a negative factor for the position and image of the PCP and of Eanes himself.

For example, one possible hypothesis is that of running a candidate backed by the PCP in the first run of the presidential elections, concentrating votes on Eanes in the second one.

Another method is that of having the PCP candidate drop out on the eve of the first run.

Still another is that of backing an independent candidate who is not directly or totally identifiable with the PCP, but who will be deliberately eliminated for the purpose of concentrating efforts and votes on Eanes.

There remains the scenario of not running or backing any candidate, so as to give Eanes, completely and immediately, the greatest chances of electoral success.

The final option was not taken by the Central Committee, which decided to allow another week for the debates of the plenary sessions of the party's various entities, before the Central Committee meets next week and submits a proposal that must be approved unanimously at the meeting of the PCP's National Conference on 25 October (a meeting which will have to be relatively short, because not the slightest controversy is expected regarding the Central Committee's proposal).

In 1976, the final decision was up to the PCP Central Committee. This time, the difficulty involving the tactics to be adopted and the need for an image of broad representation in the organ that makes the decision explain the selection of the National Conference, with over 1,000 members, to lend more political weight to a choice which, in the final analysis, is up to the Central Committee.

This is a choice regarding which many claim the inevitability of running a PCP candidate, even if it may not be for continuing to the end, so as to allow for the concentration of votes on Eanes.

#### Eanes' Conference: a Needless Mistake

The meeting of the PCP Central Committee ended just after the Eanes press conference, which it went so far as to analyze.

With its usual tactical versatility, the PCP was ready to view Eanes' position in a very bland, if not even sympathetic way; although demarcating itself in the realm of principles (that sympathy and blandness were also visible in the PCP's televised commentary on Eanes' statements).

But actually, as we were told informally by a Communist leader, "it was a mistaken gesture on Eanes' part, from an electoral standpoint, causing problems with the Socialists, which will most likely not win him votes from the right and could cost him votes from the left."

#### Nothing New in Essence

In short, the PCP's reflection on itself and its election results ended up by not bringing in anything new in essence, and proving that the expectations or speculation of those who had agreed that the time for a great historic shift had come for that party have not been confirmed.

The PCP-80 does not appear ready for major changes, either in personal leadership or in its structures.

The future will tell how long it is possible to maintain this intangibility to change and this resistance to renewal in both personnel and methods; and this almost absolute confidence that the defeat of 5 October was only an accident along the way, from which there can be a recovery on one of the next turns of history.

#### Relationship With Intellectuals, Dissidents

Lisbon EXPRESSO-REVISTA in Portuguese 18 Oct 80 p 3-R

[Article by Jose Augusto Seabra: "The Communist Party and the Intellectuals"]

[Text] Some day, when the detailed history is written of the relations between the Portuguese intellectuals and the Communist Party (not only during the various phases of ascending, triumphant and descending Salazarism, but also during these years of a still militarized transition toward democracy, wherein critical areas of power were occupied), there will be a clearer X-ray of the tragic trauma to which the lack of liberty can lead when, as in Goya's painting, "the sleep of the intellect produces monsters." The totalitarian temptation which was the fascist beast to a few, was countered by the fascination at the opposite, homologous pole exerted by Communism on those who invested in it, even without adhering to it, owing to a kind of "Epinal image" of clandestinity and an epic pulsation of resistance which was not even its monopoly.

In a country which did not experience the industrial revolution of modern capitalism, with archaic, "ancien regime" structures, which liberalism and the republic have not managed to change profoundly, and where, since the beginning of the century, anarcho-sindicalism has replaced an incipient socialism which was nothing more than a dream of intellectuals seduced by the Paris Commune, it is not surprising that a party rigidly organized according to the Soviet model should end up dominating, underground (through propaganda, enticement and, if necessary, moral blackmail) all the fancies of not only the political, but the cultural opposition to the "new State," particularly since the Spanish Civil War and the World War. That hegemony (a genuine counterbalancing power) reached its height with the Stalinism in which Alvaro Cunhal gloried at the time, with an aura of heroism that made him, retrieving less noble leadership methods, the uncontested leader of the party, with the approval of Moscow.

#### Neorealism as an Ideological Foundation

However, an ideological foundation was necessary to subject the intellectuals to orthodoxy: For example, in literature and art it assumed the trappings of neo-realism, set up as an official aesthetic of the party of the proletariat (although, strangely enough, with a rural-type nostalgia), in a polemical opposition to the "individualism" and "formalism" of the "bourgeois" and "decadent" intellectuals of which the present quality was initially the scapegoat. In addition to being a theory and a method, Marxism was for its followers also a religion, with its gods, its saints, its apostles and its priests: in short, its church.

The Communist intellectuals, adhering to the party as members or sympathizers, owed it blind obedience, "perinde ac cadaver" [just like a corpse]; which entailed the renunciation of the critical spirit and independent judgment, and being called "traitors" or "renegades" if they dared show the slightest disagreement with the hierarchy. If expelled from the party, a Communist intellectual was reduced to



tatters and, in order to become "rehabilitated," he had to subject himself to the most degrading types of "self-criticism" (whether sincere or not): in short, his voice counted only as a tuning fork. And although there were valuable intellectuals among them (not all, to tell the truth), their contribution to the establishment of the party policy line was virtually nil. Only in their secular life could they allow themselves independent thought, in a discreet manner, and there was reinstatement if they repented...Or else a painful break was necessary with "death in the soul" as I think Sartre said, entering the party with feet down and leaving with feet up, as in burials.

### The First Great Crisis

The first great crisis in this dogmatic monolithism arose upon the revelations from the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made by Krushchev. I recall that at that time the convictions of many Communists experienced a serious upset. But the gap was immediately filled, first by denying, next by minimizing and finally by "explaining" the facts, through "deviation" from the "Stalin personality cult." Cunhal himself, after his escape from prison and going to Moscow, became a "Krushchevite," and his hagiography was even written by a descendant of the new master...This did not prevent him, as soon as Brezhnev came to power, from becoming an "anti-Krushchevite," followed as usual by his loyal disciples, including the intellectuals, of course....

Thus, the latter missed an opportunity to discharge their role as the party's conscience (or at least bad conscience) with liberty and responsibility. Just as they missed it at the time of the repression of the uprising in Hungary, despite the gnashing of teeth of some and the defection of many "fellow travelers." And just as they missed it again, at the end of the 1960's, when Czechoslovakia was invaded, unlike the intellectuals from the leading European parties. Neither the phenomenon of the dissidence in the "fatherland of socialism" and in the "people's democracies", nor the publication of the Dante-like "Gulag Archipelago" by Solzhenitsyn (which was first used by Krushchev and later banned again) moved the Portuguese Communist intellectuals, who continued to cover the strong bareness of the truth with the by no means diaphanous cloak of fantasy.

### What They Wrote About the USSR

Observe what was written by such authors as Urbano Tavares Rodrigues, Alexandre Babo and Oscar Lopes when, with the tolerance of Marcelism, they visited the Soviet Union, remaining silent (and to others, the silence was golden) about the intellectual repression which prevailed there, and the camps for the psychiatric exiles. As many readers must remember, I did not fail to denounce that complicity in an open letter addressed from exile to the latter of those authors. Even the "preliminary examination" suppressed my writings, in a solidarity with the Soviet censorship which deleted an anthology of modern Portuguese poetry compiled by me, which later came out in Moscow (then after 25 April) without my permission....

### An Exemplary Case and an Appeal in 1974

Then came the end of the Marcelist regime. It was not actually a surprise, except for the misinformed and the useful innocents, to observe the way in which the Communist intellectuals behaved when the party, with the protection of certain members



of the military, took over the news media (press, radio, television and publishing houses) or the reins of political intelligence (Fifth Division and the like). In addition to the fanaticism and terrorism that they imposed on the cultural media, there were many "aparatchiks" who did not hesitate to become censors themselves. And those tormented individuals who left the party were then relentlessly reviled and even persecuted. A new PIDE [International and State Defense Police] and a new censorship would surely have been set up if the plan for the party's seizure of power had succeeded. The example of the attempt to prevent the publication of "The Gulag Archipelago" (which I scored as its associate translator in the Constituent Assembly) is present to prove this.

I and some intellectuals such as Eduardo Laurence and Fernando Echevarria may have forewarned of that corruption when we issued, in EXPRESSO at the end of 1974, an "appeal with response" concerning "freedom of writing." Backed by several score of intellectuals, it constituted an alarm and a warning. But many of those who, on first impulse, became associated with it, later (alas!) made an agreement with the new masters.

25 November put an end to that nightmare. From then on, as if by magic, the Communist intellectuals changed from executioners to alleged "victims", without learning the lesson of their failure and, more than that, of their irrevocable loss of moral authority.... And there are some (memory is short) who still protect or excuse them, after all that has happened! It comes as no surprise to see them now, side by side with others rediscovered as "fellow travelers" or champions of the clear thinking left, even some who appeared at one time to be rather anticommunist....

#### Nothing Essential Has Changed

Apparently, and on the outside, which is what is interesting, nothing essential has changed, meanwhile, in the attitude of the Communist intellectuals. Internationally, the events in Afghanistan and Poland may reveal the crisis in the Soviet system and its geostrategic hegemony. Internally, the elections results may prove inexorable, attesting to the impasse in the party, owing to the archaism and gerontocracy of its leaders, as well as to the lack of scruples in its methods, of which the campaign unleashed against the prime minister is a sad, unfortunate example. The timid dissent of a few has not served to change the pretense, even tactically; and, strategically, there are no signs of deepseated changes.

It is true that, in these present circumstances, another opportunity is being offered to the Communist intellectuals, in view of the visible defeat of their leaders at the polls. Will they allow the party to be led by hardened Stalinists, obedient to Moscow? Will they at least realize the guilt that they incur with their silence?

Intellectuals, whoever they may be, are not by nature immune to the totalitarian viruses. And the fascination of power (even military!) also exists among non-Communist intellectuals. What has become of the intellectuals in my country who seem to be afraid of liberty and independence?

### Previous Trends, Influences, Factors

Lisbon EXPRESSO-REVISTA in Portuguese 18 Oct 80 pp 4-R, 5-R

[Article by Jose Pacheco Pereira: "Careful Omission or Manipulation...?"]

[Text] One of the greatest difficulties in researching the party's history is the extreme scarcity of available sources, beginning with the compilations of the party's press itself. The dearth of these sources results from two interconnected factors which we shall often encounter in the course of this text: the closed, "secret" nature of the files in which that documentation exists, and the destruction of documents under clandestine conditions. In the case of the party press, that allows us to reconstitute the sequence of the party's history beyond the changes in its leadership, these factors are particularly trying for the period of the 1930's.

As for the party's files, which are known to exist not only in Portugal but also in the countries where its leadership in exile remained (Czechoslovakia and the USSR), they are completely out of reach of the researchers. The material from those files that is published in the party's publications and press is extremely scanty, selected by hand and involving problems of reliability of the texts, which we shall discuss later. In reality, it is legitimate, in view of the party's known publications, to question the possibility that its historical materials will be used for a study with the requisites of objectivity demanded for scientific work.

Influenced by the Ideas of...

A book recently published by the party's publishers enables us to state what we have just said. It is "The Strikes of 8 and 9 May 1944," Avantel Publications, 1979; and it represents one of the very few exceptions to a rule of silence that the party's publications almost uniformly follow. This book is all the more remarkable because it includes unpublished documents from the party's files, and not just collections from the common press in the publications on the party's history. However, it ends up showing clearly the roots and reasons for that silence.

Even a superficial analysis of the book immediately discloses an entire series of contradictions and disturbances which become all the more prominent because of the fact that there is an attempt to disguise them. Reading the book, the reader will find, among other things: pseudonyms for unidentified PCP officials (for example, "Antonio" or "Cortes"), in contrast to the identification of others; no identification of the local entities in which there were strike committees organized by the party, despite their mention in the originals of the transcribed texts, disguised there because of coy reticence; nonidentification of participants in the debates on the occasion and nature of the strike; and documents in which only "in some instances the coded text is made clear". Why? On what grounds?

In all instances, one finds that the omissions always relate to controversial political matters which are revealed, in spite of everything, by their very omission. For example, the identified pseudonyms belong either to present party leaders or to officials who died "in holiness"; while the unidentified ones are surely individuals who were dismissed or expelled. Therefore, we are not entitled to know who they are, nor the role that they had in the direction of the struggles in 1944. As for the identification of the strike committees, which existed in the

original documents, it represents a crude attempt to prevent the reader from reaching the conclusion toward which the entire book points unintentionally: that the strikes occurred precisely in the places where the party had least organized them, and that there is an enormous contradiction between the internal information for the use of the leaders and the news published in AVANTE!, with obvious exaggeration in the latter. All the other omissions and the nontranslation of the code in the documents are also aimed at concealing information on the internal divisions existing within the PCP with regard to the occasion and nature of the strike. This is disclosed in the published part of the documents, which revealed a clear conflict between the views of Alvaro Cunhal and Alfredo Dinis. The latter wanted to lend the strikes an insurrectional nature, while Cunhal repudiated that view, accusing Dinis of being "obviously influenced by the ideas of..." (p 17); and we are left not knowing which ideas and who had them, as a result of the saving silence of the text. This latent conflict arises again in the assessment of the strikes. Dias Lourenco speaks about "failure" and the views are divided again on the basis of the initial question: Is the "failure" due to the fact that they went too far, or that they stopped ahead of time?

It is not up to us now to answer that question, but it would be interesting to learn the arguments put forth on each side, to find out what other positions and contradictions were involved and also to learn who upheld them. In all these respects, silence.

Here we have a concrete example of the PCP's difficulties in writing its history.

#### Obscure Points

The PCP has appropriated the right to curtail, change and modify the texts that it publishes, most often without indicating the place of the cutting, nor notifying the reader that they are not complete texts. Thus, the documents are falsified, leading to an attitude of widespread distrust regarding the reliability of the party's publications.

For example, there is the case of the Bento Gonçalves texts on the positions of the Tarrafal Communist Prison Organization regarding the so-called "new policy", which were simply censored in the official edition of "Duas Palavras" [Two Words]. The texts that we cited previously, relating to the 1944 strikes, also contain significant cuts. The same may be said about publications presented as "complete," which contain only a small portion of the writings of an author, as in the case of the "Complete Works" of Soeiro Pereira Gomes. While the AVANTE! Publishers entitled them "complete literary works," regardless, they certainly are not complete works, since all of Soeiro Pereira Gomes' political texts are missing, such as the text on the wage markets previously released by the party.

Another type of manipulation of the documents, in this instance not in the texts themselves but in the body of the documents, consists of a concealment of entire periods of the party's history. This holds true for most of the documents and press of the years 1921-39 and 1950-60, which are only represented in the official collections by half a dozen handpicked texts. In a sample that we took of the main collections of texts published by the PCP, this tendency appears clearly (see Table 1).



There are in this table some interesting aspects of the policy of releasing the PCP's texts. Note, in the first place, that the argument to the effect that the concern in the publication of the texts was their timeliness does not hold water, because the period of the 1940's is nearly as well represented as that of the last 14 years of clandestine existence. Next, it is highly significant that the unpleasant periods in the party's history are those in which Alvaro Cunhal was not head of the PCP, that is, before the 1940-41 "reorganization" and during his imprisonment from 1949 to 1960. Moreover, the very periodic division that we use, which is based lineally on the points of shifting in the party's history, with the exception of 1929, allows for a disclosure of the continuity of leadership from 1941 to 1974, with the jeopardizing hiatus of the "rightwing deviation" at the end of the 1950's.

If we hoped to find in the texts published by the party some of the ideological controversies and political conflicts that were waged in it, we must give up all those good hopes. The most heated issues, the "reorganization" of 1929 and 1940-41, the conflicts with the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] during the 1930's, the controversies over the dissolution of the Intersindical Commission and the clandestine unions, the position toward the war, the attitudes of the Tarrafal Communist Prison Organization that resulted in the "separated Communists group", the "transition policy," the criticism of the "personality cult" and the defense of "peaceful means," the advent of the Popular Action Front (FAP): all this is virtually eliminated from the texts. Similarly, the lack of continuous series of texts does not allow us to learn exactly the PCP's positions on a group of interesting and controversial issues, such as colonialism, the labor unions, emigration, the conduct with respect to the police, the Catholics, agrarian reform, the policy of alliances, relations with the other opposition groups, etc.

### The Party Congresses

The summary of the party congresses is also indicative of these historical impasses. Of the six congresses held before 25 April, two are clearly in disfavor: the Second Congress, held on 27-28 May 1926, and the Fifth Congress, in 1957; while the First Congress is treated as an historic relic, and the Third, Fourth and Sixth Congresses as decisive events in the party's existence.

Disregarding the usual obscurity, that is, the lack of information on the participants, the account of the course of the work, the site, the percentage of party members represented, the social composition of those present, etc., let us dwell on the reasons which prompted the PCP to maintain careful silence about these two congresses.

Insofar as the Second Congress is concerned, the one least known in the party's history, its concealment is associated with the need to preserve unchanged the image which Bento Gonçalves lent to the party crisis at the end of the First Republic. I have already cited in other texts the significance of Bento Gonçalves' analyses of the party crisis and the 1929 "reorganization," but it should be added here that the Second Congress, by no means revealing the PCP's special aggressiveness toward the military dictatorship, proved how it was inevitably involved in the same contradictions and hesitation as the labor movement as a whole. A better understanding of this congress would make it possible to clarify many obscure points concerning the personal and group struggles within the party, and the increasing



role of the envoys from the Communist International in the party's orientation. Bento Gonçalves' role during this period also would appear greatly diminished in comparison with that of Jose de Sousa and Julio Cesar Leitao, the real creators of the party's adjustment to the conditions of clandestine existence.

The Fifth Congress is on the black list because it represents the high point of the so-called "rightwing deviation." Held in the ashes of the 20th CPSU Congress, it reflected a deepseated revision of the party's policy, including the criticism of the "personality cult" within the PCP and the defense of the "possibility of arriving at socialism by peaceful means." After Alvaro Cunhal's escape from the Peniche prison, the policy line of the Fifth Congress was harshly attacked, and the latter gradually disappeared from the party's press. In the official documents currently in progress the Fifth Congress is only cited, incidentally, as the one at which there was acceptance of the "unconditional recognition of the rights of the peoples in the Portuguese African colonies."

#### Of 100 Only 40 Are Known

From 1929 to 1974, about 80-100 individuals were in the PCP's leadership organs. This estimate is obviously risky, owing to the dearth of reliable information. But of all those militants, the party's press cites only about 40 now. One can observe from this the large number of persons doomed to oblivion.

The insufficient knowledge of the PCP leaders precludes accurate information on the social composition and the party's leading organs, as well as on the distribution of functions and tasks within those organs. If we were to attempt to fill the gaps in the overall information with the public biographies of the members still in the party's leadership today we would also encounter many difficulties.

The biographies of the present leaders of the party, such as those accompanying the PCP's election propaganda, are filled with omissions and inaccuracies, if not simply falsified. They do not contain the most important information for judging the political activity of the leader in question, and they disregard almost completely certain issues such as the role assumed in the party's international relations. On the contrary, they are filled with abundant statements regarding the imprisonment and other repressive acts of which the leader in question was a victim. In the case of professions, as well, the information offered is often deceptive.

A well-known instance is that of the biography of Alvaro Cunhal himself, filled with contradictions, even in comparison with a biography published by the CPC in 1954. The present biography contains controversial data on Cunhal's entry into the PCP, his move to clandestine status, the duration of his first imprisonments, the leadership posts that he held during the 1930's, his participation in the "reorganization" of 1940-41 and other biographical details as well.

In the 1950's, during the "rightwing deviation," one can follow the activity of a leader on the basis of whether the articles published in the party's press are signed with a pseudonym. One can thereby learn from the topic of the article which sector of the party's work he was associated with and the views that he subscribed to on a particular issue. But, with the criticism of the "rightwing deviation" in 1960-61, that criterion was abandoned, and the authorship of texts previously

claimed fell into oblivion. This criterion affects the biographies currently published, such as that of Alvaro Cunhal, whose authorship of texts such as "The Cell of Enterprise," "If You Are Taken Prisoner, Comrade," "The Party, the Catholics and the Church" and "The Communist Party and the Presidential 'Elections,'" published during the 1940's, has ceased to be attributed to him.

This policy is aimed at giving the impression of a collective effort of authorship of texts which is often nonexistent. As a result, and apart from the reports to the congresses (which in many instances are published only in excerpts), almost nothing is known of the writings of the top-ranking party leaders. Of 10 members of the Secretariat (Cunhal, Bento Gonçalves, José de Sousa, Fogaca, Manuel Rodrigues da Silva, Militao Ribeiro, José Gregorio, Manuel Guedes, Pires Jorge and Octavio Pato) only a small number of texts by Cunhal, Gonçalves and José Gregorio have been published since 25 April, in addition to some incidental fragments.

#### Who the Party Members Are

The number of members of the PCP in the various phases of its history, and particularly on the eve of 25 April, is also regarded as a party secret. In his rather odd and mysterious way of providing information, Alvaro Cunhal reported, at a PCP congress, that a year after 25 April the number of organizations (6,000) exceeded the number of party members "regularly controlled" as of the date of the revolution. We are left without knowing whether the number of party members was, for example, one or 5,999, since both figures are true on the basis of Cunhal's statement.

Confronted with these enigmas, wherein the old scholastic methods of "omissio veri" [omission of truth] and "suggestio falsi" [suggestion of untruth] are used, we can hardly find out for certain the true strength of the party organization; and all the more so because these difficulties are compounded by methodological problems as to who should or should not be counted as a member, militant or sympathizer. The following table should be considered an indication, without regard for completeness, of some of the figures given by highly diversified sources on the number of party members (see Table 2).

This table roughly reveals the progress of the party and, although all the figures must be considered approximations, this is not mean that they fail to depict the general lines of the PCP's growth. Two major crises in growth appear clearly: one, when the party went underground; and another, at the time of the police roundup in 1949-50. In the first instance, however, there was not merely a sharp decline in party members, but also a change in the criterion for membership, caused by the Bolshevikization of the PCP. In the second instance, the police repression was also not the only reason, and account must be taken of the political upsets caused by the "cold war" and the PCP's isolation, in contrast to the unfavorable postwar situation.

What we said previously about the difficulty in ascertaining the number of party members and the party's progress likewise holds true for the social composition of the party, concerning which even less is known. The taboos are greater here, in view of the image that the PCP always wants to offer of the workers party. The extremely scant information supplied by the PCP discloses a certain uncomfortable feeling in dealing with this question. An example of what we claim is found

in the habit of constructing rather inaccurate statistics wherein workers and employees are included on the same line, such as in the instance of the information on the social composition of two thirds of the members, supplied in 1973. There, "workers and employees" are combined, giving a majority of 57 percent, a percentage which the party itself claimed "could not be considered satisfactory."

Also there is virtually complete disregard for the composition by age, the number of women, peasants, rural proletariat, students, intellectuals, etc.

#### The PCP and the International

Recently, AVANTE! published an article commemorating the 10 years since the death of Victorio Codovilla, including a detailed biography of the "exemplary internationalist" who is "little known to us." Very significantly, the biography did not make the slightest mention of what might have most interested the PCP: the fact that Codovilla was the Communist International official who controlled the PCP from Spain during the 1930's, and that he went to Portugal in 1923.

We are again faced with a real black hole in the party's history, one of those wherein the rule of silence is still more complete even now: the PCP's relations with the Communist International, the Information Bureau, the CPSU and the international Communist movement as a whole. Now the history of the PCP is replete with incidents, ideological shifts and purges wherein the intervention of the IC (Communist International) delegates had a decisive role; something which was not an exception in comparison with other Communist Parties.

The first members of the IC apparatus to have contacts with members of the Portuguese party were Jesus Ibanez, Pierre Semard and Andres Nin. Insofar as is known, they did so informally, in the context of congresses or workers meetings. It was not until Humbert Droz came to Portugal that the IC began systematically intervening in the party's activity. It did so in connection with the factional struggle between the Rates group and that of Caetano de Sousa, backing the former. The details of its action are well known, thanks to the fact that Droz kept his personal files, which he donated to the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, which will soon publish the complete documents relating to the PCP.

In 1925, Rates' star began to fall, and the new IC delegates who came to Portugal withdrew their support from him, giving it to his opponents of 1923. With the arrival of Dupuis (could it be a pseudonym for Doriot?), and Codovilla, in 1925, the party accelerated its Bolshevization and started having regular relations with the IC international agencies, such as the Red Sindical International, the Communist Youth International, the Red Relief and the International Peasant Council. Its control was part of the Third Section of Agitprop (Agitation and Propaganda) of the Executive Commission and the Secretariat, in the Sixth Subsection of IC.

With the move to clandestine status, there was a reinforcement of the Bolshevization and, consequently, of the IC control over the party leadership. There is every indication that IC intervened directly in the establishment of the party leadership during the 1930's, until the break with the PCP in 1939. The delegations to Moscow became frequent (1927: Augusto Machado, Bento Goncalves, Silvino Ferreira, Lima; 1928: Gambeta das Neves, Bernardo Bandurra; 1932: Miguel W. Russel, at the



First Congress of Red Relief; 1935: Bento Gonçalves, Pavel and Manuel Raque Junior, at the IC's Seventh Congress; Alvaro Cunhal, Florindo de Oliveira, Domingues dos Santos, at the Sixth Congress of International Communist Youth; Francisco Miguel, Jose Gregorio, Manuel Domingues, Jose de Sousa, Fernando Quirino, Manuel Alpedrinha, etc.); as well as the sending of cadres to the USSR for political training and instruction. After the victory of the Popular Front, Spain served as a connection point with IC.

In view of the conditions surrounding clandestine status and the secrets carefully guarded by the PCP, there are many obscure areas in the reports on the arrival in Portugal of IC delegates after 1925. Hence, little is known about the arrival in Portugal of the Czechoslovak couple, "Rene" and "Rosa," who had functions relating to the organization of the Communist Youth Federation. Expelled from the country, they were said to have been shot in the USSR as British secret service agents.

Little is also known about the PCP's break-off from IC, which reportedly caused the party's expulsion in 1939. The excuse given for that expulsion is that of the party's position concerning conduct toward the police, associated with a rather unclear incident involving Pavel's escape. What is certain is that the question of relations with IC was present in the "reorganization" of 1940-41, although we also lack detailed information. Both the Velez Grilo group and the "reorganized" PCP fought for recognition from IC, the dissolution of which was supported in a 1943 message from the PCP Central Committee. Both groups imitated each other, using the epithet "Trotskyite," and Velez Grilo's AVANTE! accused the other AVANTE! of "never publishing in its entirety any official document of Stalin, IC or any other foreign Communist organization"; and reported that "IC learned in a timely manner and in all detail about the establishment and activity of the group of denounciators." This and other statements made in the controversy between the two groups disclosed not only the importance of IC's backing but also the fact that the factional struggle in the PCP was started in its absence and, apparently, without its direct intervention.

With the disappearance of the Velez Grilo group and the hegemony of the "reorganized" PCP, the party leadership normalized its relations with the international organizations which replaced IC after the war. In 1947, Alvaro Cunhal participated in meetings of the newly created Information Bureau, a sign of that normalization. From then on, the PCP was to be a well-behaved member of the International Communist movement and, with the exception of some problems involving the criticism of the "rightwing deviation," considered leftist at the height of the Krushchev era, no particularly unique positions that attracted attention were known to exist.

## Two Sources

The recent bibliography on the PCP, based on stringent criteria, is very brief and devoted almost exclusively to the period of the First Republic, for which nearly all the documentation is public. Despite their scarcity, the studies which have been published reveal the gradual progress toward a better understanding of the party's history, toward surmounting the obstacles posed for research and toward the dispelling of the myths protecting it like watchdogs.



There are many difficulties, and some of them are insurmountable immediately. But the worst foe of the historian and the individual interested in learning about the lines to which the present adheres is the perpetual postponement of the handling and disclosure of what is gradually being learned. The PCP's history is not an academic study, and cannot be treated with academic methods. It requires of the historian a particularly active and militant position. He must run the risk of making mistakes, making assertions which would be rash if they were to be checked, and of formulating dangerous hypotheses backed by little concrete evidence. This risk is the price that is paid for opening up the path: all the studies on the PCP will suffer from this ephemeral quality. But the party's history will only become known by writing about it, and by speaking louder than the silence that has enshrouded it.

At the present time in Portugal, two types of individuals are quite familiar with the PCP's history: its leaders and the PIDE-DGS [Security Directorate General] agents. While the one group is silent, the others will speak, precisely because there will then be room for its voice. In opposition to this sinister Manichaeism, the individuals who do not agree that the past belongs to a half dozen neophytes and to the police, have an obligation not to remain silent.

Table 1

Number of Texts Included in the PCP's Collected Works

	1921-39	1940-50	1951-60	1961-74
The PCP and the union struggle	2	22	12	23
The PCP and the youth	-	3	3	14
The PCP and the struggle for agrarian reform	-	2	1	3
The diary of the workers of democracy	3	18	7	18
Total	5 3.8%	45 34.3%	23 17.5%	58 44.2%

Table 2

Date	No of Members	Observations	Source
1921	c. 1,000 (PCP) and 260 (JC)		Joao G.P. Quintela, For the History of the Communist Movement in Portugal, Porto, 1976
1922	2,900 (of which 1,702 paid dues)		Minutes of the Four IC Congresses, Petrograd-Moscow, Hamburg, 1923
1923	c. 300	Estimated from number of delegates to the First Congress	O COMUNISTA, 7, 12, III, 1923, and Humbert Droz, From Lenin to Stalin
1924	700		Annie Kriegel, The Workers Internationals, Paris, 1966
1928	70 (30 in Lisbon and 20 in Porto)		The IC's Activity from the Fifth to the Sixth Congress, Paris, 1928
1929	49 (29 in Lisbon)	This figure should be compared with the circulation of O PROLETARIO, the party's legal newspaper in 1930: 6,000 copies with 3,500 subscribers	O MILITANTE, Oct-Dec 1970
1933	50		12th Plenum of IKKI, Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1933
1935	over 400		Bento Goncalves, Duas Palavras
1943	c. 1,200	"The party's members have increased to over three times the number cited by Bento Goncalves in 1935, reaching the highest figure recorded until then in clandestinity"	O MILITANTE, December 1973
1946	c. 4,800	Quadrupled since 1943	
1945 1947	c. 7,000	The maximum reached during the entire period of clandestine status	Manuel Garca/Lopes Mauricio, 1. selgado Case, Lisbon, 1978

Date	No of Members	Observations	Source
1951	c. 1,000		Idem
1957		Circulation of AVANTE! is nearly 8,000 copies, and that of O MILITANTE is 5,000 copies. The latter circulation should be twice the number of party members	Information Bulletin (Communist Activities), Supplement No 16, 1958
1967	2,000		World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, 19th Annual Report, 1967
1973	between 2,000 and 3,000		Neil McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, Lisbon, 1977
2909			
CSO:	3101		

## PROCEEDINGS OF SECOND WORKERS COMMISSIONS CONGRESS

## Agenda, Assessment

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Oct 80 p 10

[Text] Fidel Alonso was reelected secretary general of the Madrid CCOO [Workers Commissions] at the close of its Second Congress on 10, 11 and 12 October. Securing a relative majority for the Executive Committee was the list of candidates headed by the new secretary general; the list headed by Juan Moreno took second, far ahead of a third led by Jose Sanchez. The congress was marked by heightened tension among the delegates as a result of the various options available and because in-depth discussion was lacking in connection with the most immediate challenges before the union: union elections and collective bargaining.

When the presiding officer at the congress, Alfredo Boronat, adjourned the Saturday 11 October session at 500 hours, immediately after making known the results of the elections for secretary general and the Executive Committee, the delegates rose and amid a dense silence in vivid contrast to the atmosphere that had marked the debate prior to the elections, left the AISS building, where the plenary sessions were held, with their concern reflected on their faces.

The Second Congress of the Madrid CCOO was held with union elections upcoming and collective bargaining not far behind. Nevertheless, the debate, and a harsh one it was, centered around who ought to be the union's new secretary general and who should sit on the new Executive Committee.

The split became obvious at the opening session on Friday the 10th. The general report of the outgoing secretary general, which had been distributed beforehand and discussed at precongress assemblies, was passed by a slim majority. This also happened with the progress report that he submitted directly at the congress and that was debated there by the various delegations.

On Saturday the 11th, the various position papers on organization, finances, the crisis and union action were debated in committee, while the candidates committee hashed over the various proposals. The various choices were submitted at the full session that night: two for secretary general and three for the Executive Committee.

Even though it had been previously announced that the debate would be closed, even to the press, this did not happen, and there were almost as many guest spectators as delegates.



Finally, the vote was taken and the results made known.

The Sunday session, with attendance cut in half, was devoted to a discussion by the plenary of the proposals from the various committees.

#### Assessments

In response to questions from MUNDO OBRERO, Fidel Alonso said that "this congress has been fully representative of the feelings of CCOO members in Madrid. The discussions have been democratic, and the various choices have been debated in-depth. The voting was by a show of hands on the position papers, while secret ballots were used to elect officials. The fact that there were two candidates for secretary general, both members of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], does not mean that there are two approaches to union policy in the party; I look at it, instead, as the freedom of choice that individuals have to run for positions of responsibility in a specific mass organization."

MUNDO OBRERO also asked for the opinion of Juan Moreno, who told us this in connection with the tense atmosphere at the congress: "The tension began from the time that various unions made public their decision at the pre-congress assemblies to struggle for a change in the leadership team, including the secretary general, that had headed up the union until then.

"We are now going to struggle for a synthesis that will enable us all to work for the good of the union and of the workers, an objective that is possible if we really apply the confederation's policy in Madrid, which we all say we are agreed to do."

#### Officer Election Results

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Oct 80 p 10

[Text] Secretary general: Fidel Alonso, 281 votes; Juan Moreno, 208; abstentions, 7; invalid, 3.

Executive Committee: Candidate list of Fidel Alonso: 274 votes (19 members); candidate list of Juan Moreno: 214 (15 members); candidate list of Jose Sanchez: 18 (1 member); abstentions: 4; invalid, 2.

Makeup of the Executive Committee: For the majority list: Fidel Alonso, Macario Barja, Virgilio Heras, Jose Casado, Laureano Cuerdo, Jose Molina, Ana Trapiello, Rafael Torres, Manuel Fernandez, Jose Roldan, Jesus Cavanillas, Angel Campos, Santiago Carballo, Alejandro Guerra, Santiago Vidal, Ricardo Garcia, J.J. Lozano, Mariano Maroto and Felix Garcia.

For the minority list: Juan Moreno, J.J. Migallon, Teresa Nevado, Salce Elvira, Goyo Pimentel, Juan Senra, Maria Antonia Montero, Nati Camacho, Eduardo San Julian, Pedro Lopez, Francisco Hortet, Daniel Laguna, Susana Lopez, Luis Perez Rey and Luis Maria Gonzalez.

For the third candidate list: Jose Sanchez.

Total possible (delegates): 561. Votes cast: 499 (secretary general); 512 (Executive Committee).

Report from the outgoing secretary general debated at the preCongress assemblies and voted on at the first session, Friday the 10th: Yes, 198; No, 148; abstentions, 63.

Progress report from the outgoing secretary general debated by the delegates at the first session on Friday the 10th: Yes, 195; No, 182; abstentions, 46.



*Fidel Alonso.*



*Juan Moreno.*

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## CCOO OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY FOR LABOR UNION ELECTIONS

## CCOO Press Conference

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Oct 80 p 11

[Text] "We don't want the employers association and the UCD [Democratic Center Union] to go around advertising us as good chaps in connection with the elections now starting in the companies; rather, we want the workers to support our sense of responsibility and the consistency with which we have been working," said Julian Ariza at the press conference called last week by the CCOO to disclose the platform on which it is running in these important elections. Attending along with Ariza were Marcelino Camacho, Adolfo Pastor, Antonio Gutierrez, Vicente Campos and Manuel Gonzalez.

Camacho mentioned the press conference staged the day before by the UGT [General Union of Workers], at which Nicolas Redondo had said that the union's major objectives for the next period were the defense of the buying power of wages, maintaining job posts and extending and intensifying union power. "Those are also our objectives," Camacho said. "What the UGT has to do now is carry them out, not just defend them in theory. Since we seem to agree on the central issues, I invite our UGT comrades right now to sit down with us at the same table the day after the elections to discuss a way out of the crisis, because there can be no valid solutions for the workers without unity."

Camacho criticized the government, "which is boycotting the elections, using and abusing union assets, giving sites to some unions and not to others, granting economic aid and loans to a certain union against its one-time assets and, in short, doing all it can to prevent clear-cut results, and for a very simple reason: because CCOO is winning the elections."

Julian Ariza outlined the CCOO election platform by noting that "above all, we have explained to the workers what the cause of their problems is: the economic crisis and how the government is dealing with it, not something else."

"We also condemn the strategy pursued by the employers association and the UGT, with government cover, regarding the model agreement, as well as the Workers Statute and the Employment Law, because as a whole this package of laws has had very negative repercussions. You can see the alarming rise in the number of jobless workers, and when it comes down to pointing out the employment-generating measures in these laws, more than one minister, as well as employers and a number of labor leaders have sat there with their mouths open. We can clearly see that there aren't any.

"The union model is also at stake in these elections," concluded Ariza, who briefly outlined the CCOO election platform, the contents of which we offer in detail further on.

Adolfo Pastor talked about the money that has been invested and the general organization of the campaign: "It has cost us some 25 million," he said, "to which we would have to add another 10 million in specific outlays in the various regions and among the various nationalities. What we want to make clear is that the CCOO will finance its campaign with its own funds, without resorting to loans from anybody."

Adolfo Pastor also explained the results of the union elections held so far: "Ten percent of the workers have already voted, which we consider a representative sampling of voter trends. CCOO is reaffirming itself as the country's number one union, there is quite an increase in the number of nonaffiliates, and the UGT is dropping off." There is a report on the results later on in this article.

#### Labor Union Elections

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Oct 80 p 11

[Report by Francisco Herrera on union elections]

[Text] The moment of truth has arrived for labor union federations. The time has come to elect new delegates and shop committees, which were elected for the first time 2 years ago after the long night of the dictatorship.

At the 1978 elections, 3,806,339 workers from 55,967 companies elected 191,284 delegates. CCOO won 42 percent of them, thus becoming the country's leading union, followed by the UGT with 26.9 percent and nonaffiliates with 14.7 percent.

The delegates and shop committees were elected to 2-year terms. Hence, new elections had to be held in 1980. During the first few months of the year, the government, the employers association and the UGT itself showed some resistance to the election of new union representatives. The CCOO, on the contrary, pressed at all times for the elections mandated 2 years prior. Despite the refusal of the other forces involved, it kept on pressing for elections wherever it could.

Finally, last June the CCOO and UGT reached an agreement to hold union elections throughout the country from 15 October to 30 November, 1½ months to establish the union balance of power for the next period and probably for many years to come. Ballots will be cast at this election by some 6 million workers, a bit less than half of the active population, from 175,000 companies to select 330,000 delegates.

The significance of this event has led MUNDO OBRERO to feature it in this week's issue. We are reporting on the press conference that the CCOO called last week to kick off its campaign; we are publishing the results from the 1978 elections and the 1980 returns so far; we are reporting in detail on the CCOO



election platform; we are bringing back the ongoing section on "Labor Movement Issues" that worked out so well for us during the presummer months in which we offered it, and parallel to these issues we are covering the Second Congress of the Madrid CCOO.

#### Main CCOO Election Objectives

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Oct 80 p 11

[Article by Hector Maraval Gomez and Enedina Alvarez]

[Text] Labor Movement Issues: What We Are Playing for at These Elections

We are now in the home stretch of the election process, and over the next few weeks the attention of the workers, of the unions and also of the country's political and social forces is going to be largely focused on how these second free union elections develop.

Last week, in presenting the basic planks of its election campaign platform, the Confederated Secretariat of the CCOO made public the results, as computed according to IMAC records, of the union elections held so far this year. The returns, which we list in this same issue of MUNDO OBRERO, clearly show that the CCOO is garnering a majority.

In light of these returns, which have just begun to trickle in but which are nonetheless significant because of the size of the sample, now seems a good time to make a number of remarks on the scope of these elections.

In discussing the far-reaching importance of these elections, we are thinking about the close relationship between the majority union model in our country and ways of surmounting the crisis, and in this regard the CCOO and the UGT agree in their analyses.

We are not going to repeat here the well-known arguments about the role that class unionism must play in future sector overhauls, in the process of joining the EEC, in the consolidation and furtherance of democracy in labor relations, in the construction of a more democratic economic development model and, in a nutshell, in gradually creating the conditions for a negotiated and markedly progressive solution to the crisis.

In this connection, we can set forth and summarize our first basic idea as follows: keeping the CCOO as the country's leading union force is a firm guarantee that a solution to the crisis will be accompanied by substantial gains for workers. This is not just a slogan or statement of wishful thinking. It is based on facts proven not only during the time when the CCOO was the decisive factor in the resurgence of the labor movement in our country (its role during the transition) but also and particularly in more recent times, when union pluralism was, furthermore, already a reality.

Today, therefore, when even CCOO comrades make a profoundly negative assessment of the results of 4 years of democracy, they are implicitly underestimating

the major labor mobilizations over these years and questioning whether the CCOO's union policies have secured positive results for the workers. Put another way, they feel that big capital has imposed its policy without restrictions and without paying attention to significant labor struggles. In making such assertions, which could be defensive and, in the long run, demobilizing, they are overlooking a number of issues that we would like to discuss briefly here.

### Progress Has Been Made

Perhaps the most clear-cut struggle has been in connection with the Workers Statute, as it has been led exclusively by the CCOO. Without questioning the correctness of rejecting the whole of the statute, neither can we truthfully say that this is precisely the statute that big capital was demanding. The elimination of Section 4 (employer lockout and labor disputes), the constructive modifications in Section 3 (limiting the attack on the bargaining power of the committees and establishing the legal leverage of unified action by 51 percent of the delegates and 60 percent of the bargaining committee), and the few (though some of them are significant) modifications of the original text of Section 1 can be regarded as closely connected with our opposition to the statute. It is another matter whether later on we were unable to capitalize on the rejection that we voiced, at times without much qualification.

The blockage of the Strike Law and the employer lockout, which the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] has repeatedly demanded; the slowdown of the plans to return companies to private hands and to cut social security; the very limits placed on a law as reactionary as the Employment Law, which is far from what capital wants and has achieved in other Western countries; the indecision regarding a number of sector revampings, which are not turning out to be the military parade that the employers association needs and are being accomplished much more easily in France, for example; the appreciable rise in initial employer offers because of our presence at the AMI bargaining table; the substantial wage boosts in the 1970's, which are without parallel in the other EEC countries and which the press has recently highlighted (these wage gains are tied to the collective bargaining that was conducted mainly by CCOO men and women during these years); the spread of collective bargaining to all sectors and spheres of the nation: all of these developments are conclusive evidence that the presence of the CCOO, its capacity for organization and mobilization and its determination at the bargaining table have secured clear-cut, tangible benefits for the working class.

Although it is not our intention to engage in exultant analyses that overlook the harsh reality of the costs of the crisis, mounting unemployment, the capabilities of the political forces of big capital during the transition period or the attempts at a reactionary reading of the constitution, it is nevertheless true that the CCOO has been the biggest stumbling block that capital has encountered in its bid for an authoritarian, reactionary solution to the crisis. Although we do not set enough store in this at times, the country's other political and social forces clearly realize it.

Thus, we are witnessing an objective confluence of a patchwork of interests to diminish our status as the number one union as much as possible. Some want to accomplish their objectives in connection with the crisis (and to do this they need unions receptive to a social pact policy), while others want to establish an Anglo-Saxon model for our country in the medium term, in which they would be one of the groups taking turns in government (and to achieve this goal, it is vital for them to be backed by their union, which, in turn, must be the largest one in the country).

### The Strengths of the Rightwing

Thus we can see why election regulations are being issued with obvious political input, at the request and to the specifications of the UGT (restrictions on the construction sector, where the CCOO has a clear majority, not figuring in the elections prior to 15 March 1980 for institutional purposes, publication of final results...); why distasteful anticommunist films are being shown in prime time on the biggest viewing days; why detailed reporting is done on UGT and USO (Workers Trade Union) activity while anything in reference to the CCOO is hushed up as much as possible, and why local sites are now being returned to the UGT and loans are being granted to the USO, thus openly discriminating against the CCOO.

The right has two union cards that it can play in different ways. In some instances it promotes the shadowy USO of Zaguirre and in others it discourages candidacies that might overshadow the UGT, especially among technicians and middle-level personnel, thus wagering everything on one aim: to lessen the presence of the CCOO, because, we stress, they clearly grasp our rallying capacity and our determination at the bargaining table.

### The CCOO's Strengths

We have to say this openly to the workers: in spite of our shortcomings and our difficulties in joining with the masses at certain moments, the CCOO has been the decisive factor in seeing to it that the crisis has not had an even more serious impact on Spanish workers. The CCOO is a union that can point to concrete results; our union has created problems for the reactionary plans of big capital, of the CEOE, not for workers.

We must also say that unified action by the CCOO and the UGT is not only desirable in principle but furthermore, it is a basic condition for achieving a negotiated settlement of the crisis. Here and today, this means that only on the basis of a clear majority for the CCOO will we be able to cease pursuing our own contrasting policy, which is the leitmotif of UGT conduct. Only in the event that the CCOO consolidates its majority will the UGT be able to alter its much-deliberated policy with respect to relations with us.

In short, although we have no reason to doubt the UGT's determination to achieve a progressive solution to the crisis, its determination will be even firmer to the extent that the majority presence of the CCOO leads all of our country's workers forward with every passing day.

So then, we would summarize our second basic idea as follows: maintaining the CCOO as the country's leading union force is the best guarantee of a unified CCOO-UGT policy and of a strong stand by our country's unions in achieving a progressive solution to the crisis.

#### Defending Specific Interests

Moreover, we must not forget that a union model and the conditions for surmounting the crisis are not the only things to be decided at these elections. We are also deciding how we are going to defend the interests and resolve the specific problems of the workers on a daily basis in small, medium-sized or large companies.

And it is not a question of our returning to that lengthy tradition of a struggle for grievances by CCOO personnel in businesses, to the union practices even before we became a union, to the status of real experts in labor rights enjoyed by CCOO men and women, many of them ever since the years of the vertical union.

In each company today, the CCOO is the best guarantee that the committee and the delegates are going to settle problems, and not only because the delegates defend the committees at all costs and therefore have the greatest interest in seeing to it that the committees do an effective job for the workers. It is also because our policies as a union, based on the involvement of all workers in union activities, are consistent with the concrete and everyday realities of the working class and reflect a sensitivity and responsiveness to everything that affects workers in labor relations.

In the meantime, we are offered a unionism that is supposed to be capable of doing a good job; at present, however, this is inconsistent with the structural weakness that such unions suffer from. Moreover, based on their own views of union activity, they can do without the active involvement of the workers; thus, they are divorced from the realities of the working class and, in a nutshell, can neither take up nor resolve the workers' problems.

We must concede, however, that they have been able to portray themselves as representing the socioeconomic grievances of the workers and as capable of negotiating for and defending them. We, however, who through our thousands of members in companies really do defend the specific interests of the workers, as we have been doing in our collective bargaining activities, have often not been able to properly balance and relate these grievance-related actions with the union's overall prospects, with its sociopolitical dimension.

Thus, we would summarize our third major idea as follows: maintaining the CCOO as the nation's number one union force is the best guarantee that the daily impact of the crisis on the workers will be dealt with by CCOO delegates through strong, effective committees, through mass labor union methods and through a markedly participatory unionism.



## Surmounting the Crisis

Hence, we agree on the policy voiced at the recent major conference of Union Action: that in the long and difficult process of overcoming the crisis, we, as unions, are going to take action first in connection with the impact of the crisis on the working class. Moreover, we are going to help eliminate the causes of the crisis and defend the socioeconomic grievances of the workers by making them part of the overall aims of the struggle for an advanced society, for socialism.

In this regard, the majority presence of the CCOO on the committees guarantees, day after day and company by company, the defense of the specific interests of all workers. Furthermore, with its mass union methods, its desire for unity and its ability to organize, mobilize and bargain, it will gradually but decisively help to create the conditions for a negotiated and clearly progressive solution to the crisis.

## Election Results to Date

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 17-23 Oct 80 pp 14-15

[Text] As we have noted, the delegates and shop committees elected in 1978 had a 2-year term. This year, then, most of them were up for reelection. Early this year, both the employers association, the administration and the UGT itself seemed reluctant to hold elections. The CCOO, nevertheless, began pushing for elections throughout the country in the companies in which terms were concluding and in the firms that had not held elections in 1978. Little by little, it forced elections to be held where it had enough strength.

The election returns from Seat in April of this year, which were in the UGT's favor, changed the picture completely. The UGT people felt that their policy of an understanding with the government and the employers association, via the Workers Statute and the Inter-Confederation Model Agreement, was beginning to bear fruit and they moved quickly to reap their harvest in its full scope. Under a presummer UGT-CCOO agreement, union elections would be held throughout the country between 15 October and 30 November. And that is where we are now.

Throughout this year, however, and even during the last few months of 1979, unions have been holding elections. Some returns are in, and we are reporting them today to our readers, both the overall returns and those for companies with more than 1,000 workers. When the numbers begin rolling in, words become unnecessary. The CCOO is winning the union elections.

**(1) Los resultados de las elecciones del 80 (datos hasta el 31 de julio)**

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Empresas de más de 1.000 trabajadores (7)	79	271.912	3.183	1.469.148 (5)	924 (27%)	116 (3%)	816 (22%)	659 (16%)
Empresas de 251 a 1.000 trabajadores (8)	189	1.18.376	7.098	1.899.042 (5)	635 (33%)	120 (6%)	812 (42%)	660 (35%)
Empresas hasta 250 trabajadores (9)	2.440	127.869	9.048	3.461.143 (5)	816 (24%)	270 (7%)	2.076 (60%)	662 (19%)
TOTAL (todas las empresas) (10)	2.708	537.957	19.329	6.829.333 (5)	2.361 (34%)	506 (7%)	3.004 (44%)	1.981 (29%)

**Key:**

1. 1980 election returns (as of 31 July)
2. Number of companies
3. Number of workers
4. Total delegates
5. Nonaffiliated
6. Others
7. Companies with more than 1,000 workers
8. Companies with from 251 to 1,000 workers
9. Companies with up to 250 workers
10. Total (all companies)

**The Results of the 1978 Elections**

Free union elections were held in Spain in 1978 for the first time after 40 years of the Franco dictatorship. The government's total inability to guarantee a democratic monitoring of the results, the employers association's deliberate policy to create as much confusion as possible and the weakness of union organization at the time prevented the results of this historic election in our factories from being brought to light as clearly as they should have. Nevertheless, the CCDO was the clear-cut victor, with the UGT in second place, an obvious triumph for class unionism as these two federations established strong roots. The results naturally wound up coming to light, and we present them below, based on statistics furnished by the Labor Ministry and tabulated by the technical services of the CCDO. This is the first time that these results have been published, a scoop for our readers.

(1) TOTAL DE EMPRESAS											
(2)	(3)	(4)	CE/UTA (1)	UNIV (1)	UTD (1)	NO (1)	CE/UT (1)	No. all. (1)	Other ind. (1)	BLA/UTV (1)	
11 967	3 006 339	191 304	80 963 662.51	51 387 126.91	9 638 151	3 469 111.81	9 336 12.81	28 161 114.71	8 932 16.81	3 381 11.71	

(9) EMPRESAS DE MAS DE 1.000 TRABAJADORES											
Nº empresas	Trabajadores	Delegados	CE/UTA (1)	UNIV (1)	UTD (1)	NO (1)	CE/UT (1)	No. all. (1)	Other ind. (1)	BLA/UTV (1)	
301	771 582	12 681	4 781 137.81	3 384 1781	713 15.81	278 12 11	238 11.81	1 861 114.71	1 317 118.41	223 11.71	

Key:

1. All companies
2. Number of companies
3. Workers
4. Delegates
5. Confederation of Unitary Trade Unions of Workers
6. Nonaffiliated
7. Other unions
8. Basque Traditional Catholic Labor Union/National Confederation of Labor
9. Companies with more than 1,000 workers

## Relación de empresas con MAS DE 1.000 trabajadores a

[illegible]

**TOTAL:** <sup>(7)</sup>NUMERO DE EMPRESAS 49. <sup>(8)</sup>TRABAJADORES 271.511. <sup>(9)</sup>DELEGACIONES TOTALES 1.381. DE ELLOS 80% DE

no han realizado elecciones total o parciales en 1999[illegible]

CC-00: 1.489 (44%) - DE UUT: 934 (27%) - DE USO: 116 (3%) - NO APLICADOS: 414 (32%) - OTROS: 499 (14%)



**Key:**

1. List of companies with more than 1,000 workers that are holding or have held elections in 1980
2. Number of employees
3. Number of workers who have voted
4. Total delegates
5. Nonaffiliated
6. Others
7. Total number of companies
8. Total number of workers
9. Total number of delegates

8743

CSO: 3110

## UCD'S 'YOUNG TURKS' DISCUSS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, GOALS

Madrid BLANCO Y NEGRO in Spanish 23 Jun-1 Jul 80 pp 13-14

[Interview with seven "Young Turks," at a Madrid hotel, by Ana de Benavides; date not given]

[Text] Three months ago, five UCD (Democratic Center Union) deputies met at a dinner to talk over the internal structure of the party and the kind of pattern that they should follow. As the weeks went by, the dinners continued to be repeated, no longer with 5 deputies attending, but with many more; as many as 43 have been meeting every Tuesday since that date. At the beginning of June, the news burst into the newspapers: the "Young Turks"--as they call themselves--were beginning to make noise not only on the party level, but throughout the nation. Some hours later, Rafael Calvo Ortega, current secretary general of the UCD, "called the Turks to order" to ask them to dissolve; a call which did not sit well at all with them, since in the "Turks'" opinion, they could not be called an established group, but rather an open working team within which some members discuss the internal dynamics of the UCD.

As the days passed, the news took on some unexpected turns, which, according to some members of the "Young Turks," "have completely misrepresented the topic." That is why we wanted to find out what is behind this team, what its goals are, who its leader is, and what the consequences of its actions could be. It has not been easy to get them together. This journalist wanted to attend one of the dinners, but she was told that it was better to wait because of the turn which events had taken. Finally, after a series of steps, she was able to meet with seven "Young Turks" in a Madrid hotel. Jose Manuel Garcia Margallo, Nona Ines Vilarino, Jose Ramon Pin Arboledas, Antonio Fauras, Leon Buil, Ricardo Leon and Jose Luis del Valle will explain to BLANCO Y NEGRO's readers the origins, the background and the objectives of the "Young Turks" and the effects this group can have.

## Three Months Ago

"At that now famous first dinner"--says Garcia Margallo--"we started with the fact that when we deputies arrived in Congress we had no experience whatsoever. We believed that parliamentarians should share in the political decisions which affect the party, and we could see that our party, the UCD, has functioned during these years looking inward and without flexibility. Starting from this, some of us decided that the important thing was not to revive or crush factions, but rather to create an internal dynamic of democratization and participation. Our main

objective is to work together to arrive at conclusions and to create a forum in which the different tendencies of the UCD can express themselves."

Leadership: No

[Question] What is the structure of this team, and who is its leader?

[Answer] (Ricardo Leon speaks) We have no leader. The position of moderator rotates week by week. Moreover, we have no fixed structure. We are a group of people who, by means of analysis, questions and planning, are trying to create a force which will make the party function better.

[Question] There has been a great deal of criticism in the press....

[Answer] (Nona Vilarino speaks) If anything has distinguished its spontaneous origin, it has been its positive character. Naturally, positions have been criticized at the meetings, but people have never been directly attacked. We have always acted in the assurance that internal pluralism is the essence of the UCD.

"Turks" and "Barons"

[Question] It has been said, on repeated occasions, that the "Young Turks" have come into being with one basic purpose: to attack the "barons." What is the truth?

[Answer] The "barons" are an important asset to the party, and some of us are convinced that we would vote for many of the "barons." What may have given rise to the misunderstanding is that we do not accept those "barons" as part of the party structure. We have a responsibility to those who elected us and to our districts. Therefore, if some "barons" block our performance in parliament we have no other recourse than to take action.

Intellectuals in the Party

[Question] In one of the "papers" prepared by the "Young Turks," there is talk of the need for the party to penetrate more into the fabric of society so as to reach the masses more deeply....

[Answer] We are trying to create a complex dynamic, and therefore tension is necessary at times so that things may go well. We need advanced ideas as a prelude to specific decisions.

[Question] And what might those elements of tension be?

[Answer] Intellectuals must come into the UCD; they undoubtedly could contribute creative advanced ideas. On the other hand, the new membership of the UCD is very important, with its eagerness and new assets which we are failing to take advantage of at this time. We should study the problems of joint management in enterprises; we should also study the cultural and labor world. If we do not consider these elements, the party runs the risk of becoming sterile.

## We Are Not Fascists

[Question] Into what ideology would you fit yourselves, since there are some who have criticized the "Young Turks" as being the "social-Francoists" and "fascists" of the UCD?

[Answer] They cannot brand us as fascists either because of our political origins or because of our democratic planning. These assertions are so fantastic and unreal that they are not even worth denying. In any case, how can people whose main goal is for the party to function democratically be called fascists? Those who say that our objectives are mediocre are asserting that any democratic project is mediocre.

[Question] Could it be that fear, among certain sectors of the party, is the factor that has motivated these statements?

[Answer] We do not know if anyone is afraid, or who it is, and moreover we are not worried. An unforeseen factor has arisen which is going to create a different dynamic. This, without a doubt, does not sit well with certain gentlemen who are not interested in this dynamic, and who are trying to make us abandon the attempt by means of a perfectly orchestrated campaign.

[Question] But your actions could affect the debates at the second congress of the UCD....

[Answer] Without a doubt. One of our main objectives is for the second congress to take place inside the congress; for the opinions of the people to be revealed within the second congress, and not outside it.

## Suarez and the "Young Turks"

[Question] To what extent have the "Young Turks" arisen on the initiative of President Suarez?

[Answer] Those assertions are completely false. If anything has induced some of us to continue on in the group it has been impartiality: our goal is participation by all who make up the group. Suarez' political worth is very important to us, and we defend it, but it is a far cry from thinking that we originated at his instigation.

## 1983 Elections

[Question] Although the elections are still far off, could one of your objectives be to change the electoral spectrum between now and 1983?

[Answer] If we demonstrate a capacity for service, if we are steadfast and patient about the results, if we are realistic in our planning, we are convinced that we will contribute to altering the spectrum in 1983 in favor of a broader center, with more voters. But this is not our main objective; it is, on the contrary, that of imparting to the people the dream of creating a more modern and democratic state.

8131

CSO: 3110



## PAPER DISCUSSES VPK ROLE IN PALME'S NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Among their tasks, the Communists like to number the role of the driving force within the labor movement. Lars Werner could also have taken much of the credit Wednesday in the general debate in parliament on the declaration of no confidence against the Falldin government which the Social Democrats have now requested. Quite generously, Werner refrained from any dispute over his birth-right--and thank Marx for that! Werner's prayers could not have been more completely answered.

It is also correct that the Communists have worked hardest out among the people with petitions and agitation for the declaration of no confidence, which their own votes were not sufficient to bring about. However, they have received good help from that wing of the splintered Social Democrats, within which a number of newspapers have bombarded the leadership almost daily with demands for action.

Opposition, however, has been strong. It is no secret that LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] chairman Gunnar Nilsson is among those who have warned against a "spectacle." Even if Olof Palme never committed himself against a campaign in parliament, his enthusiasm has never been especially conspicuous.

There are now, however, some difficult questions which must finally be raised to escape their paralyzing effect. The Social Democratic parliamentary group was forced to pull itself together for a declaration of no-confidence in order to be done with this question for good. It threatened to dominate internal debate so much that all political issues of substance were in jeopardy of being pushed aside.

Thus, oddly enough, our first declaration of no confidence has come about more as a result of fatigue than as an offensive. Historic, many say--yes, if history may be as short as a decade! The institution has existed no longer than that! Votes of no confidence, however, are nothing new. This possibility was available to the government most recently--as even a Social Democrat with a good memory will remember--when the Erlander government wanted to push through a reestablishment of the sales tax.

The people demand, Olof Palme says. AFTONBLADET (Social Democratic), the editorial writer of which, metaphorically speaking, is crawling through the famous E-flat

corner to explain his sudden reversal, speaks of "popular indignation." But it is Social Democrats and communists who are behind the campaign. Only the firmly cemented Palme-Werner block reduces the government's majority to a single vote.

Let us return to AFTONBLADET. History may show, the newspaper writes, that the Social Democrats' declaration of no confidence was the factor that united them (the government parties).

In this case, history need be no longer than several hours to answer this question. It was a perceptibly fresh and battle-ready, well-composed and prepared trio of party leaders from the Falldin government that took both to the offensive and the defensive Wednesday. On every weak point--and there are many when it comes to the motives behind the declaration of no confidence--the duo of Palme and Werner was driven to retreat.

No one should doubt that this is a government that plans to emerge from this test of strength both victorious and strengthened and to change the no-confidence effort into a parliamentary vote of confidence in the three-party government. This chance for renewed legitimacy, which the Social Democratic-Communist block is offering, shall be taken advantage of.

Actually, Olof Palme has himself to blame. He has made it much too easy for the government. The declaration of no confidence is tied to savings plans and economic policies. The counterproposal will probably not be made until 6 November. Thus, Palme has voluntarily placed himself in the position of calling for a vote of no confidence against a policy that is rooted in the real world, which would mean confidence in an alternative that has not seen the light of day.

9336  
CSO: 3109

## SPECIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE BACHMANN ESPIONAGE CASE

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 24 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Marcel H. Keiser: "Suffering From the Bachman Case"]

[Text] The activities of General Staff Colonel Albert Bachmann remains mysterious: should a special commission of the federal assemblies now once and for all clear up the inconsistencies surrounding the Swiss intelligence service?

Official Bern is suffering visibly from the affair of the dubious intelligence service colonel, Albert Bachmann, and political body pains therefore have gripped the country's government, EMD [Federal Military Department] administration, party secretariats as well as the parliament in general, and the expanded military section of the National Council's business investigation commission in particular. Primarily on the basis of a report by Lucerne CVP representative Alfons Mueller-Marzohl, this last body is trying to discover connections which other authorities would prefer to keep under the lid. Circles of parliamentary commissars have so far only let on that the matter is extremely difficult to get a grip on, and requires much time for clarification.

A fundamental problem of the investigation is to expose the irregular methods practiced by Bachmann and his cohorts without in turn causing irreparable damage to the official secret service, whose findings our country needs urgently in these unsettled times. The close reciprocal entanglements surely make a sharp drawing of dividing lines almost like trying to square a circle.

The subdivision Intelligence Service and Defense (UNA)--its current division chief Richard Osner, not in the best of health, will soon resign--has been a state of ferment for years. This is so not in the least because of the carryings on of a certain Albert Bachmann: Captain Urs N., who at higher instances inquired into the colonel's communist past, was quickly transferred to the EMD accounting center where, subjected as before to a criminal investigation, he still is today.

Among those damaged by Bachmann are also Captains Walter A. and Marco B.; the boss had once even had Captain A., who in the meantime has left the UNA service, placed under arrest for alleged violation of military secrets. They are all alleged to have illegally exchanged information with one another, and beyond that were subservient to suspended Major Fritz Leuthi, an outright manic Bachmann enemy.

But, to be sure, on 20 December 1979, the accusations collapsed like a house of cards; on that day the chief auditor completely stopped all proceedings against A. and B., and against N. to the extent to which he was accused of having passed on military secrets to the other two captains as well as to Major Luethi.

Brigadier Raphael Barras flatly stated that it is "problematic to speak of unauthorized in cases where the same persons must or may officially (and unofficially) assume secondary functions in addition to their regular functions."

The highest officer of justice deems the delineation of the circle of those who are privy to "specific secrets" as "virtually impossible" in an organization of this type. There is "no ground whatsoever" for an indictment charging violation of military secrets when it is ascertained "that the proper superiors have taken cognizance of and tolerated the reciprocal exchange of information among coworkers in various sections."

"Astonished," the chief auditor observed that Bachmann had selected, of all people, bitter enemy N., who had been transferred for disciplinary reasons, as a go-between to get into contact with Major Luethi. Brigadier Barras was unable to gain a clear understanding of the strange customs among intelligence service members from "Colonel Bachmann's profusely twisted testimony." Surely, only criminal proceedings against the teacher of the blundering novice-spy Kurt Schilling could bring insight, but the DMB [director of the federal military administration] did not want to go along with such a move by a military examining magistrate.

Why is the DMV unfolding a protective cover? Such consideration strengthens in any case the bad suspicion that Bachmann enjoys protection at all levels because too many personalities in high positions inside and outside of the EMD are involved. The goal of department head Georges-Andre Chevallaz and General Staff Chief Senn appears to be to get rid of the calamitous colonel without the latter, dagger in hand, blazing intelligence secret abroad.

The affair has created a new phenomenon in Bern; the "Gnaegi syndroms." In a conversation taken down on tape, the former EMD chief emphasized to the WELTWOCHTE his deliberate abstention for the purpose of a "clear conscience" which would allow him to "sleep peacefully." But simultaneous references to a "storm" brewing at the time of the former General Staff Chief Johann Jacob Vischer and to reservations on the part of the military delegation discredited the pensioner's statements, transforming them into a purely protective assertion.

Bachmann financed the activities in part by money from outside the department, as G.A. Chevallaz revealed for the first time in a WELTWOCHTE interview. According to an official "language adjustment," imposed after this explosive revelation, the federal president was aiming solely at means which emanated from a remaining fund of the, during World War II legendary Hausamann organization.

But the predecessor to the post, Gnaegi, frequently spoke of an additional 50,000 francs with whose origin he was not concerned, which, to quote the pensioner's original words, "came perhaps from a bank." Stubbornly circulating rumors purport, moreover, that monetary funds of the former Shah-police Savak reached Bachmann via the French secret service SDECE; influx from South Africa is also mentioned. Should



this state of affairs prove correct, the affair would turn into an outright scandal, which also threatens if the self-appointed subversives-hunter Ernst Cincera were drawn into it, and there are indications pointing to his assistance.

Colonel Bachmann was not the small fish to which interested circles want to demote him now. He was in charge of a "special intelligence service in the process of being built;" until last year he directed the special service which organized the resistance in the interior of the country, that planned temporary posts for the Federal Council in Spain, Brazil and Ireland. Once he even sought to drive the official intelligence service out of areas near the border: the ZOL (Zone operative limitrophe) project luckily disappeared, after two attempts, into a drawer; otherwise the parliament would today be faced with a still greater UNA chaos.

9011

CS0: 3103

## EFFORTS TO ATTRACT EXCHANGE INTENSIFY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Nov 80 p 9

[Text] Intense efforts are being made to attract into this country foreign exchange savings accounts belonging to Turkish workers but which are deposited in foreign banks. It is stated in an edict prepared on this matter that there are disparities between present interest rates on foreign exchange accounts opened in Turkey and those rates on the international market. It was noted, therefore, that a restructuring of foreign exchange accounts is in order.

An official stated that the goal is to pump into Turkey the foreign exchange savings accounts of workers abroad that are deposited in foreign banks. He said with regard to the edict:

"Authorized banks up to now have not been paying interest on foreign exchange deposit accounts opened for true and legal persons residing abroad and in Turkey in return for foreign exchange which did not have to be sent to Turkey. Now efforts are being made to apply interest in line with rates given on the international market to foreign exchange account deposits. These rates will apply to accounts being opened or which have been opened for true and legal persons residing only in Turkey in return for foreign exchange which does not have to be brought in. There are also efforts to make these accounts workable as well as to introduce a realistic procedure."

According to information received, those who work abroad are to be regarded as residents of this country. Therefore, should workers abroad desire, they can open such an account in Turkey. On the other hand, officials stated that banks in Turkey are under no obligation to conform with this edict. They said, "Banks that wish can implement the foreign exchange deposit account procedure; those that do not, need not."

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